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In recent years, an increasing number of countries have passed corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting regulations for all or a subset of listed firms. An important 
feature of the CSR reporting regulations worldwide is that the regulations are relatively 
soft in the sense that most countries pass disclosure regulations that contain ‘comply-or-
explain’ provisions. This dissertation contains three distinct studies that collectively 
examine economic and behavioral consequences of CSR reporting regulations. Study One 
surveys a large empirical evidence in accounting, finance, economics, law and management 
to evaluate the impact of CSR reporting regulations on (i) reporting quality, (ii) capital-
markets and (iii) firm behavior. The survey indicates that CSR reporting regulations 
generate significant costs for affected firms around legislative events leading up to the CSR 
regulations. The survey also indicates that the CSR reporting regulations cause significant 
changes in firm behavior, and lead to improved social and environmental performance of 
affected firms. However, reporting and disclosure quality remain low. Based on this, Study 
Two experimentally investigates how comply-or-explain disclosure regulations affect 
managers’ disclosure recommendations of a negative event affecting the firm’s underlying 
economics. Results reveal that managers are more likely to make disclosure of a negative 
event in a comply-or-explain regulatory system relative to a voluntary regime. In addition, 
the impact of comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure judgements is larger 
when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown than when it is known to be biased 
toward no disclosure. Finally, Study Three reports the results of an experiment examining 
investors’ reactions to the incorporation of CSR performance measures in regulated 
financial reports relative to reporting CSR measures in standalone CSR reports. Results 
show that reporting CSR measures in standalone CSR reports triggers stronger reactions 
from investors, such that the influence of CSR information on investors’ firm value 
estimates are stronger when CSR information is reported in a separate report relative when 
integrated in a financial report. Further, more investors misclassified CSR information as 
assured when integrated in a financial report relative to when reported in a separate report. 
Consequently, misclassifying investors rated credibility of CSR information higher and 
derived higher firm value estimates compared to investors who correctly classify this 
information as non-assured. Overall, studies in this dissertation inform the international 
CSR reporting regulations and standard-setting process.      
 
Keywords:  Regulation; Disclosure; Sustainability; Corporate Social Responsibility 










1.1 Background  
In recent years, an increasing number of countries have mandated corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting for all or a subset of public listed firms1 (Christensen, Hail, 
and Leuz 2019; Ho 2017; Sarfaty 2013). Regulators in several countries have also 
introduced CSR reporting standards and frameworks as part of enhanced disclosure 
reforms. One important motivation of the CSR reporting regulations and standards is the 
understanding that increased transparency puts pressure on firms, and potentially 
constrains undesirable corporate behavior. The CSR reporting regulations are, however, 
relatively soft in the sense that most countries implement reporting regulations that contain 
“comply-or-explain” clauses (Ho 2017). 
Early studies focus on capital-market reactions to CSR reporting regulations, and 
find that firm value of affected firms significantly declines around legislative events 
leading up to the CSR reporting regulations in several institutional settings (Chen, Hung, 
and Wang 2018; Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017). A 
separate line of research documents real effects of the CSR reporting regulations 
(Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann 2019), consistent with the 
reporting regulations generating changes in firm behavior such as reductions in carbon 
emissions and workplace fatalities (Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Downar et al. 2019; 
                                                          
1 The CSR reporting regulations require disclosure of various CSR and sustainability topics including 
employee safety, social performance, greenhouse gas emissions, human right abuses, product material 
sourcing, and extraction payment to foreign governments, climate change disclosures among other 
issues. 
2 
Gramlich and Huang 2017). However, evidence on the impact of CSR reporting regulations 
and frameworks on reporting quality is still scarce.  
This dissertation expands research on CSR and sustainability reporting by 
examining the behavioral implications of CSR reporting regulations on managers’ and 
investors’ judgements. Prior literature has largely focused on the implications of CSR 
reporting in voluntary settings. The next section provides an overview of the studies in this 
dissertation.  
 
1.2 Studies in the Dissertation 
This dissertation contains three distinct studies that collectively examine economic and 
behavioral consequences of CSR reporting regulations. This chapter introduces the studies 
in this dissertation and briefly describes how the studies fit together and collectively 
contribute to important accounting and public policy issues. 
Study One surveys a growing empirical research across five disciplines to evaluate 
economic and behavioral consequences of CSR reporting regulations. Specifically, Study 
One focuses on the impact of CSR reporting regulations on (1) reporting quality (2) capital-
markets and (3) firm behavior. Study One also describes major developments leading up 
to the CSR reporting regulations in major institutional settings.  
Study One finds that the stated objectives and enforcement level of CSR reporting 
regulations vary systematically across countries. Empirical studies show that the 
regulations generate significant costs for affected firms around legislative events leading 
up to the CSR reporting regulations. Growing empirical evidence also supports real effects 
following the regulations, specifically changes in firm behavior which give rise to social 
externalities. Given the worldwide move to CSR reporting regulations, conclusions in 
3 
Study One provide a broader set of important considerations for cost-benefit analyses of 
the different types of CSR reporting regulations. 
An important finding in Study One is that reporting quality continues to be low after 
the CSR reporting regulations have been implemented in various institutional settings. In 
addition, most countries pass CSR reporting regulations that contain ‘comply-or-explain’ 
clauses. Comply-or-explain disclosure regulations allow firms to forego compliance with 
disclosure requirements provided that they explain reasons of non-compliance.  
A natural question that arises is: How does comply-or-explain disclosure regulation 
affect managers’ disclosure recommendations? Study Two of this dissertation examines 
this question using an experiment with experienced corporate managers. Drawing on 
motivated reasoning theory with insights from reason writing literature in psychology and 
legal research, Study Two predicts and finds that comply-or-explain disclosure regulation 
constrains the delay of bad news CSR disclosures. Specifically, managers are more likely 
to make disclosure of a negative event affecting the firm’s underlying economics in a 
comply-or-explain regulatory system relative to a voluntary regime. In addition, the results 
reveal that the effect of a comply-or-explain regulation on managerial disclosure judgement 
is larger when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown than when it is known to be 
biased toward no disclosure. Mediation analyses further indicate that comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulation increases managers’ perceived accountability which in turn drives 
their disclosure recommendations. Study Two contributes to the comply-or-explain 
literature, research on CSR reporting, and the broader disclosure literature. A detailed 
discussion of the contributions of Study Two is provided in Chapter 3.   
Another finding in Study One is that the international CSR reporting regulations 
give rise to alternative CSR reporting frameworks across countries. For example, South 
Africa and the UK mandate integrated reporting, while other countries such as China and 
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Singapore require the publication of standalone CSR reports. The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks public feedback for several CSR reporting policy 
questions including “How important to investors is integrated reporting, as opposed to 
separate financial and sustainability reporting?” (SEC 2016, p. 214). The final and third 
study of this dissertation explores this question using an experiment with investors.  
Specifically, Study Three examines how the integration of CSR performance 
measures in regulated financial reports, relative to reporting CSR measures in standalone 
separate reports, affects investors’ firm value estimates. Guided by theories in cognitive 
psychology such as theory of ‘category construction’, results of Study Three show that 
CSR information has a greater impact on investors’ firm value estimates when this form of 
information is reported in a separate report than when integrated in a financial report. 
Additional analyses indicate that integrating CSR measures in financial reports causes 
investors to misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured, consistent with category 
construction theory that categories evoke people to treat items of the same category as 
equivalent. As a result, misclassifying investors rated credibility of CSR disclosure higher 
and arrived at higher firm value estimates relative to investors who correctly classified CSR 
information as non-assured. Collectively, the findings of Study Three highlight important 
caveats of integrated reporting, and should be informative to global regulators such as the 
SEC who are presently considering alternative CSR reporting frameworks. The 
implications and contributions of Study Three are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.   
Taken together, this dissertation shows that CSR reporting regulations are not 
homogenous across countries, with some countries implementing comply-or-explain 
reporting regulations while other countries introduce more stringent mandatory reporting 
requirements. The CSR reporting regulations also give rise to alternative CSR reporting 
frameworks. Experimental results show that comply-or-explain regulation causes 
5 
managers to make disclosure of a negative CSR event affecting the firm’s underlying 
economics, consistent with reason writing theory. However, CSR disclosure has a greater 
impact on investors’ judgements when reported in a separate report relative to when 
integrated in a financial report. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
This section introduces the grand contributions of this dissertation as follows. First, Study 
One describes CSR reporting regulations worldwide, and finds that the objectives of CSR 
reporting regulations vary systematically across countries or regimes. For example, the 
CSR reporting regulations in more advanced countries such as the EU and UK focus on 
“reporting outcomes” such as comparability and transparency of disclosure reports whereas 
CSR reporting regulations in developing economies such as China, India and South Africa 
primarily focus on “welfare outcomes”, specifically poverty alleviation and environmental 
preservation. Since the regulatory objectives vary across countries, what constitutes 
“intended” versus “unintended” consequences varies as well. Specifically, capital-market 
effects of CSR reporting regulations appear to be of first-order (second-order) importance 
in developed (developing) economies, whereas real effects in the form of social 
externalities seem to be of first-order (second-order) importance in developing (developed) 
countries. In sum, Study One emphasizes that (i) institutional details are crucial when 
considering consequences of CSR reporting regulations and (ii) exploiting these details 
allows for useful “narrow-sample” evidence (Christensen 2019) – two insights that inform 
research on CSR reporting regulations. 
 Second, Study Two contributes to the accounting literature and existing policy 
questions by considering how comply-or-explain disclosure regulation affects managers’ 
evaluations of new disclosure matters. Comply-or-explain regulation, previously used as a 
6 
corporate governance mechanism, is increasingly presented as an alternative regulation to 
voluntary or line-item disclosure requirements worldwide. An important feature of the 
comply-or-explain regulatory system is that firms can forego disclosure but must provide 
an explanation if disclosure is not provided. Consistent with reason writing theory, Study 
Two shows that managers are more likely to recommend disclosure of a negative event in 
a comply-or-explain regulatory system than in a voluntary regime. As predicted by 
motivated reasoning and accountability theories, however, the effect of comply-or-explain 
regulation on managers’ disclosure recommendations is larger when the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy is unknown than when it is known to be biased toward less disclosure. 
Study Two provides initial evidence on how and when comply-or-explain regulation 
affects managers’ disclosure recommendations. An important contribution of Study Two 
is that it adds to the voluntary versus mandatory disclosure regulatory dichotomy that has been 
the focus of prior accounting research. 
Finally, Study Three informs the international CSR reporting regulations by 
highlighting potential costs of integrating CSR measures in regulated and audited financial 
reports. Specifically, Study Three shows that integrating CSR measures in financial reports 
causes investors to misclassify non-assured CSR measures as assured, consequently 
affecting investors’ perceived disclosure credibility and firm value estimates. This finding 
has implications for global regulators considering alternative CSR reporting frameworks, 
and especially responds to the SEC’s question of “How important to investors is integrated 






1.4 Dissertation Structure  
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first study of 
this dissertation and surveys a large empirical evidence across five disciplines. Chapter 3 
reports the results of an experiment with corporate managers examining the impact of 
comply-or-explain disclosure regulations on managers’ disclosure judgements. Chapter 4 
presents the final and third study of this dissertation investigating how integrating CSR 
performance measures in regulated financial reports affects investors’ firm value estimates. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and provides a summary of the main research findings 
as well as theoretical, policy and practical implications of the research findings. Chapter 5 
also highlights several limitations of the studies in this dissertation which raise 
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In recent years, a growing number of countries have mandated Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) reporting for all or a subset of listed firms. We survey a large 
empirical evidence in accounting, finance, economics, law and management to evaluate the 
impact of CSR reporting regulations on (1) reporting quality (2) capital-markets and (3) 
firm behavior. We also describe major developments leading up to the CSR reporting 
regulations in major institutional settings. We find considerable heterogeneity in the stated 
objectives and enforcement level of the regulations across countries. Empirical studies 
concentrate on capital-market reactions and show the regulations generate significant costs 
for affected firms around CSR legislative events. However, affected firms experience 
positive valuation outcomes over time via reductions in information asymmetry. There is 
limited evidence supporting improvements in reporting quality after the regulations. 
Growing empirical evidence supports real effects, specifically social externalities of CSR 
reporting regulations. Our survey presents a broader set of important considerations for 
cost-benefit analyses of the international CSR reporting regulations. We conclude with a 
number of future research suggestions. 
 
 
Keywords:  CSR; Reporting Regulation; Reporting Quality; Economic Consequences; 












2.1 Introduction  
Prior research provides evidence that reporting and disclosure regulations have important 
economic consequences (e.g., Bushee and Leuz 2005; Dhaliwal 1979; Lee, Strong, and 
Zhu 2014; Lo 2003; Zhang 2007). However, the main focus of prior research has been the 
economics of financial reporting regulations (Leuz and Wysocki 2016) or financial 
regulation in general (Coates 2014; Cochrane 2014). In this study, we survey growing 
empirical studies across five related disciplines that examine economic and non-economic 
consequences of non-financial reporting regulations, specifically corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting regulations. At the outset, we emphasize that the literature 
we survey in this study examines consequences of a broad CSR reporting regulations that 
are imposed on publicly listed firms, as opposed to prior CSR literature which focuses on 
voluntary CSR and/or a more targeted, industry-specific environmental reporting 
regulations2.  
The CSR reporting regulations have been implemented in a growing number of 
jurisdictions (Ho 2017; Sarfaty 2013), and coincide with current debates on whether 
disclosure of a wide-range of CSR matters should be mandated (Berger-Walliser and Scott 
2018; de Villiers and van Staden 2011; Ho 2018). These regulations have been 
implemented in major economies including the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom 
(UK), China, India and many other developing countries3. In the United States (US), as 
discussed more detail in the paper, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does 
not mandate CSR reporting on a standalone basis, but instead incorporates this form of 
                                                          
2 Throughout the paper, we use “CSR reporting” for consistency purposes. However, the literature we 
survey uses various terms commonly used in practice including sustainability reporting, environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) reporting, conflict mineral reporting, integrated reporting or more 
generally non-financial reporting (Huang and Watson 2015).  
 
3 A number of developing countries such as South Africa, Malaysia, Brazil, Indonesia and many others 
have also mandated CSR disclosure for all or a subset of public listed firms.  
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reporting into securities regulations and requires disclosure of “material” matters including 
CSR issues (SEC 2010, 2016). However, specific sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (hereafter, Dodd-Frank Act) contain 
disclosure provisions that mandate CSR disclosures for certain US firms and industries. 
We begin our survey by describing major developments leading up to the CSR 
reporting regulations and implementation in major institutional settings. Specifically, we 
describe the stated objectives and enforcement level of the CSR reporting regulations 
across different jurisdictions. We then review and assess empirical studies in accounting, 
finance, economics, law and management that examine broad research questions about the 
effects of CSR reporting regulations in various institutional settings4. Following prior 
studies (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Andrew and Baker 2020), we classify the empirical 
studies into three broad categories: Studies focusing on (1) reporting and disclosure quality 
effects (2) capital-market effects and (3) real effects of the CSR reporting regulations5. The 
overarching objective of this study is to (i) establish a common ground for researchers 
interested in studying consequences of CSR reporting regulations (ii) synthesize empirical 
evidence on the effects of CSR reporting regulations on various outcomes, and (iii) identify 
directions for future research. Throughout the paper, we draw on prior studies that examine 
consequences of reporting and disclosure regulations in the past with a specific focus on 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) studies, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) adoption literature, and industry specific environmental reporting 
regulations. We refer to these literatures to highlight similar research-design challenges 
common in regulatory studies. 
                                                          
4 Given studies that examine consequences of CSR reporting regulations are still at an early stage, we 
follow prior studies and include in our review both published as well as working papers (see e.g., 
Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). 
 
5 Following Leuz and Wysocki (2016, p. 530), we define real effects of reporting regulation as situations 
in which affected firms change their behavior in the real economy as a result of the reporting regulation.  
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Five important insights emerge from our survey. First, we find that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the CSR reporting regulations across jurisdictions, both in 
terms of stated objectives as well as reporting models. Specifically, the stated objectives of 
CSR reporting regulations reflect the socio-economic development and goals of the 
implementing country. For example, CSR reporting regulations in more advanced 
economies such as the EU and UK focus on “reporting outcomes” such as comparability 
and transparency of disclosure reports whereas CSR reporting regulations in emerging 
economies such as China, India and South Africa primarily focus on “welfare outcomes”, 
specifically poverty alleviation and environmental preservation. There is also considerable 
variation in reporting enforcement level and CSR reporting models across countries. 
Specifically, we identify two major forms of CSR reporting models across jurisdictions (1) 
“comply-or-explain” and (2) mandatory regimes6. We posit that this heterogeneity in CSR 
reporting regulations across countries is an important consideration for the development of 
research questions and the interpretation of empirical results, particularly generalizability 
of empirical results across institutional settings.  
Second, we find that empirical studies concentrate on capital-market effects of CSR 
reporting regulations. Event studies almost unanimously find that firm value of affected 
firms significantly declines around legislative events leading up to the CSR regulations in 
various institutional settings7 (Birkey et al. 2018; Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Grewal, 
Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; Hombach and Sellhorn 2019; Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017), 
                                                          
6 We distinguish between the “comply-or-explain” and “mandatory” CSR reporting regulations in that 
the latter does not provide affected firms the option to opt out disclosure, but rather requires them to 
provide mandatory disclosures on their CSR activities either in the form of issuing standalone CSR 
reports or integrating in financial reports. We note that some countries such as the UK and South Africa 
adopt CSR disclosure regulations that contain both “comply-or-explain” and “mandatory” clauses.  
 
7 An important feature of the CSR reporting regulations is that most implementing countries impose the 
regulations on a subset of firms. This presents researchers an attractive quasi-natural experimental 
setting to examine capital-market effects, real changes in firm behavior and the associated societal 
benefits and costs of the reporting regulations. 
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consistent with capital-markets perceiving CSR regulations as bad news. However, 
affected firms experience positive valuation outcomes over time (Ioannou and Serafeim 
2017; Jadiyappa, Iyer, and Jyothi 2019; Krüger 2015), consistent with increased CSR 
disclosure reducing information asymmetry (Hung, Shi, and Wang 2013; Krüger 2015). 
Empirical evidence on other economic outcomes such as liquidity (Barth et al. 2017; 
Kajueter, Kerkhoff, and Mauritz 2019), firm profitability (Bhagawan and Mukhopadhyay 
2018; Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Mukherjee, Bird, and Duppati 2018), and cost of 
capital (Gong, Xu, and Gong 2018; Zhou, Simnett, and Green 2017) is inconclusive. Our 
review indicates that the capital-market outcomes from CSR reporting regulations are 
confined to a group of firms – and is mainly driven by firms who had not previously 
engaged in CSR activities (Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019). 
Third, there is growing empirical evidence supporting real effects of CSR reporting 
regulations (Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann 2019; Gramlich 
and Huang 2017). For example, studies provide evidence showing that CSR reporting 
regulations are associated with (1) increases in CSR ratings and spending of affected firms 
(Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann 2019), (2) decrease in 
emissions and pollution levels (Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Downar et al. 2019; Gramlich 
and Huang 2017), (3) better internal control decisions (Barth et al. 2017), and (4) decreases 
in employee injuries and fatalities (Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Christensen et al. 2017). 
However, the real effects of CSR regulations are not homogenous across firms or industries 
and, again, depend on various industry and firm-specific factors including affected firms’ 
pre-regulation CSR reporting and performance records (Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann 2019; 
Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019). 
Fourth, our review indicates that the empirical evidence is both consistent with the 
intended and unintended consequences of CSR reporting regulations. A number of studies 
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find that CSR reporting regulations impose substantial costs on firms but create societal 
benefits (Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Christensen et al. 2017; Tomar 2019), indicating a 
trade-off between profitability and social responsibility. Other studies also provide early 
evidence showing that the reporting regulations backfire and impose significant costs on 
vulnerable societies (e.g., Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Emerson 2017; Parker, Foltz, and 
Elsea 2016; Parker and Vadheim 2017). Given these trade-offs, it remains an open 
empirical question whether CSR regulations generate net benefits or costs on society as a 
whole (Coates 2014). 
Finally, studies find no significant improvements in reporting and disclosure 
quality after CSR reporting regulations. Specifically, early evidence suggests that firms 
continue to be selective of their CSR disclosures post CSR reporting regulations, with a 
continued use of boilerplate language in CSR reports (Chauvey et al. 2015; Haji 2013; Setia 
et al. 2015). Other studies also argue that CSR disclosures reflect symbolic rather than 
substantive response to CSR reporting regulations (Birkey et al. 2018; Schwartz 2016; 
Solomon and Maroun 2012). The latter observation that CSR disclosure is motivated by 
corporate legitimation strategies is consistent with the main conclusions in the voluntary 
CSR literature (for an early exception see e.g., Guthrie and Parker 1989). Further, effects 
of CSR reporting regulations on qualitative properties such as credibility, comparability 
and accessibility of CSR disclosure reports is unclear (Ackers 2017; Ioannou and Serafeim 
2017). The lack of evidence supporting reporting quality improvements after the CSR 
reporting regulations does raise valid questions as to what is driving the positive economic 
outcomes observed in capital-market research. That is, potential capital-market benefits of 
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reporting regulations (e.g., reductions in information asymmetry) should supposedly stem 
from improvements in reporting and disclosure quality8.  
Our insights are important for the following reasons. First, several prior studies 
surveyed the vast and growing CSR literature (e.g., Erkens, Paugam, and Stolowy 2015; 
Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015; Huang and Watson 2015; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 
2009; Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Liu 2018). However, these surveys focused on empirical 
studies that provide evidence based on a voluntary setting. In contrast, we focus on 
empirical studies that examine mandatory CSR reporting. Our study most closely relates 
to a concurrent paper by Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2019) who survey the vast CSR 
reporting literature with a focus on the economic effects of CSR reporting standards in the 
United States. We complement their survey and focus on the potential consequences of 
CSR reporting regulations internationally. Further, we link the empirical findings in 
different institutional settings to the stated objectives of the specific CSR reporting 
regulation, and determine whether the empirical evidence is consistent or inconsistent with 
the stated objectives of CSR reporting regulations (for a similar approach see e.g., 
Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013). 
Second, extant literature on the economics of reporting and disclosure regulations 
largely focuses on more developed financial markets, primarily the US and continental 
Europe. In this study, we survey empirical evidence on the capital-market and real effects 
of reporting regulations in “nontraditional institutional settings” (Leuz and Wysocki 2016, 
p. 533). Because a key objective of CSR reporting regulations in developing countries is to 
                                                          
8 This observation is similar to previous conclusions drawn from financial reporting and disclosure 
regulations. For example, see Coates and Srinivasan (2014) for a review of SOX literature, Koch, 
Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2013) surveys Regulation FD studies, and other papers review the IFRS 
adoption literature (e.g., Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013; De George, Li, and Shivakumar 2016; 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007). In addition, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) surveys the broad literature on 
financial reporting regulations. The key conclusion is that empirical studies of reporting and disclosure 
regulations attribute a number of economic benefits to reporting regulations, but provide limited 
evidence that supports reporting quality improvements (e.g., comparability and transparency).  
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improve public welfare, we synthesize empirical evidence on the welfare implications of 
CSR regulations in settings where the reporting regulations are directly linked to welfare 
outcomes. Our survey also indicates that (i) institutional details are crucial when 
considering consequences of CSR reporting regulations and (ii) exploiting these details 
allows for useful “narrow-sample” evidence – two insights that inform early research on 
CSR reporting regulations.   
Third, our survey of the mandatory CSR reporting literature complements and 
extends prior reviews that historically focused on the economics of financial reporting and 
disclosure regulations (Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013; Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Importantly, we highlight the implications of mandated CSR 
reporting for the broader information environment, both within and across firms (Beyer et 
al. 2010). Although financial and CSR reporting share some important features, a key 
difference is that CSR disclosure audience and the uses of this information are much 
broader (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2019). Our review indicates that CSR reporting 
regulations generate important economic benefits for affected firms including positive 
valuation outcomes. Importantly, our review shows that the positive valuation outcomes 
for affected firms are mainly due to reductions in information asymmetry (i.e., capital-
market channel) rather than improvements in operating performance (i.e., real effect 
channel) (Hung, Shi, and Wang 2013; Krüger 2015). We provide comprehensive review of 
the international empirical CSR reporting literature and synthesize important reporting, 
economic and behavioral implications of CSR reporting regulations9.  
Finally, we inform ongoing CSR reporting regulations around the world. 
Specifically, our survey provides a broader set of important considerations for cost-benefit 
                                                          
9 Further, we suggest alternative interpretations of the documented findings and highlight research 
design-issues that have recently taken at centre stage in academic research, in particular issues of 
identification and drawing causal inferences (Coates and Srinivasan 2014; Glaeser and Guay 2017; 
Gow, Larcker, and Reiss 2016; Leuz 2018).   
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analyses of CSR reporting regulations. Our insights also inform ongoing CSR reporting 
standard setting and CSR reporting guidelines. Currently, a number of nonprofit 
organizations such as the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) promote 
enhanced reporting and disclosure frameworks (IIRC 2013, 2017). Similarly, the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) recently published a set of 77 codified 
industry-specific CSR standards in which investors and companies can use to identify and 
integrate financially-material CSR matters (SASB 2018). The main conclusions of our 
survey support these ongoing initiatives of CSR reporting frameworks and standard-
setting, and should be informative to the IIRC and SASB campaigns. Specifically, our 
survey indicates that CSR reporting regulations alone may not increase reporting and 
disclosure quality, and that CSR standards and reporting guidelines are important 
instruments for improving reporting quality. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview and 
developments of CSR reporting regulations in major institutional settings. In Section 3, we 
briefly discuss theoretical background of reporting regulations regarding reporting quality, 
capital-market outcomes and real effects.  Section 4 reviews studies that examine 
consequences of CSR reporting regulations. We focus on studies that examine (i) reporting 
quality (ii) capital-market reactions and (iii) real effects of CSR reporting regulations. In 
Section 5, we provide a number of future research directions and suggestions for 
researchers that are interested in studying consequences of CSR reporting regulations. 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2.2 CSR Reporting Regulations in Major Institutional Settings 
Prior literature has often described CSR as voluntary actions by companies that are not 
required by law. For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 117) define CSR as 
20 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that 
is required by law”. The CSR reporting regulations represent a setting in which CSR 
practices of a firm are no longer voluntary but are simply required by the law. In this setting, 
Berger-Walliser and Scott (2018) re-define CSR as those corporate actions, or processes 
that consider the impact of corporate actions on affected stakeholders, which are 
undertaken at least in part because of a recognized moral or ethical duty to society and 
stakeholders beyond shareholders. 
A growing number of countries have passed CSR reporting and disclosure 
regulations in recent years (Ho 2017; Sarfaty 2013). Unlike the more targeted, industry-
specific environmental reporting regulations in the past (e.g., Toxic Release Inventory), the 
recent CSR reporting regulations require public listed companies across various industries 
to file comprehensive disclosures covering environmental, social and governance matters. 
In this section, we describe major developments leading up to the CSR reporting 
regulations and implementation in a growing list of countries. We have undertaken a review 
of CSR reporting regulations in a number of jurisdictions and this is reported in Table 2.1 
of Appendix A. However, we have restricted our discussion in the paper to major 
institutional settings and those leading this type of regulatory change10. Specifically, we 
focus on three aspects of the CSR reporting regulations: (1) stated objectives of the 
regulations (2) level of enforcement and type of reporting regulations and (3) assurance / 
audit requirements. 
                                                          
10  For the purposes of this paper, we define ‘major institutional settings’ as those countries or 
jurisdictions with sizeable economy or population. We include South Africa as it is a leading country 
in the global movement of enhanced reporting reforms. 
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2.2.1 CSR Reporting Regulations in Developed Countries 
The EU passed CSR disclosure Directive 2014/95 on April 2014, and became effective 
from 1st January 2017, or during calendar year11 (EU-Directive 2014). European public 
listed firms are required to report on broad CSR matters including policies, risks and 
outcomes about environmental matters, social and employee aspects, respect for human 
rights, anticorruption issues, and diversity in their board of directors among other metrics12. 
Consistent with financial reporting objectives of the EU, the stated objective of the CSR 
Directive is to “increase the relevance, consistency and comparability of information 
disclosed by certain large undertakings and groups across the Union” (EU-Directive 2014, 
p. 4). Also consistent with the EU’s capital-market objectives of reporting regulations, the 
CSR Directive is a “step towards reaching the milestone of having in place by 2020 market 
and policy incentives rewarding business investments in efficiency under the roadmap to a 
resource-efficient Europe” (EU-Directive 2014, p. 3). 
As the EU adopted a disclosure ‘Directive’ rather than ‘regulation’, affected firms 
have considerable discretion and therefore disclosure requirement is effectively on a 
‘comply-or-explain’ basis (Aureli, Magnaghi, and Salvatori 2019; Christensen, Hail, and 
Leuz 2019). The Directive does not also delineate consequences or penalties imposed on 
the affected companies for non-compliance. Interestingly, the Directive also requires 
auditors to state in their audit report whether their client firm provided the CSR disclosure 
statement. An EU commission has recently issued a non-mandatory reporting guideline to 
assist firms to transition into the new reporting requirements (EU-Commission 2017).  
                                                          
11 The EU CSR Directive applies to large listed firms and “public-interest entities” with 500 or more 
employees, and with either more than EUR 20 million of total assets or more than EUR 40 million of 
sales. Public-interest entities are firms listed on EU stock exchanges, insurance companies, non-listed 
banks and companies designated by EU Member States as public-interest entities due to their size, 
activities or industry. Before the EU’s CSR reporting directive, individual member states such as France, 
Spain and Denmark required public listed companies to provide CSR disclosures. 
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In the UK, new CSR disclosure regulations coded as the ‘Strategic Report’ under 
the Companies Act 2006 were approved in August 2013 which came into force on 1 
October 2013 (Act-Companies 2013). The Strategic Report replaces a previous ‘comply-
or-explain’ CSR disclosure regulation in the UK and requires large listed companies to 
prepare a Strategic Report for each financial year13. The Strategic Report must contain (1) 
a fair review of the company’s business, and (2) a description of the principal risks and 
uncertainties facing the company. Specifically, affected companies must provide 
information on (1) environmental matters such as greenhouse gas emissions, (2) the 
company’s employees and (3) social, community and human rights issues in their annual 
reports. Consistent with financial reporting objectives of the UK, the stated objective of the 
Strategic Report is to “inform members of the company and help them assess how the 
directors have performed their duty under section 172 (i.e., duty to promote the success of 
the company) (Act-Companies 2013, p. 22). Failure to comply with this act is an offence 
committed by every person who was registered as (i) a director of the company 
immediately before the end of the period for filing the report for the specific financial year, 
and (ii) failed to take all reasonable steps for securing compliance with that requirement. 
On conviction, a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum applies. Audit or assurance of 
CSR reports is not mandatory under the new disclosure requirements. 
Parallel with the Strategic Report, the Modern Slavery Act (MSA) was separately 
passed in the UK in 2015, which imposes additional disclosure requirements on listed UK 
firms satisfying specific size threshold (MSA 2015). The MSA includes a Transparency in 
Supply Chains (TISC) clause which mandates firms that conduct businesses in the UK with 
a total global annual turnover of £36m additional reporting requirements. Specifically, the 
                                                          
13 The directors of a company must prepare a strategic report for each financial year if the company is 
(i) a parent company, and (ii) the directors of the company prepare group accounts. The strategic report 
must be a consolidated “group strategic report” relating to the undertakings included in the 
consolidation. Small companies need not prepare a strategic report. 
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MSA requires affected companies to issue an annual slavery and human trafficking 
statement for each financial year. In this statement, affected firms must provide information 
on specific steps the firm has taken during the financial year to ensure that slavery and 
human trafficking is not taking place (i) in any of its supply chains, and (ii) in any part of 
its own business. Otherwise, affected firms must prepare a statement that the organization 
has taken no such steps (MSA 2015). The stated objective of the MSA disclosure regulation 
is to “make it absolutely transparent what action a business is or is not taking and will allow 
investors, consumers and the general public to decide who they should and should not do 
business with” (Home-Office 2015, p. 66). Assurance, however, is not required under the 
MSA disclosure requirements. 
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) adopts a ‘comply-or-explain’ corporate 
governance and CSR reporting system (also known as the “if not, why not” approach) 
(ASX 2019). Specifically, Principle 7.4 of the Australian corporate governance code states 
that “a listed entity should disclose whether it has any material exposure to environmental 
or social risks and, if it does, how it manages or intends to manage those risks” (ASX 2019, 
p. 27). Listed firms can satisfy this requirement by simply issuing integrated reports or 
sustainability reports, although issuance of such reports is not mandatory. The ASX defines 
material exposure as the “real possibility that the risk in question could materially impact 
the listed entity’s ability to create or preserve value for security holders over the short, 
medium or longer term” (ASX 2019, p. 27). However, the ASX does not provide specific 
reporting guidelines to firms, specifically regarding the identification of “material” risks. 
Assurance is also voluntary.  
In the US, the SEC does not mandate CSR reporting on a standalone basis, but 
instead incorporates this form of reporting into securities laws and requires disclosure of 
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“material” matters including CSR issues14 (SEC 2010). Nonetheless, the SEC 
acknowledges that there is a growing desire for greater disclosure of a variety of public 
policy and CSR matters, and states that these matters are of increasing significance to 
investors’ voting and investment decisions (SEC 2016). Specifically, the SEC (2016, p. 
213) sought public feedback for several questions regarding potential CSR reporting 
mandate including “If we were to adopt specific disclosure requirements involving 
sustainability or public policy issues, how could our rules elicit meaningful disclosure on 
such issues?”.  
Despite absence of a standalone CSR disclosure regulation, specific sections of the 
Dodd-Frank Act contain several clauses that mandate CSR disclosures for certain US listed 
firms. These sections are Section 1502, 1503 and 1504. Section 1502 requires publicly 
listed US firms to file a Conflict Minerals Report (CMR) and Specialized Disclosure Report 
(Form SD) with the SEC from 2014 and provide conflict mineral disclosures, specifically 
their use of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold (3TGs) in their products and supply chain. 
Firms are required to determine and disclose if their products are sourced from conflict 
minerals originating from Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or an adjoining 
country, collectively known as the Covered Countries15. The SEC requires an audit for 
firms that claim their products are free of conflict minerals from the DRC (Sankara, 
Lindberg, and Razaki 2015). Firms, however, have discretion to engage auditors for either 
an attestation engagement or a performance audit (Herda and Snyder 2013). The objective 
                                                          
14  The SEC is concerned that adopting CSR disclosure requirements “may have the goal of altering 
corporate behavior, rather than producing information that is important to voting and investment 
decisions” (SEC 2016, p. 212). The concern here arises because the SEC does not have a congressional 
mandate to pursue altering corporate behavior. 
 
15 The Covered Countries as defined by the Dodd-Frank Act are: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia. 
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of this disclosure regulation is to curb human rights violations in Central Africa by forcing 
US firms to disclose whether they are sourcing their products in an ethical manner.  
Section 1503, on the other hand, requires SEC-registered mining firms to disclose 
their mine-safety performance records in regulated financial reports. Finally, Section 1504 
required US extractive firms to provide extraction payment disclosures detailing payments 
to all foreign governments in which they operate. However, the US Congress repealed 
Section 1504 in 2017 (Hombach and Sellhorn 2019; Schneider, Michelon, and Paananen 
2018). 
 
2.2.2 CSR Reporting Regulations in Developing Countries 
A growing number of developing economies have passed CSR reporting regulations. China 
has mandated CSR reporting for a subset of listed firms in December 2008, specifically 
firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). 
Affected firms are required to issue a separate standalone CSR report starting from fiscal 
year 2008. Specifically, affected firms are required to provide information on (1) protection 
of the interests of shareholders and creditors (2) protection of workers’ rights (3) protection 
of suppliers, customers and consumers (4) environmental protection and sustainable 
development (5) public relations and social welfare services and (6) social responsibility 
problems and corrective action plans. Both exchanges explicitly state that firms will be 
delisted and publicly condemned if they fail to issue a separate CSR report. The aim of the 
CSR reporting regulation is consistent with the Chinese government’s recent attempts to 
control increasing levels of environmental pollution and “building a harmonious society” 
(Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018). However, audit or assurance of CSR reports is not required 
under the CSR reporting regulation.  
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In South Africa, the Institute of Directors in South Africa (IoDSA) issued a series 
of corporate governance and disclosure reforms, known as King Reports in 1994 (King I), 
2002 (King II), 2009 (King III) and 2016 (King IV). The King Reports strongly emphasize 
importance of CSR disclosures as part of national development goals. In particular, the 
IoDSA issued King III and mandated integrated reporting16 for all firms listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2009, effective from March 2010 on a “comply-or-
explain” basis (IoDSA 2009). In 2016, the IoDSA upgraded the disclosure mandate from 
“comply-or-explain” to “comply-and-explain”. The governance reforms, and in particular 
the implementation of integrated reporting in South Africa, reflect the social setting of 
South Africa and are part of larger government policies intended to tackle social and 
economic inequalities following apartheid in South Africa (De Villiers, Rinaldi, and 
Unerman 2014). Specifically, listed firms are required to file annual integrated reports 
detailing “how a company has, both positively and negatively, impacted on the economic 
life of the community in which it operated during the year under review; and how the 
company intends to enhance those positive aspects and eradicate or ameliorate the negative 
aspects in the year ahead” (IoDSA 2009, p. 44). The reporting and governance reforms are 
also expected to significantly enhance South Africa’s reputation and competitiveness in 
global financial markets, as well as inflow of foreign direct investments. King III required 
“combined assurance”17 as well as independent external assurance on CSR disclosures on 
a “comply-or-explain” basis (Ackers and Eccles 2015; IoDSA 2009). However, external 
                                                          
16 The King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) defines integrated reporting as “a 
holistic and integrated representation of the company’s performance in terms of both its finance and its 
sustainability”. 
 
17 Combined assurance also known as ‘‘three lines of defense,’’ is defined as “integrating and aligning 
assurance processes in a company to maximize risk and governance oversight and control efficiencies, 
and optimize overall assurance to the audit and risk committee, considering the company’s risk appetite” 
(IoDSA 2009, p. 49). Combined assurance integrates assurance from management, internal and external 
auditors. 
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assurance of CSR disclosure requirement is subsequently relaxed in King IV issued in 2016 
(Ackers 2017). 
India has legislated a unique CSR regulation in August 2013 under the Companies 
Act on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. Unlike other countries, the CSR regulation in India 
requires firms that meet certain size or profitability thresholds to spend 2% of their average 
net income of the last three years on specified CSR causes (Companies-Act 2013). In 
addition, affected firms must publicly disclose an official CSR policy and report their CSR 
activities during the year in their annual reports18. Consistent with national goals to 
alleviate poverty, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs specified a number of CSR areas in 
which affected firms should direct their CSR spending on including education, health care, 
poverty eradication, environment, arts, gender equality, reducing inequalities among other 
areas (Dharmapala and Khanna 2018). Affected firms are not penalized for failing to spend 
on CSR activities. However, firms must explain in their annual reports reasons for failing 
to spend on CSR causes. Failure to explain shall result in monetary fine on the company 
and its officers, with default company officers potentially facing up to three years in prison. 
Audit or assurance on CSR spending or disclosures is not required. 
A growing list of other countries have mandated CSR reporting for all or a subset 
of listed firms. These countries include Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan. We summarize key developments and implementation 
of the international CSR reporting regulations in Table 2.1 of Appendix A. 
 
                                                          
18 The CSR mandate in India also requires affected firms to make changes in board structure. 
Specifically, affected firms are required to form a CSR board committee consisting of three or more 
directors, of which at least one member must be an independent director. 
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2.2.3 Summary of CSR Reporting Regulations 
We summarize a number of key observations from the international CSR reporting 
regulations. First, there is clear differences in the stated objectives of the reporting 
regulations across countries, largely due to differences in socio-economic development and 
national interests of implementing countries. The stated objectives of CSR reporting 
regulations in economically developed nations such as the EU and UK are consistent with 
financial reporting objectives (e.g., transparency and comparability) and capital-market 
outcomes (e.g., resource-efficient markets) (Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013). In 
contrast, the primary objectives of CSR reporting regulations in developing economies 
such as China, India, South Africa and other similar economies focus on “welfare 
outcomes”, specifically social and environmental outcomes such as poverty alleviation, 
environmental conservation, and human rights violations – consistent with the socio-
economic development and national goals of these countries.  
We posit that the heterogeneity in the stated objectives of CSR reporting regulations 
across countries is an important consideration for the generation of research questions and 
the interpretation of empirical results in specific institutional settings. Specifically, capital-
market effects of CSR reporting regulations appear to be of first-order (second-order) 
importance in developed (developing) economies, whereas real effects in the form of social 
externalities seem to be of first-order (second-order) importance in developing (developed) 
countries. Further, the nature and considerable variations of CSR reporting regulations 
across countries “localizes” the empirical evidence to only the studied settings (Leuz 2018; 
Leuz and Wysocki 2016). However, we note that local evidence can sometimes be useful 
and applicable to other settings, especially if these settings share important institutional 
characteristics.      
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Second, we find two major types of CSR reporting regulations: (1) ‘comply-or-
explain’ system and (2) mandatory regime, with most countries introducing comply-or-
explain regulations19. Countries such as the UK and South Africa, however, adopt CSR 
regulations that contain both ‘comply-or-explain’ and mandatory clauses, thereby creating 
a ‘hybrid’ form of CSR reporting regulation. From our survey, it remains an open empirical 
question how alternative forms of CSR reporting regulations (i.e., comply-or-explain 
versus mandatory regimes) affect reporting quality, capital-markets and firm behavior20.  
Third, our observations suggest that enforcement of CSR reporting regulations is 
remarkably weak in most jurisdictions. An important finding in prior research investigating 
effects of reporting regulations, specifically the IFRS adoption literature, is that potential 
effects of reporting regulations are driven by concurrent changes in reporting enforcement 
(Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2013; Daske et al. 2008). It is unclear how CSR reporting 
regulations would have significant reporting quality, capital-market and/or real effects 
without concurrent changes in the supporting infrastructure, especially considering the 
‘comply-or-explain’ clauses in most countries and the broad range of CSR disclosure topics 
and audience. 
Fourth, we observe that the CSR reporting regulations in most countries do not 
require independent external assurance on CSR disclosures. The EU-Directive (2014, p. 
                                                          
19 It is less clear what is driving the widespread adoption of comply-or-explain disclosure regulations. 
However, it appears that the adoption of comply-or-explain regulations is motivated by an understanding 
that such regulatory systems remedy the one-size-fits-all concerns of mandatory disclosure regulations 
- particularly for broad governance and/or disclosure topics such as CSR performance disclosures - 
while also addressing problems of voluntary disclosure regimes by way of putting pressure on firms to 
explain their CSR performance. 
 
20 Specifically, little is known about the effects of a “comply-or-explain” disclosure regulation. Prior 
literature examines effects of a “comply-or-explain” governance and the empirical evidence is heavily 
mixed. For example, several studies find that the comply-or-explain regime is associated with high 
compliance rate (Akkermans et al. 2007; Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud 2010). However, other 
studies find the opposite, and conclude that the comply-or-explain regime is ineffective (Andres and 




33) broadly states that “statutory auditors and audit firms should only check that the non-
financial statement or the separate report has been provided”, but does not mandate an audit 
or assurance of the disclosures21. Similarly, the South African King IV principles require 
combined assurance on a comply-or-explain basis. Finally, the SEC requires independent 
audit under Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank Act for firms that conclude their products are free 
of conflict minerals from the DRC. Despite these exceptions, independent assurance of 
CSR reports remains voluntary in most implementing countries.   
Fifth, we find that the CSR reporting regulations give rise to alternative CSR 
reporting formats across countries. For example, South Africa and the UK mandate 
integrated reporting, while other countries such as China and Singapore require the 
publication of standalone CSR reports. The EU and Australia are flexible about CSR 
reporting format, as long as affected firms provide CSR disclosures. The SEC seeks public 
feedback for several CSR reporting policy questions including “How important to investors 
is integrated reporting, as opposed to separate financial and sustainability reporting?” (SEC 
2016, p. 214). 
Finally, there is limited regulatory and/or professional guidance for affected 
companies in implementing and addressing CSR reporting requirements. In particular, 
most CSR reporting regulations do not provide reporting guidelines or standards for 
affected firms. There is some evidence that shows implementation of CSR reporting 
guidelines enhances CSR disclosure quality. For example, Tauringana and Chithambo 
(2015) find that the introduction of a CSR reporting guideline in the UK increased the level 
of CSR disclosures. Similarly, Berkman, Jona, and Soderstrom (2019) document that 
climate risk disclosures were less useful to the market prior to the issuance of an SEC 
                                                          
21 EU member states have the choice to mandate assurance on non-financial reports. For example, France 
mandates assurance on environmental disclosures since 2012. 
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guidance in 2010. Moreover, Michelon, Pilonato, and Ricceri (2015) show that the 
voluntary adoption of GRI guidelines by a sample of UK firms is associated with increased 
CSR reporting quality, specifically reporting comparability, precision and balance – 
consistent with reporting guidance improving reporting quality.  
Despite absence of specific reporting guidelines in most jurisdictions, we note that 
a number of countries have published general, voluntary CSR reporting guidelines. For 
example, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK has published a non-binding 
reporting guidance to “encourage preparers to consider how the strategic report fits within 
the annual report as a whole, with a view to improving the overall quality of corporate 
reporting” (FRC 2018, p. 33). The EU has also released a similar non-binding reporting 
guidelines that provide general, principles-based, guidelines to help affected companies 
“disclose non-financial information in a relevant, useful, consistent and more comparable 
manner” (EU-Commission 2017, p. 44). Other countries such as South Africa also provide 
similar non-mandatory general guidelines in the implementation of CSR reporting 
mandates (De Villiers, Rinaldi, and Unerman 2014). Further, most jurisdictions also allow 
affected companies to align their CSR reporting with other national or international 
reporting frameworks22. However, despite these general guidelines, CSR reporting 
regulations lack specific disclosure and reporting guidelines, potentially giving firms and 
managers considerable discretion over their CSR disclosures. Another general concern of 
allowing firms to follow alternative reporting frameworks is that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in these frameworks, potentially reducing the comparability of CSR 
disclosure reports which is an important objective of CSR reporting regulations. 
 
                                                          
22 These reporting frameworks include the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), IIRC Framework, and SASB. 
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2.3 Theoretical Background   
As discussed above, the underlying motivations of CSR reporting regulations considerably 
vary across countries depending on the socio-economic development and national interests 
of implementing countries. In this section, we briefly discuss theoretical foundations of 
reporting regulations as they relate to important outcomes of CSR reporting regulations 
(i.e., reporting objectives, capital-market outcomes and real effects). As our focus is on 
reviewing empirical evidence, we do not attempt to provide a thorough coverage of 
alternative theories on disclosure regulations, but instead describe theoretical links between 
reporting regulations and expected outcomes23.   
 Voluntary disclosure theories generally conclude that firms provide disclosures 
when the benefits exceed the costs (Verrecchia 1983). Accordingly, voluntary disclosure 
regimes are often associated with information asymmetries which introduce adverse 
selection problems into capital-markets (Verrecchia 2001). As a result, market liquidity 
declines as uninformed investors trade less frequently or exit the market to avoid possible 
losses from trading with the informed counterparties (Leuz and Wysocki 2016; Verrecchia 
2001).  
Economic theory posits that mandatory disclosure requirements mitigate adverse 
selection problems by increasing the overall amount of information available to investors 
(Fu, Kraft, and Zhang 2012; Healy and Palepu 2001). Prior empirical studies show that 
reduction in information asymmetry or increased reporting quality has important economic 
consequences including, among others, lower cost of capital (Chen, Dhaliwal, and Xie 
2010; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), increased market liquidity (Lang and Maffett 2011; Leuz 
and Verrecchia 2000), higher investment efficiency (Biddle et al. 2011; Schleicher, 
                                                          
23 Leuz and Wysocki (2016) provide a useful synopsis of theoretical links between disclosure regulations 
and several capital-market outcomes such as liquidity and cost of capital.   
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Tahoun, and Walker 2010) and improvements in price formation (McMullin, Miller, and 
Twedt 2019).  
The real effects channel is consistent with disclosure regulations indirectly affecting 
corporate decision-making (e.g., resource allocations) because the increased transparency 
stemming from disclosure regulations allows outside parties to more effectively monitor 
firms (Cormier, Lapointe-Antunes, and Magnan 2015; Kanodia 2007; Kanodia and Sapra 
2016). Accordingly, disclosure regulations or voluntary commitment to high disclosure 
affect operating performance and investment efficiency of firms (Kanodia 2007; Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016). In a CSR setting, reporting regulations could generate social externalities 
as firms are required to disclose their social and environmental records (Christensen, Hail, 
and Leuz 2019). 
However, empirical evidence on whether disclosure regulations actually improve 
reporting quality and the information environment is mixed. For example, evidence from 
Regulation FD – which the SEC introduced to level the playing field among different 
investors – is mixed.  Several studies find a decrease in the level of information asymmetry 
after Regulation FD, consistent with the regulation creating a more level playing field for 
all investors (Chiyachantana et al. 2004; Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman 2004; 
Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009). In contrast, other studies find a decline in the overall 
amount of information, consistent with a “chilling effect” on information flows24 (e.g., 
Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira 2007; Sidhu et al. 2008; Wang 2007). The IFRS adoption 
and SOX studies also provide mixed results on improved reporting quality (Brüggemann, 
Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013; Coates and Srinivasan 2014; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). 
                                                          
24 Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2013) provide a detailed survey of the Regulation FD literature, 
and discuss identification challenges in Regulation FD studies as the regulation applies to all US firms. 
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From the above discussion, it is clear that despite strong theoretical links between 
high quality reporting and positive economic outcomes, empirical evidence on whether 
reporting regulation improves reporting quality is less conclusive. As discussed in Section 
2.3, the international CSR reporting regulations have several appealing characteristics that 
allow us to further explore and understand the theoretical expectations of reporting 
regulations. From a research design perspective, most countries impose the CSR reporting 
regulations on a subset of firms, effectively providing researchers a local control group of 
firms unaffected by the reporting regulations in estimating various outcome variables. Prior 
financial reporting regulations such as Regulation FD, IFRS and SOX Act do not enjoy this 
important feature. However, an important challenge is that most CSR reporting regulations 
are less enforced, and follow the ‘comply-or-explain’ system.    
 
2.4 Consequences of CSR Reporting Regulations   
In this section, we review empirical studies in accounting, finance, economics, law and 
management to assess economic and non-economic consequences of CSR reporting 
regulations in various institutional settings25. We classify the empirical studies into three 
main categories. In the first category, we review empirical studies that examine reporting 
and disclosure quality effects of the CSR reporting regulations. We also summarize 
empirical evidence that focuses on effects of the regulations on CSR disclosure assurance. 
The second stream of research we review investigates economic consequences of CSR 
reporting regulations. In our setting, economic consequences denote to both positive and 
                                                          
25 We relied on Google Scholar search to identify empirical studies focusing on consequences of CSR 
reporting regulations. We restrict the period from 2005-2019 on the basis that non-industry specific CSR 
reporting regulations became popular from 2005 onwards (Ho 2017). Given the diversity of CSR related 
terminologies used in academic research (Huang and Watson 2015), we identified key terms and 
searched using the ‘advanced search’ feature of Google Scholar. Our individual searches returned a total 
of 1,680 results. After excluding unrelated returns and non-empirical studies such as commentary or 
review papers, we end up with 102 papers. These papers examine the impact of CSR reporting 
regulations on reporting quality, capital-market and/or firm behavior.  
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negative effects of the disclosure regulations on the welfare of those parties affected by the 
information environment such as investors and creditors (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; 
Zeff 1978). In the third category, we review a growing number of studies that examine real 
effects of the CSR reporting regulations.  
We review these streams of studies in the following subsections. We also discuss 
whether the documented findings are consistent or inconsistent with the stated objectives 
of CSR reporting regulation in the specific jurisdiction, consistent with the approach in the 
review of IFRS reporting by Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn (2013). Where a given study 
simultaneously examines reporting quality, capital-market and/or real effects of CSR 
reporting regulations, we discuss the specific findings in the relevant subsection(s).  
 
2.4.1 Reporting and Disclosure Quality  
A key objective of CSR reporting regulations is improvement in reporting and disclosure 
quality (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2019; Ho 2017). This is particularly important 
considering evidence that CSR disclosures have historically been largely biased toward 
good news (Boiral 2013; Lyon and Montgomery 2015), boilerplate and copy from prior 
year as well as largely symbolic rather than substantive for reasons of “greenwashing” 
(Kim and Lyon 2014; Marquis and Qian 2013; Michelon, Pilonato, and Ricceri 2015). 
However, prior CSR reporting literature provides evidence based on a voluntary setting. A 
natural expectation of CSR reporting regulations is, therefore, improvements in the quality, 
accessibility, and comparability of firm-specific CSR information (Ho 2017). 
To this end, several studies provide evidence consistent with CSR reporting 
regulations improving disclosure quantity and quality in various institutional settings. For 
example, Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) examine effects of CSR reporting regulations on 
CSR disclosure quantity across four countries (i.e., China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South 
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Africa). Using a differences-in-difference design with Propensity Score Matched samples 
(DID-PSM), they find a significant increase in the amount of CSR disclosures of affected 
relative to a worldwide control group of firms as well as further control group of US firms 
after the CSR reporting regulations. Similarly, Wang et al. (2017) find that CSR reporting 
quality increased for affected relative to control firms after the CSR reporting regulation 
in China.  
Other studies provide corroborating evidence and show an increase in CSR 
disclosure level after CSR reporting regulations in several countries including the UK 
(Hummel and Rötzel 2019), France (Chauvey et al. 2015; Chelli, Durocher, and Fortin 
2018), Malaysia (Haji 2013), Australia (Perera, Jubb, and Gopalan 2019), and South Africa 
(Haji and Anifowose 2016; Setia et al. 2015; Wang, Zhou, and Wang 2019). Mion and 
Loza Adaui (2019) provide descriptive evidence indicating an increase in CSR disclosure 
level for firms in Italy and Germany after the EU’s CSR directive. They also argue that 
comparability of CSR reports across the two countries improved after the disclosure 
mandate. These studies find that the effects of CSR reporting regulations are confined to 
a group of firms - often larger, better corporate governance and more profitable firms (Haji 
2013; Haji and Anifowose 2016; Hummel and Rötzel 2019; Wang et al. 2017; Wang, Zhou, 
and Wang 2019).  
Despite studies suggesting increased level of CSR disclosures, other studies find a 
decrease or no significant changes in CSR reporting quality after the disclosure 
regulations26. For example, Luque-Vílchez and Larrinaga (2016) find a decrease in the 
number of affected companies publishing CSR reports in Spain after a CSR disclosure 
regulation in 2011, and conclude that disclosure quality remains low. However, they 
                                                          
26 The studies use alternative approaches to measure ‘disclosure quality’ including the extent to which 
firms follow CSR reporting guidelines (e.g., GRI guidelines) as well as scoring methods ranging from 
0-3 based on pre-defined disclosure checklist. 
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observe a modest increase in the quality of CSR disclosures after the regulation27. In 
another study, Chauvey et al. (2015) find a decrease in negative disclosures of French firms 
post CSR reporting regulation and conclude that, despite increasing levels of CSR 
disclosures over time, disclosure quality remains low (also see Kühn, Stiglbauer, and Heel 
2014). Similarly, Marquis and Qian (2013) focus on the Chinese setting and find that 
mandatory CSR reporting firms increased issuing CSR reports (symbolic), but not the 
quality (substance) of CSR disclosures - indicating that the reporting mandate exerts 
pressure on firms, such that they are more likely to engage in symbolic rather substantive 
CSR reporting. Other studies provide corroborating evidence and conclude that CSR 
disclosures are symbolic in nature rather substantive after CSR regulations, and simply 
reflect corporate legitimation strategies to comply with the regulations (Cong, Freedman, 
and Park 2020; Dong and Xu 2016; Dumay and Hossain 2019; Haji and Anifowose 2016; 
Kansal et al. 2018; Matuszak and Różańska 2017; Setia et al. 2015; Solomon and Maroun 
2012). 
Several studies examine disclosure quality effects of Section 1502 of the Dodd–
Frank Act in the US, and conclude that firms continue to provide boilerplate disclosures 
after the disclosure regulation (Dalla Via and Perego 2018; Kim and Davis 2016; Schwartz 
2016). Islam and van Staden (2018) use a global sample of firms subject to Section 1502 
and find that collaboration with social movement organizations (NGOs) and activist protest 
against companies lead to more comprehensive and transparent mineral disclosures – 
consistent with the view that disclosure regulation alone may not improve reporting quality. 
Consistent with this conjecture, Stolowy and Paugam (2018) document a general increase 
in the amount of CSR disclosures over time for a sample of firms in South Africa, United 
                                                          
27 A related study by Larrinaga, Luque-Vilchez, and Fernández (2018) examined CSR reporting quality 
of public sector organizations after the same disclosure regulation in Spain and find no significant 
changes in CSR disclosure level or quality (also see Peña and Jorge 2019).  
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States (i.e., S&P 500 index firms) and Europe (i.e., Euro STOXX 600 firms). Stolowy and 
Paugam (2018) suggest that the increasing levels of CSR disclosures are not necessarily 
exclusively driven by CSR reporting regulations, but instead reflect other factors such as 
firm characteristics, industrial affiliation, and the emergence of CSR reporting guidelines 
(e.g., GRI framework). 
In summary, evidence on the effects of CSR reporting regulations on reporting 
quality is still developing and mixed. Importantly, early studies provide evidence of 
changes in the quantity but not the quality of CSR disclosures following CSR reporting 
regulations. Several studies argue that the increased level (and not the quality) of CSR 
disclosures reflect symbolic rather than substantive response to CSR reporting regulations 
(Birkey et al. 2018; Kansal et al. 2018; Marquis and Qian 2013; Schwartz 2016; Solomon 
and Maroun 2012). Specifically, early evidence suggests that firms continue to be selective 
of their CSR disclosures post CSR reporting regulations, with a continued use of boilerplate 
language in CSR disclosure reports (Chauvey et al. 2015; Haji 2013; Setia et al. 2015) 
These conclusions, albeit based on the development stage of the regulations, cast doubt on 
expectations that CSR reporting regulations can improve CSR disclosure quality (de 
Villiers and van Staden 2011). It also reinforces prior claims that CSR reports are unlikely 
to ever evolve into substantive disclosures due to conflicting interests of various 
stakeholder groups – leading firms to engage in organized hypocrisy and organizational 
facades (Cho et al. 2015; Gray 2010). 
The main concern of this stream of research, though, is that reporting quality 
changes may not be exclusively due to the disclosure regulations28 (Islam and van Staden 
                                                          
28 The lack of sufficient empirical evidence supporting the extent in which reporting regulations improve 
reporting quality is not specific to the CSR setting, but has also been observed by prior literature surveys 
in settings other CSR including SOX literature (Coates and Srinivasan 2014), Regulation FD (Koch, 
Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2013) and the IFRS adoption literature (Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 
2013; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Also, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) reach similar conclusion from the 
broad literature on disclosure regulations. 
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2018; Stolowy and Paugam 2018). Few studies rely on DID or similar research designs to 
isolate the effects of disclosure regulations on reporting quality from other concurrent 
changes (Hummel and Rötzel 2019; Ioannou and Serafeim 2017). However, we expect 
more studies using tighter research designs as the CSR reporting regulations move to 
maturity.  
Another important observation is that the “comply-or-explain” nature of CSR 
reporting regulations in most jurisdictions may signal a weakly enforced reporting 
regulation, and is a likely explanation of the lack of changes in CSR reporting quality. 
Chelli, Durocher, and Fortin (2018) contrast France’s Parliamentary CSR disclosure 
regulation to Canada’s market disclosure regulation and conclude that the former leads 
more CSR disclosures.  However, it is unclear how alternative CSR reporting regulations 
(i.e., comply-or-explain versus mandatory regimes) affect CSR reporting quality. In short, 
we still do not know much about the true impact of CSR reporting regulations on reporting 




2.4.1.1      CSR Disclosure Assurance  
Prior research provides evidence that CSR disclosure assurance has several benefits 
including increased reporting quality as well as capital-market benefits (Ballou et al. 2018; 
Casey and Grenier 2014). Experimental studies in controlled settings provide corroborating 
evidence that CSR disclosure assurance is valued by investors (Cheng, Green, and Ko 
2015; Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff 2009). However, prior studies focus on a setting 
where CSR reporting is voluntary (for a general survey of this literature see e.g., Cohen 
and Simnett 2014). In this section, we discuss early studies that directly examine effects of 
CSR reporting regulations on firms’ propensity to seek CSR disclosure assurance. 
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It is not obvious, ex ante, how CSR reporting regulation affects CSR disclosure 
assurance. It is possible that CSR reporting regulation acts as a substitute for CSR 
disclosure assurance, thereby reducing firms’ propensity to seek CSR disclosure assurance. 
Consistent with this conjecture, Casey and Grenier (2014) find that US firms in highly 
regulated industries (i.e., finance and utilities) are less likely than firms in other industries 
to obtain CSR assurance, despite facing significant social and environmental risks. They 
argue that regulatory oversight may be acting as a substitute for CSR disclosure assurance 
as these industries are highly regulated. However, because they do not exploit a specific 
CSR reporting regulation, their inference is based on financial regulation in general.  
 Several studies provide evidence indicating an increase in CSR disclosure 
assurance after CSR reporting regulations. For example, Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) 
examine effects of CSR reporting regulations on CSR disclosure assurance in four 
countries (China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa)29. Relative to a worldwide control 
group of firms as well as further control group of US firms, they find that affected firms 
significantly increased obtaining voluntary CSR disclosure assurance after CSR reporting 
regulations in the four countries, consistent with CSR reporting regulations increasing 
firms’ propensity to seek CSR assurance. 
Several studies focused on South Africa and examine CSR disclosure assurance 
following the ‘comply-or-explain’ CSR disclosure assurance. Maroun (2019) provides 
evidence that CSR disclosure assurance increases from 38% in 2010 to 54% by 2016 
in South Africa, and finds that the number of CSR disclosure items externally assured 
is associated with higher disclosure quality, regardless of whether reasonable or 
limited assurance is obtained. Maroun (2019) also finds that CSR reporting quality is 
                                                          
29 These countries have mandated CSR reporting. However, CSR assurance is not mandatory in these 
countries except in South Africa where CSR disclosure assurance is required on a “comply-or-explain” 
basis under King III. However, the “Comply-or-Explain” assurance requirement was relaxed in the latest 
South African code of corporate governance, that is King IV of 2016 (Ackers 2017).  
41 
higher when assurance is provided by Big 4 than smaller audit firms. In another study, 
Ackers and Eccles (2015) document an increase in CSR disclosure assurance over time. In 
their study, assurance uptake is more visible in larger firms and firms in highly regulated 
and environmentally sensitive industries30 (i.e., mining, chemical and financial firms).  
Finally, Zhou, Simnett, and Hoang (2019) find an increase in combined assurance 
provisions in South Africa after the integrated reporting mandate. Their results also indicate 
combined assurance is associated with several capital-market benefits including reduction 
in analyst forecast errors and dispersion as well as information asymmetry. Caglio, Melloni, 
and Perego (2020) also find that assurance mitigates negative effects associated with poor 
integrated reports and increases users’ confidence in CSR information. 
In summary, evidence on the effects of CSR reporting regulations on CSR 
disclosure assurance is still limited. Most of existing studies focus on the South African 
setting where CSR disclosure assurance was initially required on a ‘comply-or-explain’ 
basis. Even in this setting, CSR disclosure assurance appears to be driven by industry and 
firm-specific factors rather than the reporting regulation– consistent with prior evidence in 
voluntary settings (Sìmnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).  We also do not know much 
about how CSR regulation affects CSR assurance market, specifically whether the 
regulations spark or inhibit new CSR assurors entering the CSR assurance market alongside 
accounting firms. Finally, it remains an empirical question whether CSR reporting 
regulations exacerbate or attenuate firms’ propensity to obtain joint provision of financial 
and CSR audit (Dal Maso et al. 2019; Lu, Simnett, and Zhou 2019). Table 2.3 of Appendix 
A summarizes evidence on the effects of CSR regulations on CSR disclosure assurance. 
 
                                                          
30 Ackers (2017) conducted a follow-up study and finds a significant increase of CSR disclosure 
assurance over time in South Africa. Further analyses show that larger firms and firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries are more likely to obtain CSR disclosure assurance, 
suggesting that the decision to obtain assurance is driven by industry and firm-specific factors 
rather than CSR regulations. 
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2.4.2    Capital-Market Effects  
In this section, we survey empirical evidence on capital-market effects of CSR reporting 
regulations. First, we review extant evidence on capital market reactions to important 
events around the passage of CSR reporting regulations in various institutional settings. 
Second, we review evidence on the capital-market effects of CSR reporting regulations 
over time. Following prior surveys of financial reporting and disclosure regulations 
(Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn 2013; Leuz and Wysocki 2016; Soderstrom and Sun 
2007), we classify capital-market research into (1) studies that directly evaluate economic 
consequences of CSR reporting regulations by examining outcomes such as firm value or 
profitability effects and (2) studies that indirectly assess economic consequences by 
examining effects of CSR reporting regulations on information environment as perceived 




2.4.2.1      Capital-Market Reactions  
Several studies examine capital-market reactions to critical legislative events leading up to 
the passage of CSR reporting regulations in various institutional settings. Given that the 
CSR reporting regulations in certain jurisdictions apply only to a subset of firms, several 
studies rely on difference-in-differences (DID), regression discontinuity design (RDD), 
and other similar research specifications designed to isolate economic effects of the 
disclosure regulations. 
Overall, the empirical evidence indicates that the CSR reporting regulations 
generate significant costs for affected firms at announcement dates. For example, 
Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017) examine capital-market reactions to eight legislative 
events leading up to the CSR disclosure regulation in India. Using RDD, they find the 
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cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of affected firms significantly declines by 4.1% 
relative to control firms around the eight events31. Consistent with cross-sectional 
variations in capital-market reactions, they show that firms that spend more on advertising 
are less affected by the CSR rule. They also find a significant decline in Tobin’s Q of 
affected firms relative to control firms around event dates that increase the likelihood of 
CSR regulation. Similarly, Chen, Hung, and Wang (2018) use DID-PSM sample 
specifications and provide corroborating evidence showing that CAR of affected firms 
significantly declines after the CSR reporting regulation in China. These studies suggest 
that capital-markets perceive CSR reporting regulations as bad news. 
In another study, Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim (2019) study capital-market reactions 
to three events associated with the passage of the EU’s CSR reporting directive. Using 
DID, they find an overall negative market reaction to the passage of CSR reporting 
directive (an average decline of –0.79%, equivalent to $79 million of market value). Cross-
sectional analyses show that the negative market reaction is concentrated for firms with 
weak pre-regulation CSR disclosure and performance records, suggesting that equity 
markets perceive enhanced reporting regulations are more costly to firms with weak pre-
regulation CSR performance and information environments. Their results support this latter 
notion by showing firms with above-median and stronger CSR records pre-regulation 
experience a positive abnormal return.  
Several other studies examine capital-market reactions to important events around 
the passage of Dodd-Frank Act sections that mandate CSR disclosures for certain US firms 
(i.e., Section 1502 and 1504). Consistent with the above results in other countries, the 
studies show that the US capital-market reacts negatively to events around the passage of 
                                                          
31 Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017) are careful to recognize a common limitation in RDDs that the 
treatment effects are localized around the threshold firms and therefore the findings are not necessarily 
generalizable to the entire population. 
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Dodd-Frank Act sections that contain CSR disclosure requirements (Elayan et al. 2019; 
Healy and Serafeim 2020; Hombach and Sellhorn 2019; Sankara, Patten, and Lindberg 
2019). Again, the negative capital-market reactions are confined to a subset of firms 
consistent with differential effects of CSR reporting regulations (Elayan et al. 2019; Seitz 
2015). For example, Hombach and Sellhorn (2019) find firm value of affected firms, on 
average, significantly declines around 12 events associated with the passage of Section 
1504. Importantly, they find that the negative firm value effects is stronger for firms that 
face greater reputational risk, consistent with these firms facing higher exposure to 
potential adverse capital-market reactions from public pressure (also see e.g., Birkey et al. 
2018). Similarly, Elayan et al. (2019) find negative stock market reaction to events leading 
up to the passage of Section 1502 is more negative for firms that source their minerals from 
the Congo and adjoining countries, and for firms with prior records of human rights 
violations.  
Other studies focus on capital-market reactions to first time CSR disclosures after 
the regulations. For example, Sankara, Patten, and Lindberg (2019) document that the 
negative capital-market reactions to Section 1502 is less pronounced for firms with 
more extensive CSR disclosures. Similarly, Elayan et al. (2019) find that adverse capital-
market reactions to Section 1502 are more pronounced for firms with ambiguous 
disclosures. Further,  Griffin, Lont, and Sun (2014) find the negative capital-market 
reactions to Section 1502 is less pronounced for higher public information environment 
firms (i.e., larger and more analyst following firms). Mittelbach-Hoermanseder, Hummel, 
and Rammerstorfer (2020) find that CSR disclosure has positive (negative) relation with 
firm value before (after) the CSR reporting Directive in the EU – suggesting that the value-
relevance of CSR disclosures depends on CSR reporting requirements (i.e., voluntary 
versus mandatory). Finally, Wang and Li (2016) find positive capital-market reactions to 
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the first time issuance of CSR reports both for mandatory and voluntary CSR reporting 
firms in China, suggesting that investors appreciate both voluntary and mandatory CSR 
disclosures. 
Taken together, the event studies almost unanimously document adverse capital-
market reactions to events leading up to the CSR reporting regulations32 (Birkey et al. 2018; 
Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; Hombach and Sellhorn 
2019; Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017). However, there is considerable cross-sectional 
variation in capital-market reactions across firms and industries, consistent with investors 
taking cues from various firm-specific factors including pre-existing CSR performance and 
disclosure records of affected firms. We summarize key themes of the event studies in 
Table 2.4 of Appendix A.  
 
 
2.4.2.2       Direct Economic Consequences  
A number of studies examine the long-term effects of CSR reporting regulations on firm 
value, profitability, information asymmetry, liquidity, cost of capital/debt, and stock price 
crash risk of affected firms. Majority of the studies in this stream focus on firm value effects 
(measured as Tobin’s Q) of CSR reporting regulations. 
Consistent with the disclosure regulations reducing information asymmetry, early 
studies almost unanimously find that firm value of affected firms increases after CSR 
reporting regulations in various institutional settings33 (Bhagawan and Mukhopadhyay 
                                                          
32 The only exception is the study by Cousins et al. (2018) who examine capital-market reactions to 
eight events around the passage of the UK’s Modern Slavery Act (MSA) in 2015. They find no evidence 
of firm value effects for the combined events or individual event dates. However, they find a positive 
stock market reaction on the first trading day when the stock market learned about the UK Government’s 
plans to tackle modern slavery through disclosure regulation. The positive effect is stronger for firms 
with a lower risk of modern slavery in their business and supply chain. 
  
33 This line of literature is different from the ‘event studies’ as the latter focuses on legislative events 
around the CSR reporting regulations and so capture investors’ expectations rather than investors’ actual 
reactions to mandated CSR disclosures. 
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2018; Ioannou and Serafeim 2017; Jadiyappa, Iyer, and Jyothi 2019; Krüger 2015; Rossi 
and Harjoto 2019). Cross-sectional analyses show that the positive valuation outcomes are 
larger for (1) firms most affected by the disclosure regulations (Baboukardos 2017; Krüger 
2015; Swift, Guide Jr, and Muthulingam 2019), (2) firms with higher CSR disclosure 
quality (Caglio, Melloni, and Perego 2020),  and (3) firms in more complex information 
environment (Lee and Yeo 2016). In a related study, Tang and Zhong (2019) use 
international data set from 46 countries and find that the probability of stock price crash 
risk significantly declines for affected firms in countries that implement CSR disclosure 
regulations.  
The positive firm valuation outcomes documented in the above stream of studies is 
consistent with CSR reporting regulations reducing information asymmetry for affected 
firms. Consistent with this view, Hung, Shi, and Wang (2013) and Krüger (2015) find a 
decrease in information asymmetry for affected firms relative to control firms after the CSR 
reporting regulations in China and the UK, respectively. Other studies provide 
corroborating evidence and show a decrease in information asymmetry after CSR reporting 
regulations in several institutional settings (Zhong and Gao 2017). Similarly, Tang and 
Zhong (2019) use international data set and show that CSR reporting regulations decrease 
likelihood of stock price crash risk more for less transparent firms pre-reporting 
regulations, consistent with the reporting regulations reducing information asymmetry for 
firms in opaque information environments. However, Wu, Zhao, and Chen (2019) find a 
decrease in stock price informativeness of affected firms relative to control firms after the 
CSR reporting regulation in China, indicating that the CSR reporting regulation does not 
reduce information asymmetry in the Chinese capital-market. 
Several other studies focus on firm profitability effects (measured as ROA and 
ROE). For example, Chen, Hung, and Wang (2018) and Mukherjee, Bird, and Duppati 
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(2018) find firm profitability of affected firms significantly decreases relative to control 
firms following CSR reporting regulations in China and India, respectively. In contrast, 
Bhagawan and Mukhopadhyay (2018) and Bhattacharyya and Rahman (2019) document 
profitability of affected firms significantly increases relative to control firms after the CSR 
reporting regulation in India. Swift, Guide Jr, and Muthulingam (2019) show that firm 
profitability (ROA) of high visibility supply chain firms, relative to low visibility firms, 
increases after the passage of Section 1502. At the same time, Krüger (2015) find no 
significant profitability effects of CSR reporting regulation in the UK. In another study, 
Bhattacharyya, Wright, and Rahman (2019) report no associated between actual CSR 
spending and ROA, but find a negative association between CSR spending and stock return 
after the CSR regulation in India. The mixed results in profitability studies appear to 
suggest that the positive valuation outcomes of CSR reporting regulations stem from 
reductions in information asymmetry (i.e., capital-market effects) rather than 
improvements in operating performance (i.e., real effects) (Krüger 2015).  
Other studies examine liquidity effects of the CSR reporting regulations, and the 
evidence is also mixed. Barth et al. (2017) and Caglio, Melloni, and Perego (2020) find 
that increased reporting quality is positively associated with liquidity for South African 
firms. However, Kajueter, Kerkhoff, and Mauritz (2019) use RDD and find no overall 
liquidity effects after the CSR disclosure directive in the EU for their full sample of EU 
firms. Cross-sectional analyses in Kajueter, Kerkhoff, and Mauritz (2019) show that firms 
in weaker institutional environments and few prior CSR disclosure regulations experience 
small but significant liquidity benefits. However, the CSR disclosure regulation does not 
provide incremental liquidity benefit for firms in stronger institutional environments.  
Finally, a number of studies consider whether CSR reporting regulations affect 
access to finance. For example, Xu, Xu, and Yu (2019) find cost of debt decreases for 
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affected firms relative to control firms after CSR reporting regulation in China. They also 
show that affected firms have more access to long-term debt after the reporting regulation. 
In the same Chinese setting, Gong, Xu, and Gong (2018) find that high CSR disclosure 
quality is associated with lower costs of corporate bonds, and more for voluntary than 
mandatory CSR reporting firms – consistent with bond investors already expecting CSR 
disclosure from mandatory CSR firms than voluntary firms. In another study, Zhou, 
Simnett, and Green (2017) document that cost of capital is significantly lower for South 
African firms that provide high quality integrated reports. However, Barth et al. (2017) find 
no significant cost of capital effects after the integrated reporting mandate in South Africa. 
Finally, Lemma et al. (2019) find that integrated reporting is associated with lower (higher) 
levels of debt (equity) financing, suggesting that a firm’s financing needs may be driving 
integrating reporting. 
In sum, empirical evidence on the economics of CSR reporting regulations is still 
limited but growing. The evidence suggests adverse capital-market reactions around 
announcement dates, but positive firm value outcomes over time consistent with the 
disclosure regulations reducing information asymmetry. However, evidence on the impact 
of CSR reporting regulations on operating performance is conflicting, albeit limited. Given 
differences in CSR reporting regulations across countries (e.g., comply-or-explain versus 
mandatory), it remains an empirical question whether alternative forms of CSR reporting 
regulations lead to similar economic outcomes.  Table 2.5 of Appendix A summarizes key 
findings of this literature.     
 
 
2.4.2.3      Indirect Economic Consequences  
In this subsection, we review a third stream of studies that investigate indirect economic 
consequences of the CSR reporting regulations by examining whether CSR regulations 
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improve the information environment of affected firms. The idea is that improved 
information environment will consequently create positive economic benefits for affected 
firms. The extant evidence has so far examined effects of CSR reporting regulations on (1) 
analysts’ report informativeness and (2) financial reporting quality. 
A number of studies find CSR reporting regulations improve investment 
professionals’ report informativeness in several countries (Bernardi and Stark 2018; 
Cormier, Lapointe-Antunes, and Magnan 2015; Shi and Song 2019; Zhou, Simnett, and 
Green 2017). For example, Zhou, Simnett, and Green (2017) find a decrease in analysts’ 
earnings forecast error and dispersion after the integrated reporting mandate in South 
Africa. In the same South African setting, Caglio, Melloni, and Perego (2020) document a 
decrease in analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is associated with integrated report 
readability. Bernardi and Stark (2018) find that analyst forecast accuracy improves after 
the integrated reporting mandate in South Africa, particularly for non-finanical firms 
relative to finanical firms. In another study, Bernardi and Stark (2018) find an increase in 
analysts following after the CSR disclosure regulations in the EU and UK. Finally, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) use data from 31 countries and show that issuance of standalone 
CSR reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error both for voluntary and 
mandatory CSR reporting firms. 
Other studies find CSR reporting regulations improve financial reporting quality. 
For example, Wang, Cao, and Ye (2018) report a decrease in earnings management for 
affected firms relative to control firms after the CSR reporting regulation in China. 
Similarly, Cheng and Kung (2016) find that CSR reporting regulation in China constrains 
accounting conservatism and earnings management, although the effects are less 
significant for state-owned firms. However, Liao, Chen, and Zheng (2019) partition firms 
in China into voluntary versus mandatory CSR firms and find that voluntary CSR firms are 
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significantly less likely to engage in fraudulent behavior. In another study, Nair et al. (2019) 
find a decrease in earnings management in India after the CSR reporting regulation. They 
also find that the decrease in earnings management is stronger (weaker) for firms with retail 
(institutional) investors, consistent with the CSR disclosure regulation enhancing the 
information environment for retail investors. Finally, Baboukardos and Rimmel (2016) find 
an increase in the earnings’ valuation co-efficient after the integrated reporting mandate in 
South Africa, consistent with the expectations of integrated reporting. However, they report 
a decline in the value relevance of net assets, seemingly due to the multiple capitals 
appraoch of integrated reporting34.  
Collectively, the extant evidence indicates that the CSR regulations improved 
analysts’ report informativeness and certain metrics of financial reporting quality. Another 
important observation is that the positive capital-market outcomes are confined to a subset 
of firms.  Table 2.6 of Appendix A summarizes key findings of this literature. 
 
 
2.4.3 Real Effects of CSR Reporting Regulations 
Understanding the real effects of reporting and disclosure regulations is increasingly 
becoming first-order importance in accounting and related research (Kanodia and Sapra 
2016; Leuz and Wysocki 2016). However, empirical evidence on the real effects of 
disclosure regulations is scarce (Leuz and Wysocki 2016), despite such evidence having 
the potential to inform accounting policy debates (Kanodia 2007). A basic premise in real 
effects research is that mandatory disclosure requirements will have a second order effect 
on firm behavior as the increased transparency allows outsiders to more closely monitor 
                                                          
34 In another study, Tlili, Othman, and Hussainey (2019) find the value relevance of organizational 




corporate decision-making (Kanodia and Sapra 2016). A limited number of studies provide 
empirical evidence supporting real effects of firm disclosures and reporting regulations 
(Chen, Young, and Zhuang 2012; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel 2013; Gao and Sidhu 2018).  
In this section, we review a growing number of empirical studies that examine real 
effects of CSR reporting regulations35. We identify three streams of real effects studies. 
The first stream focuses on real effects of CSR reporting regulations on CSR spending. A 
second stream of studies examine environmental effects, particularly impact of CSR 
reporting regulations on firm-level pollution and carbon emissions. Finally, we review a 
third stream of studies that examine unintended real effects of CSR reporting regulations.  
 
 
2.4.3.1       CSR Spending and Activities  
Several studies examine the impact of CSR reporting regulations on CSR spending and 
overall CSR ratings as provided by independent rating bodies (e.g., Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4). For example, Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann (2019) examine effects of the EU’s 
CSR reporting directive on CSR performance of affected EU firms that previously did not 
engage in CSR reporting. Using Thomson Reuters ASSET4 CSR scores to measure overall 
CSR performance, they find a significant increase in the CSR performance of previously 
non-reporting firms after the disclosure directive relative to EU and US control group of 
firms. Similarly, Jackson et al. (2020) use ASSET4 CSR scores for an international data 
set of firms in 24 OECD countries36 and provide a corroborating evidence. Specifically, 
they find a significant increase in the CSR performance of firms in countries with 
                                                          
35 Given that the CSR reporting mandates are imposed on a subset of firms in most countries, they 
provide an attractive quasi-natural experimental setting to examine real changes in affected firms’ CSR 
performance relative to control group of unaffected firms. However, we note that not all studies find a 
suitable control group of firms unaffected by the regulations and instead rely on pre- and post-regulation 
analyses. 
 
36 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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mandatory CSR reporting requirements. However, they do not find a decline in corporate 
irresponsibility scores as provided by ASSET4. Boodoo (2016) finds similar results 
showing CSR scores of affected firms improved after the CSR regulation in India relative 
to a control group of US firms. 
A number of other studies use actual CSR spending data and find results showing 
an overall increase in CSR spending after the CSR regulation in India (Bansal, Khanna, 
and Sydlowski 2019; Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Marques and Srinivasan 2018). For 
example, Dharmapala and Khanna (2018) find a significant increase in CSR spending of 
affected firms relative to control firms after the CSR regulation in India. However, they 
find that firms initially spending more than 2% reduced their CSR expenditures to just 
about the required 2% after the mandate, indicating a potential unintended consequence of 
specifying a certain level of CSR spending (also see e.g., Bansal, Khanna, and Sydlowski 
2019; Kapoor and Dhamija 2017). 
Consistent with the CSR reporting regulations generating positive societal 
externalities, Christensen et al. (2017) find a significant decrease in employee injuries and 
mining-related citations of SEC-registered mining firms relative to a control group of non-
SEC registrants after Section 1503 of Dodd-Frank Act37. However, they also find a 
significant decline in labor productivity following the disclosure mandate, consistent with 
the disclosure regulation creating a trade-off between safety and labor productivity. In 
another study, Li and Raghunandan (2019) report a decline in safety violations of mining 
firms after the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act. Similarly, Chen, Hung, and Wang 
(2018) document a significant decrease in workplace fatalities (i.e., deaths) of affected 
                                                          
37 Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires SEC-registered mining firms to disclose their mine-
safety disclosures (MSD) in regulated financial reports. 
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relative to control firms after the CSR regulation in China, consistent with the CSR 
regulation creating positive externalities. 
Other studies further provide corroborating evidence indicating that the CSR 
reporting regulations affect internal decision-making and resource allocations of affected 
firms. For example, Barth et al. (2017) document that the integrated reporting mandate and 
the embedded integrated thinking concept is associated with higher investment efficiency, 
consistent with the reporting regulation improving internal decision-making of South 
African firms. Similarly, Ni and Zhang (2019) find a significant decrease in dividend 
payouts of affected firms relative to control firms after the CSR reporting regulation in 
China, consisting with CSR reporting regulations adversely affecting firm profitability 
(Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018) 
Overall, the extant evidence indicates that the CSR reporting regulations improve 
CSR performance of affected firms, which in turn generates positive social externalities. 
However, as with the capital-market studies - the documented effects of the regulations are 
confined to a subset of firms, particularly for firms that previously did not engage in CSR 
activities (Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann 2019; Jackson et 
al. 2020). Finally, it is also clear that the CSR reporting regulations generate positive social 
externalities, although they are associated with costs to shareholders. 
 
2.4.3.2       Carbon Emissions  
A growing number of studies focused on the environmental implications of CSR reporting 
regulations in several countries. For example, Gramlich and Huang (2017) find a decrease 
in pollution levels of affected firms relative to control firms after the CSR reporting 
regulation in China, and the decrease is more pronounced among affected firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries than firms in service sectors. In the same Chinese 
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setting, Chen, Hung, and Wang (2018) find that cities most affected by the CSR reporting 
regulation (i.e., cities with a high proportion of affected firms) experience a greater 
decrease in their industrial wastewater and SO2 (sulfur dioxide) emission levels
38. These 
studies suggest that the CSR reporting regulation in China is associated with changes in 
firm behavior that create important societal benefits – consistent with one of the stated 
objectives of the CSR reporting regulation in China. 
In the UK, Downar et al. (2019) and Jouvenot and Krueger (2019) both find 
significant reductions in carbon emissions (between 15 and 18%) after the CSR disclosure 
regulation in the UK. An appealing characteristics of the UK’s CSR disclosure regulation 
is that listed firms are required to disclose their carbon emissions in their traditional annual 
reports, although these firms already had to publicly report their emissions to a central 
government register before the disclosure regulation. Motivated by this, Downar et al. 
(2019) compare carbon emissions of installations owned by affected UK firms and 
installations owned by unaffected firms and show a significant decrease in carbon 
emissions of affected firms for up to 18% after the disclosure regulation in the UK relative 
to control firms. Their results also show that the emission reductions occur across all 
industries but are more pronounced for firms in the energy industry. Jouvenot and Krueger 
(2019) provide a corroborating evidence and find a significant 15% decrease in carbon 
emissions of UK firms after the disclosure regulation relative to a control group of 
European firms. The decrease is larger for firms with high levels of tangible assets, and 
persists both for absolute and relative39 carbon emissions. 
                                                          
38 Recall that Chen, Hung, and Wang (2018) also find a decrease in firm profitability (ROA and ROE) 
and firm value of affected firms following the CSR reporting regulation in China, consistent with the 
disclosure regulation creating positive societal benefits at the direct expense of firm shareholders. 
 
39 The disclosure mandate requires listed U.K. firms to disclose their absolute (i.e., annual quantity of 
carbon emissions in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) and relative carbon emissions (emissions based 
on firm size measures such as assets or sales revenue) in their annual reports (Jouvenot and Krueger 
2019). 
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In the US, Tomar (2019) examine carbon emissions effects of Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program introduced by the US Environmental Protection Agency40 (EPA) in 
2010. Tomar (2019) compares emissions disclosed by US facilities to Canadian facilities 
and find a 7% decrease in emissions after the disclosure regulation, and reductions in 
emissions are larger for facilities with more disclosing peers nearby consistent with 
benchmarking-learning hypothesis. Results also show that within-industry emissions 
dispersion declines, indicating greater overlap in US facilities’ information sets after the 
disclosure program (for a similar observation see Jackson et al. 2020). However, Matisoff 
(2013) examines several state-level carbon emission reporting requirements in the US and 
finds no significant changes in carbon intensity or total carbon emissions after state-level 
carbon disclosure requirements. Interestingly, Matisoff (2013) separately examines effects 
of the voluntary participation in Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and finds that the CDP 
led to a modest decrease in carbon emissions and electricity output for participating firms 
relative to non-participating firms. 
In sum, early empirical studies provide convincing evidence indicating that CSR 
reporting regulations significantly decrease carbon emissions of affected firms in important 
institutional settings. However, as the studies focus on the early stages of the disclosure 
regulations – it is unclear whether these effects persist or disappear over time. 
 
2.4.3.3       Unintended Consequences  
Several studies provide evidence consistent with unintended consequences of the CSR 
reporting regulations. For example, Parker and Vadheim (2017) use georeferenced data 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (i.e., the target of the legislation) and examine 
                                                          
40 The EPA carbon emissions reporting requires US facilities emitting over 25,000 tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent to report their emissions to the EPA. However, affected facilities are not required to 
disclose carbon emissions in their annual reports. 
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humanitarian consequences of Section 1502 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. They find that 
the disclosure regulation incited violence in Congo by increasing looting of civilians and 
shifted militia battles toward unregulated gold-mining territories. In another study, Parker, 
Foltz, and Elsea (2016) use the same setting and examine effects of Section 1502 on the 
mortality of children born in Congo. They find a significant increase in infant deaths in 
villages near the policy-targeted mines. They also find that mothers’ consumption of infant 
health care goods and services decreased following the passage of the legislation. Further, 
Emerson (2017) finds that deaths by violent conflicts have increased per year after 
Congress and the SEC enacted Section 1502. He also finds that GDP per capita and US 
Foreign Direct Investment in Congo and other affected countries have decreased after the 
disclosure regulation, consistent with the regulation inciting a de facto embargo on these 
countries.   
The results of these studies are based on the premise that the disclosure regulation 
caused US firms to close significant business operations in the legislation targeted 
countries41. Consequently, the closure of US firms’ business operations in the targeted 
region exacerbated the already poor employment opportunities for the working class in the 
targeted region thus sparking violence. These studies provide evidence consistent with 
unintended consequences of the disclosure regulation42. 
Consistent with the above inference, Rauter (2019) exploits a similar disclosure 
Directive in the EU which requires mandatory disclosures on extraction payments made by 
                                                          
41 While Section 1502 was passed on the basis of constraining human rights violations in Congo, it is 
also essentially a de facto boycott on mineral purchases by US listed firms to curb financing warlords 
and armed militias in Congo. 
 
42 However, Koch and Kinsbergen (2018) review evidence on the effects of the legislation and argue 
that the unintended consequences of Section 1502 legislation declined over time. 
 
57 
European oil, gas, and mining firms to foreign host governments43. Consistent with the 
objectives of the Directive, Rauter (2019) finds an increase in extractive payments of 
affected firms to host governments relative to control firms after the disclosure Directive. 
However, he finds affected firms - relative to control firms - reduced investments in 
legislation targeted countries after the disclosure Directive, suggesting that affected firms 
close business operations in these countries and reallocate their investments elsewhere. 
Rauter (2019) also does not find reductions in corruption in host governments post the 
disclosure Directive. 
In summary, early studies provide evidence supporting real effects of CSR 
reporting regulations in various settings. Importantly, the evidence is consistent with the 
disclosure regulations generating both positive and negative societal externalities. We 
summarize key features of the real effects literature in Table 2.7 of Appendix A.  
 
 
2.5 Discussion and Future Research Suggestions 
The recent CSR reporting regulations present an attractive quasi-natural experimental 
setting to examine a number of important research questions. In this section, we discuss 
key opportunities and challenges for future research. We frame our discussion around the 
broad themes of the paper: (1) reporting and disclosure quality effects (2) capital-market 
effects and (3) real effects of the CSR reporting regulations. We also identify a number of 
unexplored research questions that address macroeconomic effects of CSR reporting 
regulations.  
 
                                                          
43 The EU passed a disclosure directive in 2013 (Directives 2013/34/EU and 2013/50/EU) and requires 
extractive firms to publicly disclose their payments to foreign host governments in a granular report on 
their website. This directive applies to all extractive firms in the EU, Norway, Iceland, and the United 
Kingdom, and is intended to combat corruption in natural resource rich countries. 
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2.5.1 Reporting Quality Effects  
To the extent reporting and disclosure regulations substantively improve reporting quality 
still remains an open empirical question. For example, the IFRS adoption literature still 
does not reach empirical consensus on improvements in reporting and disclosure quality, 
even after the implementation of a single set of reporting standards (Brüggemann, Hitz, 
and Sellhorn 2013). Similar conclusions abound in other reporting and disclosure 
regulations such as Regulation FD (Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2013), SOX Act 
(Coates and Srinivasan 2014), industry-specific environmental reporting regulations 
(Larrinaga et al. 2002) and more generally reporting and disclosure regulations (Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016). One likely explanation is that reporting is part of a broader institutional 
setting including legal and political systems of the countries in which individual firms 
operate (Leuz and Wysocki 2016; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Improvements in reporting 
quality are unlikely to arise without substantive concurrent changes in the supporting 
infrastructure, specifically reporting enforcement (Coates and Srinivasan 2014). Consistent 
with this conjecture, Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013) and Gao and Sidhu (2018) 
respectively provide evidence showing capital-market and real effects around IFRS 
adoption are driven by concurrent changes in reporting enforcement. 
As with financial reporting regulations, a key objective of CSR reporting 
regulations is to improve reporting quality - specifically accessibility, comparability and 
relevance of CSR information. However, our review of the mandatory CSR reporting 
literature suggests some evidence of increased disclosure quantity, but CSR disclosure 
quality remains low after CSR reporting regulations in various countries. In this subsection, 
we discuss a number of research questions that remain unexplored.  
First, an important gap is whether CSR reporting regulations affect the materiality 
of CSR disclosures. It is possible that CSR reporting regulations cause firms to provide 
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more immaterial disclosures – either strategically or unintentionally. In an experiment, 
Guiral et al. (2019) find that investors unintentionally process immaterial and positive CSR 
information when evaluating a firm’s fundamental value, but use more deliberate and 
systematic approach to process material or negative CSR issues. In fact, the SEC (2016, p. 
213) seeks feedback for several ex ante questions, one of which is whether “would line-
item requirements for disclosure about sustainability or public policy issues cause 
registrants to disclose information that is not material to investors?”. Recent studies use 
SASB’s materiality classification and find that material versus immaterial CSR disclosures 
and ratings differentially affect capital-markets (Grewal, Hauptmann, and Serafeim 2020; 
Khan, Serafeim, and Yoon 2016). Specifically, Grewal, Hauptmann, and Serafeim (2020) 
document that firms voluntarily disclosing more SASB-identified material CSR 
information have higher stock price informativeness, whereas immaterial disclosure are not 
associated with stock price informativeness. Although SASB’s materiality classification is 
still developing (SASB 2018), it provides researchers a reasonable proxy to examine 
whether CSR reporting regulations cause firms to provide more material (immaterial) CSR 
disclosures and the associated capital-market consequences.   
Second, there is limited evidence on network or spillover effects of CSR reporting 
regulations – specifically whether and how CSR reporting regulations affect CSR 
disclosure choices of related, but unaffected firms. Hung, Shi, and Wang (2013) provide 
early evidence showing firms unaffected by the CSR reporting regulation in China start 
voluntarily issuing CSR reports on or after the CSR reporting regulation. Importantly, they 
also find that late voluntary CSR reporting firms experience a reduction in information 
asymmetry. Empirical evidence in settings other than CSR also shows that a firm’s 
disclosure has important economic consequences for its peers, and specifically peer firms’ 
information environment (Badertscher, Shroff, and White 2013; Shroff, Verdi, and Yost 
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2017). However, such network effects are not necessarily positive, but can also be 
unfavorable for some firms (Bushee and Leuz 2005). The network effects of CSR reporting 
regulations deserves more attention44.  
Third, reporting format effects of mandated CSR information is relatively 
unknown, especially whether CSR information should be integrated in or separated from 
financial reports. Currently, the CSR reporting regulations in most countries do not require 
specific reporting format of CSR disclosures. In a 2017 survey of the largest 4,900 
companies from 49 countries, KPMG (2017) reports that 60% of global firms integrate 
CSR information in their financial reports, up from 56% in 2015. Cohen et al. (2012) 
provide corroborating evidence showing that companies disclose a wide variety of CSR 
measures both in their regulated financial reports and other alternative outlets such as 
company websites and investor promotion materials. Cannon et al. (2020) show that firms 
that disclose CSR information in 10-K achieve a competitive advantage relative to non-
disclosing firms, indicating that including CSR information in regulated financial reports 
is incrementally informative (also see Christensen et al. 2017). In an experiment with 
professional investors, Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk (2018) find that integrating CSR 
information in financial reports increases access of this information. However, other 
experimental studies find unintended effects of integrating CSR information in financial 
reports (Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019). Reporting format effects of CSR information 
                                                          
44 Brown, Tian, and Wu Tucker (2018) use mandated risk factor disclosure setting to explore spillover 
effects of SEC comment letters and find results consistent with network effects. Specifically, they find 
that firms not receiving comment letters from the SEC significantly modify their subsequent year's risk 
disclosures if the SEC has commented on the risk factor disclosure of (1) the industry leader, (2) a close 
rival, or (3) numerous industry peers. In a CSR setting, Cao, Liang, and Zhan (2019) use the passage or 
failure of CSR proposals by a narrow margin of votes to examine peer effects of CSR. They find that 
related firms adopt similar CSR practices following the passage of a close-call CSR proposal and its 
implementation by peer firms. 
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deserves further empirical investigation, especially considering regulatory interest in 
reporting format of CSR information and concerns of information overload45.  
Finally, we find no studies devoted to developing empirical measures of CSR 
reporting quality. As a result, the CSR literature struggles to define and measure reporting 
quality. More broadly, Leuz and Wysocki (2016, p. 541) argue that “accounting research 
has not yet found a satisfactory way to empirically identify reporting quality”.  Extant 
literature largely relies on content analyses, researcher self-constructed disclosure indices, 
readability measures, and other subjective techniques to measure CSR reporting and 
disclosure quality. However, it is difficult to use most of these techniques in large sample 
studies.  A number of studies provide several measures of financial reporting quality (Chen, 
Miao, and Shevlin 2015; De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011). However, it is not clear 
whether extant measures of financial reporting quality are applicable to CSR disclosures. 
Development of CSR reporting quality measures remains an important gap. 
 
2.5.2 Capital-market and Macroeconomic Effects  
There are a number of important capital-market research questions that remain relatively 
under-researched. First, an important gap is whether CSR reporting regulations cause firms 
with incentives to hide poor CSR performance to use boilerplate disclosure language as an 
avoidance strategy. Prior literature in other settings provides evidence that firms use 
boilerplate language to obfuscate poor performance (Li 2008) or proprietary information 
(Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016). However, little is known about whether firms use boilerplate 
language as an avoidance strategy to disclosure regulations (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
2019). For example, Campbell et al. (2014) examine information content of risk disclosures 
                                                          
45 The SEC is currently seeking public feedback for a number of CSR reporting policy issues including 
the question of “How important to investors is integrated reporting, as opposed to separate financial and 
sustainability reporting?” (SEC 2016, p. 214). 
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following risk factor disclosure mandate by the SEC and find that firms with greater risks 
disclose more risk factors. However, Cho et al. (2015) find that contradictory societal and 
institutional pressures force firms to engage in hypocrisy that lead firms to provide 
symbolic CSR reports. The CSR reporting regulations offer an interesting setting to explore  
whether mandatory CSR firms with weak CSR reporting incentives to use boilerplate 
language as an avoidance strategy, and whether the level of specificity of CSR disclosures 
is associated with better capital-market outcomes (Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016).  
 A second gap is whether the CSR reporting regulations differentially affect small 
and large investors. It is possible that the CSR regulations increase information processing 
costs for smaller investors. Consistent with this conjecture, Blankespoor, Miller, and White 
(2014) find an increase (decrease) in information asymmetry (liquidity) driven by small 
investors for XBRL adopting firms around 10-K filings after the SEC mandated XBRL.  
Third, understandably at this early stage, we find no empirical evidence on potential 
macroeconomic effects of CSR reporting regulations. The IFRS adoption literature 
provides some evidence of an increase in foreign direct investments when mandatory IFRS 
adoption leads to improved comparability (Beneish, Miller, and Yohn 2015; Defond et al. 
2011). It remains unexplored if CSR reporting regulations give rise to foreign direct 
investments based on the  notion that the reporting regulations improve the information 
environment and reduce information asymmetry (Hung, Shi, and Wang 2013; Krüger 2015; 
Tang and Zhong 2019).  
Finally, we call for research that links CSR reporting regulations to general 
economic, environmental and political outlook. For example, do regulators push for more 
CSR disclosure regulations if the macro-economic outlook is positive, but deregulate in 
poor economic times? Do environmental scandals give rise to more CSR reporting 
regulations? Also, does change from conservative to liberal political leadership or vice-
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versa affect CSR reporting regulations? For example, republican-majority US Congress 
repealed Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank Act in 2017. This type of research will be particularly 
relevant in a post COVID-19 world. 
 
2.5.3    Real Effects of CSR Reporting Regulations  
The CSR reporting regulations share some important features with financial reporting 
regulations. For example, as with financial reporting regulations, firms must develop 
reporting infrastructure to comply with the reporting regulations. However, there are 
important differences. For example, a key difference is that CSR disclosure audience and 
the uses of CSR information are much broader (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2019). Another 
unique feature of CSR reporting regulations is the embedded CSR activities beyond 
reporting and disclosure requirements. That is, CSR reporting cannot be entirely 
disentangled from CSR practices, leading firms to engage in costly CSR causes or explain 
reasons otherwise. This latter feature introduces an additional layer of costs on firms, 
especially for those firms that previously did not voluntarily engage in CSR activities. 
Therefore, CSR reporting regulations present an interesting quasi-natural experiment to 
examine real effects of reporting regulations. We discuss a number of future research 
directions that remain relatively unexplored. 
First, there is limited evidence on whether real effects associated with CSR 
reporting regulations persist or wane over time. As discussed in section 2.4.3, a growing 
number of studies provide early evidence supporting real effects of CSR reporting 
regulations (e.g., Barth et al. 2017; Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and 
Lehmann 2019; Ni and Zhang 2019). However, these studies provide evidence based on 
the early stages of CSR reporting regulations, rather than real effects after implementation. 
One possible channel in which CSR reporting regulations could have long-term effects is 
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whether firms shun or abandon environmentally irresponsible business operations. Early 
studies provide indirect evidence suggesting firms abandon certain operations following 
CSR reporting regulations (Christensen et al. 2017; Emerson 2017; Rauter 2019). 
However, it is possible that firms re-allocate resources and operations elsewhere (Rauter 
2019). In our view, the long-term real effects of CSR reporting regulations represent an 
important area for further research. 
Second, there is limited evidence on whether CSR reporting regulations cause 
affected firms to go private or go dark as an avoidance strategy. It is also unclear the extent 
to which CSR reporting regulations discourage firms to go public or cross-list in countries 
that mandate CSR disclosures. Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann (2019) focus on previously 
non-reporting EU firms and find no evidence of size management as an avoidance strategy 
after the CSR disclosure directive in the EU. Prior studies in other settings provide 
empirical evidence showing that firms manage size downward to avoid disclosure costs46 
(e.g., Bernard, Burgstahler, and Kaya 2018). If firms manage size downward and sacrifice 
growth to avoid costs of CSR reporting regulations through, for example, reductions in 
number of employees and/or decrease in tax payments, such strategies would potentially 
have negative welfare implications. However, such effects hinge on reporting enforcement 
level and whether firm-level CSR costs exceed benefits. 
Third, CSR reporting regulations present an interesting natural experiment to 
examine whether countries with poorer environmental and human rights reputation attract 
more socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. Ex ante, it is not clear how CSR 
reporting regulations affect SRI funds for countries with poorer environmental reputation. 
On the one hand, because CSR-conscious investors are motivated by both financial and 
                                                          
46 Similarly, evidence from the SOX literature shows (1) smaller firms left from the US public equity 
market and (2) foreign firms avoided the US as preferred listing market (for a review of the SOX 
literature see Coates and Srinivasan 2014).  
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social returns, it is possible that they would consider negative profitability effects of CSR 
regulations albeit empirical evidence on profitability effects of CSR regulation is still 
inconclusive (Bhagawan and Mukhopadhyay 2018; Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Krüger 
2015; Mukherjee, Bird, and Duppati 2018). On the other hand, however, CSR reporting 
regulations address and speak to concerns of CSR-conscious investors. Dyck et al. (2019) 
provide international evidence showing that socially responsible institutional investors 
drive CSR performance. Similarly, Riedl and Smeets (2017) find socially responsible 
investors are willing to earn lower returns on SRI funds than on conventional funds and 
pay higher management fees, suggesting these investors forgo financial returns to invest in 
accordance with their social preferences (also see also see also see also see Martin and 
Moser 2016). Effects of CSR reporting regulations on socially responsible investing funds 
of implementing countries represents an important area for further research. 
Finally, there is limited evidence on whether and how CSR reporting regulations 
affect performance measurement systems and control designs of affected firms (Erkens, 
Paugam, and Stolowy 2015). Several studies show that CSR reporting regulations are 
associated with improved workplace safety (Chen, Hung, and Wang 2018; Christensen et 
al. 2017) and internal decision-making (Barth et al. 2017). However, little is known about 
what is driving these outcomes, and whether affected firms start incorporating CSR 
measures (e.g., workplace safety and emissions) into their performance measurement 
systems post the reporting regulations.   
     
2.6 Conclusion  
In this study, we evaluate the international CSR reporting regulations and find that the 
stated objectives of the reporting regulations considerably vary depending on the socio-
economic development and institutional environment of the implementing countries. We 
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also find that most countries adopt a ‘comply-or-explain’ CSR reporting model, with 
assurance and reporting standards remaining voluntary.      
 Empirical research documents adverse capital-market reactions to important 
legislative events leading up to the CSR reporting regulations, consistent with investors 
and other capital-market participants perceiving CSR reporting regulations as costly. 
However, affected firms experience positive firm valuation outcomes over time, and the 
evidence suggests that the positive valuation outcomes stem from reductions in information 
asymmetry rather than improvements in operating performance. A growing number of 
empirical studies show that the CSR reporting regulations generate both positive and 
negative social externalities. Empirical research on improvements in reporting and 
disclosure quality is inconclusive. On balance, the net effects of CSR reporting regulations 
remain an open empirical challenge.    
In closing, we note that the evidence on the effects of CSR reporting regulations is 
predominantly archival. We concur with other recent calls and emphasis on studies that 
rely on multiple research approaches including more experimentation, field studies and in-
depth descriptive studies that feed empirical research on issues such as identification, 
theory-building and drawing causal inferences (Bloomfield, Nelson, and Soltes 2016; Chen 
and Schipper 2016; Erkens, Paugam, and Stolowy 2015; Gow, Larcker, and Reiss 2016). 
Combination of multiple research approaches is likely to help address some of the 
inconclusive findings from archival research and be informative to existing and potential 
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APPENDIX A – SUMMARY TABLES 
 





Affected Firms Requirement Regulatory Objective Assurance /Audit Penalties 
EU 06-Dec-14 01-Jan-17 Large firms with 500 or more 
employees, and with either more than 
EUR 20 million of total assets or more 
than EUR 40 million of sales. Firms are 
required to prepare a non-financial 
statement containing information 
relating to environmental, social and 
employee-related matters, respect for 




The objective of the directive 
is “to increase relevance, 
consistency, and 
comparability of information 
disclosed by certain large 
undertakings and groups 
across the Union”. 
Statutory auditors 
and audit firms are 
required to check 
that the non-
financial 
statement or the 
separate report has 
been provided. 
No specific penalties 
are stated. Individual 
Member States shall 
ensure that effective 
national procedures 
are in place to enforce 
compliance.  
UK 06-Aug-13 01-Oct -13 Section 414A of the Act requires all 
companies that are not small or micro-
entities to prepare a Strategic Report. 
Hybrid The stated objective is to 
“inform members of the 
company and help them 
assess how the directors have 
performed their duty”. 
  
Voluntary  Non-compliance 
results in a fine to 
company officials not 
exceeding the 
statutory maximum. 
Australia  01-Jul-14 30-Jun-15 
 
3rd Edition 
The Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) requires all listed firms to 
disclose “material exposure to 
economic, environmental and social 
sustainability risks”, and how they 
manage or intend to manage those risks 
on a “comply or explain” basis.  
Comply-or-
Explain  
To meet investors’ demands 
for greater transparency on 
the environmental and social 
risks faced by listed entities, 
so that investors in turn can 
properly assess the risk of 

























08-Feb-10 08-Feb-10 The SEC released guidance regarding 
disclosure related to CSR, specifically 
climate change disclosures under 
Regulation S-K stating that firms are 










Section 1502, 1503 and 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 contain 
provisions that mandate CSR disclosure 

















No specific objective. The 
SEC (2016) seeks feedback 
for the question of “If we 
were to adopt specific 
disclosure requirements 
involving sustainability or 
public policy issues, how 
could our rules elicit 
meaningful disclosure on 
such issues?”. 
 
The objective of Section 
1502 is to curb human rights 
violations in Central Africa 
by forcing US firms to 
disclose whether they are 



















No specific penalties 
are stated for firms 
that fail to disclose 
material CSR matters. 
However, firms are 
subject to fines if they 
fail to disclose 
material matters. 
Japan 2004 01-Apr-05 Specified corporations and government 
agencies are required to publish an 
environmental report each financial 
year. 
Mandatory To “ensure appropriate 
business-related 
environmental conservation, 
thereby contributing to 
ensuring a healthy and 
cultured living for both the 
present and future 
generations of the nation”. 





reliability of the 
environmental 
report 
A civil fine of up to 
200,000 yen shall be 
imposed on executive 
officer(s) if a 
Specified 
Corporation fails to 
publish an 
environmental report 
Canada  27-Oct-2010 27-Oct-10 The Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA) issued an Environmental 
Reporting Guidance for National 
Instrument (NI) 51-102 which requires 
listed firms to disclose “material” items 




To assist issuers recognize 
effects of their performance 
on the environment, assess 
regulatory costs and address 
investors’ demands for CSR 
information. 
Voluntary No specific penalties 
are stated for firms 
that fail to disclose 
material CSR matters.  
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31-Dec-08 Listed firms on both Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) are required to issue 
a standalone CSR report starting from 
fiscal year 2008. 
Mandatory The aim of the CSR reporting 
regulation is consistent with 
the Chinese government’s 
recent attempts to control 
increasing levels of 
environmental pollution and 
“building a harmonious 
society”. 
 
Voluntary  Both exchanges 
explicitly state that 
firms will be delisted 
and publicly 
condemned if they fail 




01-Sep-09 01-Mar-10 Listed firms on Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Limited (JSE) are required to 
issue integrated reports starting from 
fiscal year 2010. Before the integrated 
reporting mandate, sustainability 





CSR reporting requirements 
in South Africa are part of 
larger government policies 
intended to tackle social and 
economic inequalities 










No specific penalties 
are stated in The King 
Code of Governance 
Principles. 
India  29-Aug-13 29-Aug-13 Listed firms that meet certain size or 
profitability threshold must spend 2% of 
their average net income of the last three 
years on CSR issues. Non-spending 
firms must disclose why not. Affected 
firms must also publicly disclose an 
official CSR policy and report their 







The Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs specified a number of 
CSR areas in which affected 
firms should direct their CSR 
spending on including 
education, health care, 
poverty eradication, 
environment, arts, gender 
equality, reducing 







Voluntary Failure to explain 
shall result in 
monetary fine on the 
company and its 
officers, with default 
company officers 
potentially facing up 










































Listed firms on Bursa Malaysia are 
required to disclose their CSR activities 
or practices in the annual reports. If no 
CSR activities are undertaken, firms are 
required to provide a statement to that 
effect in their annual reports. 
 
CSR reporting requirements were 
amended in October 2015. Listed firms 
are now required to disclose a narrative 
sustainability statement of the 
management of material sustainability 
matters. The amendments take effect on 
a staggered basis over a period of 3 
years, beginning from 31 December 















The stated objective of these 
CSR reporting initiatives in 
Malaysia is to enhance the 














The Malaysian CSR 
reporting 
requirements do not 
state specific 
penalties for failure to 
disclose CSR matters.  
Brazil 04-Jan-12 04-Jan-12 Listed firms on BM&F BOVESPA (B3) 
are required to issue a regular 
sustainability report or explain reasons 




The objective is to develop 
and enhance Brazil’s capital 
market by encouraging best 
practices in transparency and 
management of a range of 
different strategies. Firms are 
required to align their 
reporting to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). 
Voluntary No specific penalties 
for non-compliance 
are stated. 
Indonesia  04-04-12 31-Dec-12 Listed firms are required to report CSR 




To ensure firms participate in 
the sustainable economic 
development, in order to 
increase the quality of life 
and environment, which will 
be valuable for the Company 
itself, the local community, 
and the society in general. 
Voluntary Firms that fail to 
comply with the 














Affected Firms Requirement Regulatory Objective Assurance /Audit Penalties 
Thailand 12-Dec-13 01-Jan-14 Listed firms on Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) are required to disclose 
their CSR policies and activities in their 





The objective of CSR 
reporting mandate is to 
monitor and control human 
trafficking, grow sustainable 
fishery, and curb corruption. 
The mandate is motivated by 
national efforts to attract 
foreign direct investment.  
Voluntary 
 
No specific penalties 
for non-compliance 
are stated. 
Taiwan 20-Oct-15 31-Dec-16 
 
Listed firms with common stock equal 
to or greater than NT$5 billion are 
required to issue CSR reports. Firms in 
the food, financial, and chemical 
industries, as well as listed firms where 
food and beverage sales account for 
more than 50% of total annual revenue 
are required to file CSR reports. 
Mandatory  
 
The aim is to improve 
reporting standards and 
attract more investors 
looking for sustainable 
investment opportunities. 







Listed firms are required to publish an 
ESG report on an annual basis. The 
mandate is organized into two ESG 
subject areas (i.e., Environmental and 
Social). These requirements take effect 
on a staggered basis over a 2 year 
period, beginning from 1 January 2016 




The mandate states that the 
longer term goal of the 
regulation is achieve better 
and more comprehensive 
ESG reporting amongst 
issuers in Hong Kong. 
Voluntary No specific penalties 
for non-compliance 
are stated. 
Singapore  20-Jul-16 31-Dec-17 
 
Listed firms are required to prepare a 
sustainability report, which must 
describe the issuer’s sustainability 
practices including a sustainability 
policy, material matters, targets in the 
future and board’s responsibility. 
Comply-or-
Explain  
To meet an increased 
demand of investors for 
financial reports to be 
supplemented by descriptive 
and quantitative information 
on how business is conducted 
and the sustainability of the 
current business into the 
future. 











Affected Firms Requirement Regulatory Objective Assurance /Audit Penalties 
Philippine 15-Feb-19 8 Mar-19 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requires public 
listed companies to issue a 




The aim is to ensure firms 
identify, evaluate, and 
manage their material 
Economic, Environmental 
and Social risks and 
opportunities 




Notes: Table 2.1 summarizes CSR reporting regulation developments worldwide and focuses on jurisdictions where there is a specific 
CSR reporting mandate for public listed firms. The table presents details on the adopting country / region, announcement date, effective 















Table 2. 2: Empirical evidence on reporting quality effects of CSR reporting regulations 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 






















2005-2012  CSR disclosure 
level 
 Voluntary 
adoption of GRI 
Mandatory CSR reporting firms 
significantly increased CSR disclosure 
level, increased voluntary assurance of 
CSR disclosure and increased likelihood 
adoption of voluntary reporting guidelines 
























Results show a significant increase in the 
level of mandated disclosures and 
narrative disclosures of affected firms 
relative to control firms after the 
disclosure mandate. This effect is less 
pronounced for firms with higher 
reporting incentives, suggesting that 
reporting incentives mitigate effects of 












 CSR disclosure 
level 
 CSR disclosure 
quality  
Firms significantly increased CSR 
disclosure quantity and quality following 
CSR reporting regulation. Corporate 
governance attributes drive increased 








China  5,660 firm-
years 
2006-2009  Issuance of CSR 
reports 
 Quality of CSR 
reports 
Affected firms increased issuing CSR 
reports over time. However, the quality 
(substance) of CSR reports did not 
increase over time - indicating firms 





Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 









































disclosure level  
Firms in South Africa significantly 
increased amount of CSR disclosures over 
time. The percentage of firms publishing 
CSR reports significantly increased both 
in the US and Europe, from 5% in 2006 to 
77% in 2015. Percentage of firms 
reporting CSR significantly increased 
from 13% to 47% in 2007 after the 
publication of GRI guidelines.  There is 
considerable heterogeneity in CSR 
reporting practices among global firms in 
the DJSI. Overall, results indicate 


















 Disclosure level  
 Disclosure quality  
Sample firms significantly increased 
amount, but not the quality, of CSR 
disclosures after the integrated reporting 
mandate in South Africa. 
No 
Setia et al. (2015) 
 
 




 Disclosure level  
 Disclosure quality  
Firms significantly increased amount, but 
not the quality, of CSR disclosures after 







South Africa 246 firm-
years 
2011-2013  CSR disclosure 
level  
 Disclosure quality  
Firms significantly increased amount, but 
not the quality, of CSR disclosures after 
the integrated reporting mandate. 
No 






2007-2012  CSR disclosure 
level  
 CSR disclosure 
quality  
This study focused on mining firms listed 
on SSE and SZSE and finds that amount, 
but not the quality, of CSR disclosures 
significantly increased over time. 
Membership of social responsibility index 
and cross-listing overseas are associated 




Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 




USA 133 firms 2014  Comprehensivene
ss of mineral 
disclosures 
 
Collaboration with NGO increases 
disclosure level. Activist protests also 
increase disclosure level. The effect of 
NGO collaboration on the 
comprehensiveness of mineral disclosures 
is higher when there are activist protests. 
Yes (contingent) 







105 firms 2012  CSR Disclosure 
level 
 CSR Disclosure 
quality 
 
A significant number of firms provided 
disclosures in response to the disclosure 
mandate. However, the disclosures tended 
to be symbolic rather than substantive. 
No 











122 firms 2015  Disclosure level 
 Determinants of 
disclosure 
Results show a considerable variation 
among disclosing firms’ adherence to the 
disclosure mandate. Firms with long-term 
oriented managerial incentives, more 
frequent board meetings, strong 
governance systems and inclusion in a 
sustainability index are associated with 
higher levels of conflict mineral 
disclosures. 
No 




2009-2012  CSR disclosure 
quality 
CSR disclosure quality increased after the 
reporting regulation. The effect is more 
pronounced among larger and more 
profitable firms, but is less pronounced for 
firms controlled by the government. 
 
Yes 













 CSR disclosure 
level 
CSR disclosure level increased for 
affected firms relative to control firms 
after the Act. The increase in disclosure 
level is larger for firms with higher levels 
of carbon emissions, consistent with firms 
using more disclosures to address public 






Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 




2014-2015  CSR disclosure 
quality 
Results show that nearly 80% of the 
sample companies admitted that they were 
unable to determine whether their 
products are free from conflict minerals, 
with only 1% of the companies declaring 
that their products are not sourced from 
conflict minerals with certainty beyond 
reasonable doubt. More complex firms 
and firms with larger supply chains 




Wang et al (2019) 
 
South Africa 356 firm-
years 





Results show a significant increase in 
integrated reporting quality over time.  
Both the extent and quality of CEMs have 
also increased over time. In addition, 
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., 
the board and audit committee) are 
positively associated with both reporting 









South Africa 246 firm-
years 
2011-2013  Reporting quality 
 
Results show a significant increase in 
integrated reporting quality over time. 
Audit committee effectiveness is 












2016-2017  CSR disclosure 
quality 
 CSR disclosure 
Comparability  
Results show an increase in the quality of 
CSR disclosures of both firms listed in 
Italy and Germany. Results also show 
comparability of CSR reports across the 







Australia 97 firms  2015  Disclosure level 
 Disclosure 
substance 
Results show a high level of disclosures 
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Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 






2010-2013  Number of CSR 
reports issued 
 CSR disclosure 
quality  
Results show a decrease in the number of 
affected companies publishing CSR 
reports in Spain after a CSR reporting 
regulation in 2011. Disclosure quality also 
remains low. However, results indicate a 
modest increase in the quality of 
disclosures over time. 
 
No 




2010-2013  Number of CSR 
reports issued 
 CSR disclosure 
quality 
Results show an increase in the number of 
public sector organizations (PSO) issuing 
CSR reports after the CSR reporting 
regulation in Spain. However, CSR 





Peña and Jorge 
(2019) 
Spain 147 firms 2014-2015  Number of CSR 
reports issued 
 CSR disclosure 
level 
Results show 33 out of 147 PSO issued 
CSR reports. Results also indicate a low 
level of disclosures. 
 
No 




2004, 2010  CSR disclosure 
level 




Results show a significant increase in 
CSR disclosure level and quality. 
However, informational quality (e.g., 
comparability, relevance) remains low 
after the reporting regulation. Further, 
























 CSR disclosure 
level 
 CSR disclosure 
quality  
CSR disclosure level significantly for 
French firms but not for Canadian firms. 
Also compliance and disclosure quality 
are significantly higher in France than 
Canada. However, disclosure quality in 







Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 
Schwartz (2016) USA 1,319 2014  Compliance to 
Section 1502 
 CSR disclosure 
quality 
Results show that only 1,319 firms filed 
Form SD compared to the SEC’s estimate 
of 5,994 firms. Of the 1,319 Form SD 
filing firms, only 1,020 firms 
supplemented conflict mineral reports. 
The study concludes that the disclosure 




Notes: Table 2.2 summarizes empirical studies on reporting and disclosure quality effects of CSR reporting mandates. The table provides 
details on the sample, outcome variables, key findings and whether the specific study’s results are consistent (inconsistent) with the 
objectives of the CSR reporting regulation. If the effects of the CSR reporting mandate are confined to a subset of firms, we conclude 















Table 2. 3: Empirical evidence on the impact CSR reporting regulations on assurance 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 






















2005-2012  CSR disclosure 
assurance  
 
CSR disclosure assurance increases for 
mandatory CSR reporting firms relative 




Ackers and Eccles 
(2015) 




 CSR disclosure 
assurance  
 
CSR assurance increases after the 
‘comply-or-explain’ assurance 
requirement in South Africa from 9% in 
2008 (pre-regulation) to 26% in 2012. 
This uptake is more visible in larger and 





Ackers (2017) South Africa 800 firm-
years 
2007-2014  CSR disclosure 
assurance  
CSR assurance increase over time from 
14% in 2007 to 36% in 2014. Despite the 
increase, majority of the sample firms 
(i.e., 64%) does not obtain CSR 
disclosure assurance and choose the 
‘explain’ feature of the ‘comply-or-
explain’ regime. Further, larger and 
environmentally sensitive firms are more 
likely to obtain CSR disclosure assurance, 
indicating CSR assurance is driven by 





Zhou et al. (2019) South Africa 564 firm-
years 
2009-2015  Assurance  






Combined assurance provisions in South 
Africa increases over time. Results also 
indicate combined assurance is associated 
with several capital-market benefits 
including reduction in analyst forecast 







Table 2.3 Continued 
 
Study Number of 
countries 
Sample  Fiscal 
year(s) 
Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 
Maroun (2019) South Africa 294 firm-
years 
2010-2016  CSR disclosure 
assurance  
 Reporting quality  
CSR disclosure assurance increases from 
38% in 2010 to 54% in 2016. The number 
of CSR disclosure items externally 
assured is associated with higher 
disclosure quality, regardless of whether 
reasonable or limited assurance is 
obtained. Further, reporting quality is 
higher when assurance is provided by 





Notes: Table 2.3 summarizes empirical studies on the impact of CSR reporting regulations on CSR disclosure assurance. The table 
provides details on the sample, outcome variables, key findings and whether the specific study’s results are consistent (inconsistent) 
with the objectives of the CSR reporting regulation. If the effects of the CSR reporting regulation are confined to a subset of firms, we 













Table 2. 4: Event studies on capital-market reactions to CSR reporting regulations 
 




Outcome variable(s) Key findings Consistent with the 















2009-2013  CAR 
 Tobin’s Q 
CAR and Tobin’s Q of affected firms 
significantly decline around events 
associated with CSR regulation. Firm value 
effects of the CSR rule is less negative for 




Chen et al (2018) 
 
 





2006-2011  CAR 
 
CAR of affected firms significantly 

















2013-2014  CAR 
 
CAR of affected firms significantly 
declines around events associated with CSR 
reporting directive (i.e., (an average decline 
of $79M in market value). The negative 
effects are concentrated for firms with weak 
pre-regulation CSR disclosure and 
performance. Results also show that firms 
with stronger pre-regulation CSR records 








USA 67 firms  2010-2015  CAR CAR of affected firms significantly 
declines around 12 events associated with 
the passage of Section 1504. The negative 
effect is stronger for firms that face greater 
reputational risk, consistent with these 
firms facing higher exposure to potential 














CAR of affected firms declines around four 
events leading up to the passage of Section 
1504. Results also show firms’ voluntary 
disclosure of extractive payments to host 
governments before the disclosure mandate 







Table 2.4 Continued 
 
 




Outcome variable(s) Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 




2008-2014  CAR CAR significantly declines around events 
associated with Section 1502. The negative 
effect is larger for firms relying on conflict 
minerals. Results also show a negative 
market reaction to initial conflict mineral 
disclosures for filing firms.  
 
No 




USA 797   CAR CAR of Form SD-filing firms declines at 
their filing date. Further analyses based on 
a sub-sample of firms issuing conflict 
minerals reports show that the negative 
capital-market reaction is less pronounced 
for firms with more extensive disclosures.  
No 
Griffin et al. 
(2014) 





2010-2012  CAR CAR of filing firms declines following 
initial conflict mineral disclosures. Results 
also show industry and size-matched 
control firms experience negative firm 
value effects, consistent with investors 
using the available information to assess the 
valuation of non-disclosing firms. 
 
No 




USA 105   CAR Based on to two events associated with the 
passage of disclosure mandate in 
California, results show the CAR of 
affected firms declines both for individual 
and combined events following the 
disclosure mandate. The negative firm 
value effects are stronger for firms facing 
higher regulatory cost exposures. 
No 
Wang and Li 
(2016) 






2007-2012  CAR CAR of CSR-reporting firms is higher 
relative to non-CSR reporting firms. 
However, when sample is partitioned into 
mandatory and non-mandatory CSR firms, 
results show no significant differences 
between the firm value of voluntary and 





Table 2.4 Continued 
 




Outcome variable(s) Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 




UK 205 2012-2015  CAR No evidence of CAR changes for the 
combined events or individual event date.  
However, there is a positive stock market 
reaction on the first trading day when the 
stock market learned about the UK 
Government’s plans to tackle modern 
slavery through legislative action. The 
positive effect is stronger for firms with a 
lower risk of modern slavery in their 
business chain. Results are unaffected by a 
firm’s CSR disclosure levels nor a firm’s 




Notes: Table 2.4 summarizes event studies on capital-market reactions to CSR reporting regulations. The table provides details on the 
sample, outcome variables, key findings and whether the specific study’s results are consistent or inconsistent with the stated objectives 
of the relevant CSR reporting regulation. If the effects of the CSR reporting regulations are confined to a subset of firms, we conclude that 















Table 2. 5: Empirical evidence on direct economic consequences of CSR reporting regulations 
 




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 







2008-2014  Tobin’s Q 
 Liquidity  
 Bid-ask spreads 
 Investment 
  R&D,  
 ROA 
 
Firm value and liquidity of affected firms 
increases relative to European control firms 
after the UK’s disclosure regulation. 
Information asymmetry also decreases after the 
reporting regulation. However, no evidence of 
investment, R&D and ROA effects, consistent 
with the regulation having capital-market 

















2006-2016  Tobin’s Q 
 ROA 
Firm value (Tobin’s Q) and profitability (ROA) 
of affected firms are significantly higher 























2005-2012  Tobin’s Q Firm value increases for affected firms relative 
to control firms after the reporting regulations. 
The increase in firm value is driven by 






UK 742 firm-years 2011-2014  Firm value CSR disclosures (i.e., emissions) are negatively 
associated with firm value for the full-sample 
period. However, the magnitude of the negative 
effects of carbon emissions on firm value 
decreased after the CSR reporting regulation in 
the UK, and the decrease is larger for firms in 
energy-intensive industries, consistent with the 
regulation forestalling investors’ negative 






Table 2.5 Continued 
 




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 




2000-2016  Stock price crash 
risk  
Probability of stock price crash risk 
significantly declines for affected firms in 
countries that implement CSR disclosure 
regulations. The decrease is larger for less 
transparent firms before the regulations. 
 
Yes 




South Africa 822 firm-years 2010-2013  Tobin’s Q 
 Stock return  
 ROA 
Integrated reporting quality is associated with 
increased firm value and firm performance 
(return and ROA). The effects are stronger for 
firms with higher organizational complexity 
and firms with external financing needs. 
 
Yes (contingent) 
Barth et al. 
(2017) 
 
South Africa 320 firm-years 2011-2014  Liquidity 
 Cost of capital 
 Future cash flow 
Integrated reporting quality is associated with 
increased liquidity and expected future cash 
flows but does not affect cost of capital. 
 
Yes (contingent) 
Caglio et al. 
(2020) 
South Africa 443 firm-years 2011–2016  Tobin’s Q 
 Bid-ask spreads 
 CSR controversy 
Integrated reporting readability and 
conciseness are respectively associated with 
positive firm valuation and increased liquidity. 
Textual characteristics of integrated reports 
also affect CSR reputation scores of firms. 
 
Yes (contingent) 




South Africa 443 firm-years 2009-2012  Cost of capital 
 Stock return 
 
Integrated reporting quality is associated with 
lower cost of equity capital, and lower stock 
returns consistent with investors accepting 
lower returns for firms with better information 
environment. Reduction in cost of capital is 
















2006-2010  Information 
asymmetry 
Affected firms experience a decrease in 
information asymmetry following the CSR 
regulation in China. The decrease is stronger 
for firms with greater political or social risks, 
poorer information environments, and better 
CSR reporting quality. Unaffected firms 
voluntarily release CSR reports on or after the 





Table 2.5 Continued 
 




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 
Kajueter et al. 
(2019) 





2017  Liquidity 
 
No overall liquidity effects after the CSR 
disclosure directive in the EU for the full 
sample. Further analyses show that firms in 
weaker institutional environments and few 
prior CSR disclosure regulations experience 
small but significant liquidity benefits. 
However, the CSR directive does not provide 
incremental liquidity benefits for firms in 










2005-2012  Cost of debt  Cost of debt decreases for affected firms 
relative to control firms after the CSR reporting 
regulation. Affected firms also have more 
access to long-term debt. Further analyses 
show that the decrease in cost of debt is 
stronger among firms with higher CSR scores, 
longer CSR reports, political connections and 




Gong et al. 
(2018) 
China 344 Bonds 2010-2013  Cost of debt High CSR disclosure quality is associated with 
lower costs of corporate bonds, and more for 




Lemma et al. 
(2019) 
South Africa 832 firm-years 2009-2015  Leverage Integrated reporting is associated with lower 
(higher) levels of debt (equity) financing, 
suggesting that integrating reporting may be 
driven by a firm’s financing needs. 
No 









2006-2011  ROA 
 ROE 
 
CSR reporting mandate is associated with 
significant decreases in firm profitability (ROA 
and ROE) of affected firms by 26% and 20% 
relative to control firms. These results are 







Table 2.5 Continued 
 




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 








2008-2015  ROE Results show that firm profitability (ROE) of 
affected firms significantly decreases after the 
CSR mandate in India relative to control firms. 
The decrease in ROE is stronger for firms that 
previously did not spend on CSR activities. 
Results also show an overall decrease in CSR 
spending, with large affected firms reducing 
their CSR spending after the CSR mandate. 
No 
 
Notes: Table 2.5 summarizes direct empirical studies on economic consequence of CSR reporting regulations. The table provides details 
on the sample, outcome variables, key findings and whether the specific study’s results are consistent or inconsistent with the stated 
objectives of the relevant CSR reporting regulation. If the effects of the CSR reporting mandate are confined to a subset of firms, we 



















Table 2. 6: Indirect empirical evidence on capital-market effects of CSR reporting regulations 
 




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 










Affect firms significantly constrain earnings 
management following the CSR reporting 
regulation. This effect is stronger for firms with 
poor information environments (i.e., firms with 
lower analyst coverage), consistent with the 












Results show an increase in the earnings 
valuation coefficient (EPS), consistent with 
integrated reporting improving the valuation 
relevance of accounting information. However, 
inconsistent with the expectations of integrated 
reporting, results show a decrease in the value 







South Africa 205 firms 2008- 2012  Analyst forecast 
accuracy 
Results show the association between CSR 
disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy 
improves after, not before, the integrated 
reporting mandate. These results do not persist 
for financial firms, suggesting that investors 
put greater weight on CSR disclosures of non-











Results show positive between firm 
relationships between the levels of CSR 
disclosures and the level of analyst following, 
suggesting CSR disclosures are value relevant 
to analysts.  
Yes 
Zhou et al. 
(2017) 
South Africa 443 firm-years 2009-2012  Analyst forecast 
accuracy  
Integrated reporting quality is associated with 
improved analyst forecast accuracy. 
 
Yes (contingent) 
Caglio et al. 
(2020) 
South Africa 443 firm-years 2011–2016  Analyst forecast 
accuracy 
 
Integrated reporting tone bias is associated with 
less dispersed analysts’ estimates. Assured 
integrated reports are also associated with 
lower analysts forecast dispersion, consistent 
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Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 








CSR reporting regulation in China constrains 
accounting conservatism and earnings 
management. However, the effects are less 
significant for stated owned firms. 
 
Yes (contingent) 
Nair et al. (2019) India 363 firm-years 2014-2017  Earnings 
management 
Results indicate a decrease in earnings 
management in India after the CSR reporting 
regulation. The decrease is stronger (weaker) 
for firms with retail (institutional) investors, 
consistent with the CSR disclosure regulation 




Tlili et al. (2019) South Africa 885 firm-years 2006-2015  Market value  Results show value relevance of organizational 
capital significantly increased after the 
implementation of the integrated reporting 




Notes: Table 2.6 summarizes empirical studies that indirectly assess economic consequences by examining effects of CSR reporting 
mandates on information environment. The table provides details on the sample, outcome variables, key findings and whether the specific 
study’s results are consistent or inconsistent with the stated objectives of the relevant CSR reporting regulation. If the effects of the CSR 
reporting mandate are confined to a subset of firms, we conclude that the results are contingently consistent with the objectives of CSR 












Table 2. 7: Empirical evidence on real effects of CSR reporting regulations 
 
 
Evidence on CSR performance and spending  




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 












2011-2015  CSR scores CSR scores of affected firms that previously 
did not issue voluntary CSR reports 
significantly increased after the EU CSR 
Directive. Further, the increase is stronger for 
firms with previously low levels of CSR scores, 
and for firms with higher exposure to potential 
adverse stakeholder reactions. 
 
Yes 










2002-2014  CSR scores 
 Irresponsible 
scores 
Firms in countries with mandatory CSR 
reporting engage significantly more CSR 
activities. This effect is stronger for firms with 
low levels of CSR activities pre-regulation. 
However, corporate irresponsibility does not 




Gao et al. (2016) Netherlands 491 firm-years 2004-2012  CSR 
performance 
CSR performance of sample firms significantly 
improved after the initiation of Transparency 
Benchmark program in the Netherlands. 
Results also show CSR disclosure quality is 
positively associated with CSR performance 
which in turn lead to positive capital-market 
benefits including greater analyst coverage, 
higher levels of institutional ownership, and 
greater stock liquidity.  
 
Yes 









2013-2016  CSR scores 
(performance) 
 CSR scores 
(disclosure) 
 
Firms with weak pre-regulation CSR disclosure 
(performance) scores strengthen their CSR 
disclosure (performance) in anticipation of the 
Directive by 10% (20%), versus just 4% (1%) 
for firms having high pre-regulation CSR 
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Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 







2012–2015  CSR spending CSR spending of affected firms significantly 
increased after the regulation in India. Based on 
subsample analysis of top 100 firms, results 
show that firms initially spending less (more) 
than 2% of their profits on CSR issues 
increased (decreased) their CSR spending.  
 
Yes (contingent) 
Boodoo (2016) India 7,302 firm-
years 
2010-2013  CSR scores CSR scores of affected firms improved after the 
CSR regulation in India relative to a control 






India 798 firm-years 2015-2016  CSR spending Results show an overall increase in CSR 
spending over time in India. However, a 
substantial number of firms spend less than the 
amount specified in the mandate. Results also 
show firms in business groups have higher 
likelihood of spending only the required value, 
indicating group policies for CSR spending.  
 
Yes (contingent) 




2010-2016  CSR spending 
 CSR disclosure 
Results show an increase in CSR disclosures 
and spending of affected firms after the 
regulation. However, larger firms decreased 
their CSR spending to about the required levels 
after the regulation. 
 
Yes (contingent) 







2006-2011  Employee 
fatalities 
Results show a significant decrease in 
workplace fatalities (i.e., employee deaths) of 
affected firms relative to control firms after the 
CSR disclosure regulation in China, consistent 
with the CSR regulation improving workplace 
safety and thus creating positive externalities. 
Yes 
Christensen et al. 
(2017) 
 












Disclosing safety records in financial reports 
led 11% decrease in mining-related citations 
and 13% decrease in injuries for affected firms 
relative to control firms. However, results show 
a decline in labor productivity of affected 
mining firms, indicating a tradeoff between 
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Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 
objectives of Reg.? 
Liu and Tian 
(2019) 










2004-2013  Investment 
efficiency 
Results show an  increase in investment 
efficiency via reduction in overinvestment of 
affected firms relative to control firms, 
consistent with CSR reporting regulations 
strengthening monitoring and corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Yes 
Barth et al. (2017) 
 
 




Results show a positive association between 
integrated reporting quality and expected future 
cash flows. Disentangling two possible 
channels in which this association occurs: a 
capital-market effect (i.e.., better investor cash 
flow forecasts) and/or a real effect channel (i.e., 
better internal decisions), results show higher 
integrated reporting quality is associated with 
higher investment efficiency, but not with 
higher realized future operating cash flows, 



















2006-2011  Dividend 
payouts 
Dividend payouts of affected firms 
significantly decreases after the CSR reporting 
mandate relative to control firms. The decrease 
in dividend payouts is more pronounced for 
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Evidence on carbon emissions   




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 












2005-2013  Environmental 
impact ratio (IR) 
Both direct and indirect environmental impact 
of affected firms significantly decreases 
relative to control firms after CSR reporting 
regulation. Reduction in pollution levels is 
larger among affected firms in environmentally 












2006-2011  Industrial 
wastewater 
discharge 
 SO2 emission 
levels 
Cities most affected by the CSR reporting 
regulation enjoy a greater decrease in their 
industrial wastewater and SO2 emission levels, 
with a city-level decrease of 28% (24%) in 
industrial wastewater discharge (SO2 emission) 
after the CSR reporting mandate.  
Yes 
Downar et al. 
(2019) 







Results show a significant decrease in carbon 
emissions of affected firms for up to 18% after 
the disclosure regulation in the UK relative to 
control firms. Emission reductions occur across 
all industries but are more pronounced for firms 












Results show a significant 15% decrease in 
carbon emissions of UK firms after the 
disclosure regulation relative to a control group 
of European firms. The decrease is larger for 
firms with high levels of tangible assets. 
 
Yes 
Tomar (2019) USA 13009 
Affected firm-







Results show a 7% decrease in emissions after 
the disclosure regulation, and reductions in 
emissions are larger for facilities with more 
disclosing peers nearby consistent with 
benchmarking-learning hypothesis. Results 
also show that within-industry emissions 
dispersion declines, indicating greater overlap 











Evidence on the unintended consequences CSR reporting regulations 




Outcome variables Key findings Consistent with the 









2010-2017  Extractive 
payment 
 Payment gap 
 Segment 
investments 
Results show an increase in extractive 
payments of affected firms to host governments 
relative to control firms after the disclosure 
mandate. Results also show decrease in capital 
expenditures of affected firms relative to 
control firms after the mandate. However, no 
effect of the mandate on extractive payment 
gaps, a proxy for corruption in host countries. 
 
Yes (contingent) 





Republic of the 
Congo 
7,697 infants 2007-2012  Infant mortality Results show a significant increase in infant 
deaths in villages near the policy-targeted 
mines. Infant deaths increased by at least 143 
percent. Results indicate that mothers’ 
consumption of infant health care goods and 
services decreased following the passage of the 
legislation, consistent with the Act imposing a 











2004–2012  Looting  
 Battles  
Results show violence in Congo increased after 
the passage of Section 1502. Looting of 
civilians increased and militia battles shifted 
toward unregulated gold-mining territories. 
No 







2006-2015  GDP growth 
 US foreign direct 
investment in 
Africa/ DRC 
 Deaths by armed 
violent conflict in 
DRC 
Results indicate GDP per capita and US 
Foreign Direct Investment in Congo and other 
affected countries have decreased after Section 
1502. Deaths by violent conflicts have 
increased per year after congress and the SEC 




Notes: Table 2.7 summarizes empirical studies on real effects of CSR reporting regulations. The table provides details on the sample, 
outcome variables, key findings and whether the specific study’s results are consistent or inconsistent with the stated objectives of the CSR 
reporting regulation. If the effects of the CSR reporting mandate are confined to a subset of firms, we conclude that the results are 












































Several countries have recently passed disclosure regulations that contain “comply-or-
explain” clauses. In this study, I experimentally examine whether comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulation affects managers’ disclosure recommendations of a probable negative 
event affecting the firm’s underlying economics. I also consider whether the impact of 
comply-or-explain regulation is moderated by the firm’s prior disclosure policy (known to 
be biased toward no disclosure versus unknown). Drawing on motivated reasoning theory 
with insights from reason writing literature in psychology and legal research, I predict and 
find that managers are more likely to make disclosure of a negative event in a comply-or-
explain regulatory system relative to a voluntary regime. I also find that the impact of 
comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure judgements is larger when the firm’s 
prior disclosure policy is unknown than when it is known to be biased toward no disclosure. 
In addition, mediation analyses suggest that comply-or-explain regulatory system increases 
managers’ perceived accountability which in turn drives their disclosure recommendations. 
I discuss the implications of these results for global regulators, board of directors, and 
investors. 
 













In recent years, an increasing number of countries have passed disclosure regulations that 
contain “comply-or-explain” provisions. The comply-or-explain regulatory system was 
first introduced in the UK’s Cadbury Report of Corporate Governance in 1992, and is since 
increasingly adopted as an alternative disclosure regulation to voluntary or mandatory 
disclosure requirements (Ho 2017; Zadkovich 2007). Specifically, regulators in several 
countries have passed comply-or-explain regulations to enforce a wide range of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) related disclosure topics47. In short, the comply-or-explain 
system contains clauses that allow firms to deviate from governance or disclosure 
requirements, but mandates firms to explain their reasons if they forgo compliance. 
Although historically common outside the US, the comply-or-explain approach is also 
increasingly becoming popular in the US. For example, several sections of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Act contain such provisions (Coates and Srinivasan 2014; 
Honigsberg 2019).  
Proponents argue that the comply-or-explain system recognizes and remedies the 
mandatory one-size-fits-all conundrum - particularly for broad disclosure topics such as 
nonfinancial reporting - while also putting pressure on firms to explain lack of disclosure 
(Ho 2017). However, others point out that firms could trigger the explain clause and forgo 
compliance, or provide perfunctory explanations for non-compliance (Arcot, Bruno, and 
Faure-Grimaud 2010; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2019).  
Empirical research on the implications of comply-or-explain as a disclosure 
regulation is still limited. Early studies focus on capital-market reactions to disclosure 
regulations that contain comply-or-explain clauses (Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; 
                                                          
47 Examples of jurisdictions adopting the comply-or-explain approach for CSR disclosures include the 
European Union, United Kingdom, Australia, India, South Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Brazil and others. 
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Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017). It is less clear how comply-or-explain regulations affect 
managerial disclosure judgements, particularly disclosures impacting the firm’s stock 
price. Theories in psychology such as reason writing theory suggest that the pressure to 
justify one’s decision to others make people more accountable, and potentially reduce 
decision bias (Liu 2018; Paxton, Ungar, and Greene 2012; Sieck and Yates 1997; Tetlock 
1983). However, prior accounting studies have long documented that firm managers 
exploit ambiguity in reporting requirements to arrive at desired conclusions such as 
maintaining the firm’s stock price (Bao et al. 2019; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; 
Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 1983). 
In this study, I examine whether comply-or-explain regulation affects managers’ 
disclosure recommendations of a negative event affecting the firm’s underlying economics. 
I also examine whether potential effect of the comply-or-explain system is moderated by 
the firm’s prior disclosure preference toward no disclosure. 
Understanding the effects of a comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ 
disclosure judgements is important as follows. First, while regulators in important 
economies such as the EU, UK, Australia, and India among others have recently passed 
CSR disclosure regulations that contain comply-or-explain clauses, other regulators such 
as the SEC continue to consider appropriate CSR disclosure requirements. For example, 
the SEC (2016, p. 213) is currently seeking feedback for several policy questions, among 
them is “if we were to adopt specific disclosure requirements involving sustainability or 
public policy issues, how could our rules elicit meaningful disclosure on such issues?”. The 
SEC also asked “How could we create a disclosure framework that would be flexible 
enough to address such issues as they evolve over time?” (SEC 2016, p. 213). In the same 
public release, the commission notes a concern that adopting mandatory CSR disclosure 
rules may cause registrants to disclose information that is not material to investors. My 
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study should be informative to the SEC and other global regulators as they consider 
appropriate disclosure regulation for evolving disclosure issues, and in particular, the 
effectiveness of the comply-or-explain system. Second, the comply-or-explain system 
offers a fresh alternative to the voluntary versus mandatory regulation dichotomy that has 
been the focus of prior accounting research. I provide first evidence on how the comply-
or-explain system affects managerial disclosure judgements. Further, examining managers’ 
disclosure judgements across alternative disclosure regimes and reporting preferences is 
important because it highlights in settings where managers exhibit similar (different) 
disclosure behavior in response to proposed disclosure regulations, potentially mitigating 
the unintended consequences of costly disclosure regulations (Dye 1990; Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016; Libby, Rennekamp, and Seybert 2015).  
I draw on reasoning and accountability theories to predict that managers’ disclosure 
recommendation under a comply-or-explain regime is moderated by the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy. Motivated reasoning theory suggests that managers arrive at disclosure 
choices that are consistent with pre-existing reporting preferences (Kunda 1990). Prior 
accounting research generally supports this prediction in various settings, and finds that 
accounting professionals exploit ambiguity in reporting requirements to arrive at desired 
conclusions (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher 2003; 
Mayorga and Trotman 2016; Tayler 2010; Wilks 2002). However, managers’ motivated 
reasoning is constrained when they face higher litigation risk (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 
2009). Following this reasoning, I first predict that managers are more likely to disclose a 
probable negative event affecting the firm’s economic outlook in a comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulation than in a voluntary regime. A separate line of research based on 
accountability theory suggests that people – including accounting professionals - adjust 
their positions when the party to whom they are accountable has known versus unknown 
116 
preferences (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Building on the accountability literature, I 
hypothesize that knowledge of the firm’s prior disclosure policy moderates effects of 
comply-or-explain regulation, such that managers disclosure recommendation of a negative 
event is higher when prior disclosure policy of the firm is unknown than when it is known 
to be  biased toward less disclosure.  
To test my predictions, I conduct a 2 × 2 between-participants experiment with 
experienced corporate managers. I manipulate disclosure regulation type at two levels 
(comply-or-explain versus voluntary) and knowledge of the firm’s prior disclosure policy 
(known to be biased toward no disclosure versus unknown). In my setting, participants 
(hereafter managers) consider a specific form of risk disclosure involving a climate change-
related risk matter that poses probable risks to three key business segments of the firm. I 
focus on climate change risk matter because it is a disclosure issue that plausibly involves 
considerable managerial discretion and is a matter where there is less regulatory and/or 
professional guidance48 (Ho 2018). The experimental approach is appropriate for my 
research question and hypotheses because archival data of firms subject to different 
disclosure regulations is unavailable and/or entails confounds across different institutional 
settings. In addition, firms’ disclosure policy is difficult to observe in archival settings 
(Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018; Mayorga and Trotman 2016). Further, experimental 
method allows me to more directly examine the effects of alternative disclosure regimes 
on managers’ disclosure judgements while holding key features of the firm constant (Libby, 
Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002).  
                                                          
48 Despite publishing an interpretive release to clarify existing disclosure requirements related to climate 
change-related risk disclosures (SEC 2010), the SEC continues to receive comment letters from the 
investing public as well as other stakeholder groups suggesting that current climate change-related 
disclosures are insufficient (SEC 2016). As a result, the SEC (2016, p. 215) seeks feedback for several 
policy questions including “Are existing disclosure requirements adequate to elicit the information that 
would permit investors to evaluate material climate change risk? Why or why not? If not, what additional 
disclosure requirements or guidance would be appropriate to elicit that information?”. 
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Results are consistent with my predictions. Specifically, I find that managers are 
more likely to make disclosure of a negative event affecting the firm’s underlying 
economics in a comply-or-explain disclosure regime than in a voluntary regime. I also find 
that the effect of a comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure recommendations 
is larger when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown than when it is known to be 
biased toward no disclosure. Mediation analyses further indicate that increased 
accountability drives managers’ increased likelihood of recommending disclosure in a 
comply-or-explain disclosure system. These results are robust after controlling a variety of 
manager-specific factors such as their financial reporting experience, overall managerial 
experience, accounting knowledge, and familiarity with capital-market consequences of 
bad news disclosures. 
I contribute to the literature in several ways. First, I contribute to recent archival 
studies that provide evidence of capital-market and real effects of disclosure regulations 
that contain comply-or-explain clauses49 (Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, 
and Lehmann 2019; Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017). I 
extend this line of research by considering how comply-or-explain disclosure regulations 
affect managerial disclosure judgements. My study is closely related to Honigsberg (2019) 
who shows that misreporting at US hedge funds declined after a comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulation. Consistent with a real effect channel, Honigsberg (2019) finds that 
reduction in misreporting is larger for funds most likely to be scrutinized by the SEC and 
                                                          
49 I also contribute to a large corporate governance literature that examines the effectiveness of comply-
or-explain governance regulations. This literature provides mixed results. For example, several studies 
find that the comply-or-explain regime is associated with high compliance rate (Akkermans et al. 2007; 
Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud 2010; He and Li 2018). However, other studies find the opposite, and 
conclude that the comply-or-explain regime is ineffective (Andres and Theissen 2008; Hooghiemstra 
and van Ees 2011; Keay 2014; MacNeil and Li 2006; Van de Poel and Vanstraelen 2011). I reconcile 
mixed results of prior literature by considering how the comply-or-explain interacts with pre-existing 
goals of the firm – an environmental factor that the comply-or-explain literature has not considered, yet 
is known to affect corporate outcomes (Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Gibbins, Richardson, and 
Waterhouse 1990). 
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investors, and is driven by hedge funds making real changes in their internal governance 
mechanisms. I use a controlled experiment with experienced managers to provide 
corroborating evidence on a different channel that is difficult to observe in an archival 
setting. Specifically, my findings indicate that comply-or-explain disclosure regulations 
increase managers’ perceived accountability, which in turn influence their disclosure 
recommendations. Importantly and unlike prior literature, I show that the firm’s prior 
disclosure preference is an important variable in the effectiveness of comply-or-explain 
regulations.  
Second, I extend the vast and growing CSR reporting literature that has largely 
focused on CSR reporting in voluntary settings. Specifically, I contribute to a recent line 
of studies that shows personal social preferences of managers may explain CSR investment 
and disclosure decisions (Church et al. 2019; Davidson, Dey, and Smith 2019; Martin and 
Moser 2016; Riedl and Smeets 2017). Unlike prior research, I consider a setting in which 
CSR reporting is mandatory. In doing so, I respond to Moser and Martin (2012, p. 802) 
who call for experimental research that creates and examines experimental settings in 
which alternative CSR disclosure requirements exist. 
Third, I contribute to two separate lines of accounting research that document pre-
existing personal and firm preferences affect managers’ disclosure judgements (Baginski 
et al. 2017; Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Mayorga and Trotman 2016). I extend this line 
of literature by considering the joint effect of pre-existing personal and firm preferences 
across alternative disclosure regimes. Specifically, I find that managers’ personal views on 
environmental risks and prior disclosure policy of the firm interact, such that managers are 
less likely to recommend disclosure of a negative event in a comply-or-explain regime.  
Finally, my study has policy implications for global regulators, and particularly 
responds to the SEC’s question of “how could our rules elicit meaningful disclosure on 
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sustainability issues?” (SEC 2016, p. 213). Similarly, regulators in Brazil, Singapore and 
Hong Kong among others have recently moved from voluntary to a “comply-or-explain” 
CSR reporting model. My study should be informative to the SEC as well as regulators in 
other parts of the world that are considering alternative disclosure regulations. Specifically, 
I show that the incremental effect of comply-or-explain regulations on managers’ 
disclosure judgements is contingent on pre-existing disclosure norms of the firm. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background discussion 
on comply-or-explain regulations and reviews relevant literature. In Section 3, I develop 
my theoretical framework and hypotheses. Section 4 describes participants, experimental 
manipulations and procedures as well as other research design choices. Section 5 presents 
the results as well as additional analyses. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
3.2 Background and Related Literature  
3.2.1 Comply-or-Explain Regulations 
The ‘comply-or-explain’ regulatory approach was first introduced in the UK’s Cadbury 
Report on Corporate Governance in 1992, and is often presented as an alternative 
disclosure regulation to voluntary or mandatory disclosure requirements both in the US and 
internationally50 (Coates and Srinivasan 2014; Ho 2017). Under this approach, firms can 
apply all recommended best practices, or explain why a specific requirement has not been 
complied. The idea is to “let the market decide” whether a firm’s application or explanation 
of recommended practices is appropriate. Therefore, the comply-or-explain regulatory 
approach is essentially enforced by investors and the capital-market rather than regulators 
(Ho 2017). As there are no regulations on the content of the explanations, investors and the 
                                                          
50 Several developing countries such as China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Malaysia have also 
embraced the comply-or-explain system both for corporate governance and disclosure requirements. 
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market are left to judge the appropriateness of the explanations firms provide and stimulate 
a “market sanction” rather than a regulatory action (Keay 2014; Shrives and Brennan 
2015). As such, this regulatory approach presumes a high level of shareholder monitoring 
and that they are in favor of the recommended practices. 
Prior research largely focuses on the effects of comply-or-explain corporate 
governance regulations, and the empirical evidence is mixed. Several studies show that the 
comply-or-explain is associated with certain outcomes desired by regulators. For example, 
Akkermans et al. (2007) find a high compliance rate with the governance code in The 
Netherlands, and that compliance is positively associated with firm size – consistent with 
larger firms getting more attention and scrutiny from by the media and the investing 
community. Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud (2010) find that more than half of their 
sample firms were fully compliant with all the provisions of the comply-or-explain 
corporate governance code in the UK.  
However, other studies find that the comply-or-explain regime is ineffective 
(Hooghiemstra and van Ees 2011; Keay 2014; MacNeil and Li 2006; Seidl, Sanderson, and 
Roberts 2013; Van de Poel and Vanstraelen 2011). For example, Bianchi et al. (2011) 
compare actual versus reported compliance and find that the level of effective compliance 
is considerably lower than firms’ reported levels of compliance. Their results also show 
that effective compliance increases for firms with more independent directors and high 
institutional investors. Van de Poel and Vanstraelen (2011) find a high noncompliance rate 
(only 38 percent of their sample firms complied), with noncomplying firms either providing 
poor explanations or none at all. Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud (2010) reach similar 
conclusions in the UK and find that noncomplying firms either provided perfunctory 
explanations or none at all. Finally, Shrives and Brennan (2015) focus on explanations to 
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noncompliance in the UK setting and find that, on average, explanations are less readable, 
with the majority categorized as ‘more difficult’ or ‘harder’ to read. 
More recently, a growing number of archival studies provide evidence of capital-
market and real effects of disclosure regulations that contain comply-or-explain provisions 
in several institutional settings. The capital-market research shows strong negative market 
reactions to comply-or-explain disclosure regulations in several institutional settings 
(Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017). Other studies find 
several economic benefits of comply-or-explain disclosure regulations via reductions in 
information asymmetry (Barth et al. 2017; Lee and Yeo 2016). In addition, several studies 
provide evidence supporting real effects of comply-or-explain disclosure regulations 
(Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann 2019). 
However, little is known about how comply-or-explain disclosure regulations affect 
reporting and disclosure quality.  A recent exception is Honigsberg (2019) who finds that 
misreporting at US hedge funds decreases after a comply-or-explain disclosure regulation. 
Consistent with cross-sectional variations, Honigsberg (2019) shows that reduction in 
misreporting is larger for funds most likely to be scrutinized by the SEC and investors, and 
is driven by hedge funds making changes in their internal governance mechanisms.  
I extend prior literature in two ways. First, much of the prior literature focuses on 
capital-market and real effects of comply-or-explain governance - and more recently - 
disclosure regulations. Instead, I examine the effect of a comply-or-explain disclosure 
regulation on managerial disclosure judgements. I capitalize on comparative advantages of 
experimental methods to more directly examine the effect of a comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulation on managers’ disclosure judgements while holding key features of 
the firm constant. Second, prior studies provide evidence suggesting that the comply-or-
explain regime is more effective for firms most likely to be scrutinized by the media and 
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regulators (i.e., larger firms and/or firms with prior history of misconduct) (Akkermans et 
al. 2007; Honigsberg 2019). Unlike prior studies, I consider a different dimension that is 
difficult to observe in archival settings. Specifically, I consider whether the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy moderates the impact of a comply-or-explain regime on managers’ 
disclosure judgements (Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018; Mayorga and Trotman 2016).   
 
3.2.2 Firm’s Prior Disclosure Policy  
Firms generally have clear reporting and disclosure preferences. For example, firms may 
commit to periodic voluntary disclosures such as releasing earnings guidance from time to 
time, providing forward-looking disclosures or issuing standalone sustainability reports. 
While firms’ voluntary disclosure policies are influenced by economic considerations 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005), accounting research demonstrates that firms’ 
disclosure behavior is also vulnerable to a number of other forces including manager-
specific factors (Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Brochet, Faurel, and McVay 2011), 
disclosure preferences of the board (Cai et al. 2014; Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi 2010; 
Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki 2003), and internal politics of the firm (Gibbins, 
Richardson, and Waterhouse 1990; Holland 2005). Theory and empirical evidence indicate 
that disclosure preferences of various actors of the firm can significantly explain disclosure 
pattern of companies (Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi 2010; 
Lerner and Tetlock 1999). 
Although firms’ disclosure preferences are often known, changes in corporate 
culture, board structure and top executive turnover can lead to disclosure preferences to 
become unknown. In addition, firms may not have a preference for specific disclosure 
issues because “many boards assess whether or not information needs to be disclosed in 
context rather than in isolation” (Mayorga and Trotman 2016, p. 61). Finally, certain 
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disclosure matters are by nature “rare events” in which case managers have no prior 
knowledge of the firm’s preferences.   
In this study, I examine how comply-or-explain regulation interacts with the firm’s 
prior disclosure policy. Using an experiment, I design a scenario where corporate managers 
assess and decide whether to disclose to investors a probable risk event affecting the firm’s 
underlying economic outlook. I manipulate disclosure regime at two levels (voluntary 
versus comply-or-explain). I also manipulate knowledge of the firm’s prior disclosure 
preference has been biased toward no disclosure versus unknown. In the next section, I 
describe research theory and hypotheses. 
 
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
3.3.1 Motivated Reasoning  
Motivated reasoning occurs when decision-makers have a preference or desire that relates 
to the outcome of a given reasoning task (Klein and Kunda 1992; Kunda 1990). Essentially, 
motivated reasoning posits that pre-existing preferences affect human judgement as long 
as people can construct seemingly reasonable justifications for their conclusions (Ditto and 
Lopez 1992; Kunda 1990). In this process, people selectively access, evaluate and construct 
evidence to support a preferred outcome (Kunda 1990). Consequently, information 
consistent with a preferred outcome is scrutinized less critically than information 
inconsistent with a preferred conclusion (Ditto and Lopez 1992). In the presence of 
ambiguity, motivating reasoning causes people to exploit such ambiguity to support their 
preferred conclusions.  
The motivated reasoning phenomenon is extremely robust and has been observed 
in various settings including investors’ directional preferences (Hales 2007; Han and Tan 
2010), auditing tasks (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Wilks 2002), tax professionals’ 
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behavior (Kadous, Magro, and Spilker 2008) and managerial judgements (Mayorga and 
Trotman 2016; Tayler 2010). In an experiment with investors, Hales (2007) finds that 
investors are vulnerable to motivated reasoning, such that those holding long (short) 
investment positions in a firm’s stock are more optimistic (pessimistic) about the 
company's earnings prospects. Experimental audit research also shows that auditors are 
susceptible to motivated reasoning such that they permit and justify client‐preferred 
accounting outcomes to avoid potential loss of clients (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; 
Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher 2003).   
Of particular relevance to this study, prior accounting literature documents that 
managers are vulnerable to motivated reasoning in their disclosure choices. Specifically, 
managers have strong incentives to withhold bad news disclosures, or present firm 
performance in a positive light for several reasons. First, managers may withhold negative 
disclosures to smooth earnings or maintain their firm’s stock price (Bao et al. 2019; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 1983). Second, 
managers may delay disclosure of a negative event and gamble firm performance will 
improve in the future (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Third, managers may be 
reluctant to release bad news disclosures to gain private benefits, especially when their own 
compensation is linked to firm value (Baginski et al. 2017; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki 
2003). Finally, managers are less likely to voluntarily provide bad news disclosures unless 
the benefits of doing so exceed the costs (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Verrecchia 
1983). For example, managers may voluntarily provide bad news disclosures to pre-empt 
litigation risk or avoid reputational costs (Houston et al. 2019; Skinner 1994).  
However, managers’ motivated reasoning is constrained by their ability to construct 
seemingly reasonable justifications for their reporting and disclosure preferences (Kunda 
1990). Consistent with this conjecture, prior literature shows that mandatory disclosure 
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rules attenuate managers’ motivated reasoning to withhold bad news disclosures. For 
example, Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) find that managers’ tendency to delay bad 
news disclosures significantly declined after Regulation FD. 
It is less clear how a ‘comply-or-explain’ disclosure regulation affects managers’ 
bad news disclosure judgements. Recent studies show that disclosure regulations that 
contain comply-or-explain provisions generate real changes in firm behavior, and lead to 
outcomes desired by regulators (Dharmapala and Khanna 2018; Fiechter, Hitz, and 
Lehmann 2019; Honigsberg 2019). For example, Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann (2019) find 
a significant increase in the CSR performance of previously non-reporting European firms 
after a comply-or-explain disclosure directive in the EU. Similarly, Dharmapala and 
Khanna (2018) find a significant increase in CSR spending of Indian firms relative to 
control firms after a comply-or-explain disclosure regulation in India. Other studies find 
strong capital-market reactions to comply-or-explain disclosure regulations, consistent 
with investors anticipating such regulations to affect managers’ disclosure and real 
economic decisions (Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim 2019; Manchiraju and Rajgopal 2017). 
In this study, I examine how a ‘comply-or-explain’ disclosure regulation affects 
managers’ disclosure recommendations of a negative event affecting the firm’s underlying 
economics. I argue that comply-or-explain regulation constrains managers’ motivated 
reasoning and increases their disclosure recommendations of a negative event for two 
reasons. First, given the comply clause in comply-or-explain regulations, managers’ 
litigation risk is likely heightened. Specifically, managers may find it more difficult to 
construct reasonable justifications for failing to provide timely disclosures under a comply-
or-explain system than under a voluntary regime in the event things go wrong and firm 
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performance does not improve in the future51. Consistent with this conjecture, Honigsberg 
(2019) finds that misreporting at US hedge funds decreases after a comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulation. Importantly, she finds that the regulation caused funds to make real 
internal governance changes which in turn drive reductions in misreporting.  
Second, comply-or-explain regulations may also constrain managers’ motivated 
reasoning through the explain clause by increasing their cognition. Prior psychology and 
legal research demonstrate that reason writing does indeed reduce decision bias (Cohen 
2015; Oldfather 2007; Paxton, Ungar, and Greene 2012; Posner 1995). Reason writing, or 
the pressure to justify one’s decision to others, increases human cognitive process and 
makes people become more cautious when making decisions (Liu 2018; Sieck and Yates 
1997; Tetlock 1983).  Posner (1995, p. 1447) puts it this way: “Reasoning that seemed 
sound when “in the head” may seem half-baked when written down, especially since the 
written form of an argument encourages some degree of critical detachment in the writer, 
who in reading what he has written will be wondering how an audience would react”. 
Of particular relevance to my setting, Bentley (2018) conducted an experiment and 
finds that managers asked to provide narrative explanations of their performance engage in 
less operational distortion and surrogation compared to managers who are not required to 
provide narrative explanations, suggesting that reporting requirements that contain 
narrative explanations may indeed constrain managers’ motivated reasoning. Based on the 
foregoing discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Managers are more likely to recommend disclosure of a negative event affecting 
the firm’s underlying economics in a comply-or-explain disclosure regulation than 
in a voluntary regime.    
                                                          
51 It is possible that comply-or-explain disclosure regulations have the opposite effect and amplify 
managers’ motivated reasoning to withhold bad news disclosures, such that managers simply provide 
perfunctory explanations to avoid and pre-empt future investor lawsuits. In an experiment with auditors, 
Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher (2003) find that regulations designed to constrain auditors’ motivated 
reasoning do indeed exacerbate auditors’ directional preferences to accept client‐preferred methods and 
on their ratings of the quality of that method. 
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3.3.2 Accountability to an Audience with Known versus Unknown Views 
Prior accountability literature suggests that people adjust their positions when the party to 
whom they are accountable has known versus unknown preferences (for review see Lerner 
and Tetlock 1999). This conformity occurs for two primary reasons. First, people adopt the 
positions of their supervisors to avoid “unnecessary cognitive work of analyzing the pros 
and cons of alternative courses of action, interpreting complex patterns of information, and 
making difficult trade-offs” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, p. 256). Second, motivated 
reasoning causes subordinates to tailor messages to the positions of their superiors given 
subordinates have intrinsic motivations to get-along and maintain professional connections 
with their supervisors (Kunda 1990).  
Experimental research in various settings supports these predictions, and concludes 
that people conform to the known preferences of their respective audience (Buchman, 
Tetlock, and Reed 1996; Chen, Shechter, and Chaiken 1996; Hackenbrack and Nelson 
1996; Mayorga and Trotman 2016; Mero and Motowidlo 1995; Peecher 1996; Wilks 2002). 
However, when the views of an audience are unknown – people generally engage in 
rational cognitive effort to construct a reasonable recommendation (Lerner and Tetlock 
1999). 
Wilks (2002) reports that professional audit managers conformed to the known 
preferences of the audit partner in a going‐concern task. Other studies also find that auditors 
adopted the preferred views of their supervisors or client firms (Buchman, Tetlock, and 
Reed 1996; Peecher 1996). Further, experimental studies report that firm managers are 
vulnerable to pre-existing reporting and disclosure preferences (Asay, Libby, and 
Rennekamp 2018; Mayorga and Trotman 2016). For example, Mayorga and Trotman 
(2016) find that knowledge of the board’s prior disclosure preference toward no disclosure 
moderated the otherwise positive effect of reasonable investor-perspective taking on 
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managers’ disclosure recommendations of a negative event, such that managers were less 
likely to disclose the negative event when the firm’s prior disclosure bias was known than 
unknown.    
However, prior research focused on settings where disclosure regulation is not 
salient. In this study, I examine whether managers’ disclosure recommendations of a 
negative event are vulnerable to the known versus unknown disclosure preferences of the 
firm when disclosure requirement is salient (i.e., voluntary versus comply-or-explain). 
Motivated reasoning theory and prior accounting research suggest that managers will delay 
bad news disclosures if the disclosure requirement is voluntary, regardless of whether the 
firm’s prior disclosure policy is known or unknown. This is because managers are 
intrinsically motivated to withhold bad news disclosures in voluntary settings unless the 
benefits of providing bad news disclosures exceed the costs (Verrecchia 1983). Mayorga 
and Trotman (2016, p. 53) argue that managers who do not know the firm’s prior disclosure 
policy are more likely to recommend against disclosure than managers who know that the 
firm's prior disclosure policy is biased towards no disclosure because managers in the 
former settings will need to devote extra mental thought to arrive at a defensible disclosure 
recommendation. For this reason, I do not expect significant differences between the 
known and unknown conditions when the disclosure requirement is voluntary. The dotted 






Note: Figure 3.1 summarizes predicted combined effect of regulation and the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy on managers’ disclosure recommendations. I manipulate (1) whether 
disclosure regulation is voluntary versus comply-or-explain and (2) whether the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy is known to be biased toward no disclosure versus unknown. The dependent 
variable, DISCLOSURE, is measured on an 11-point scale anchored from -5 = “extremely 




However, H1 predicts that a comply-or-explain disclosure regulation constrains managers’ 
motivated reasoning. When there is a comply-or-explain regulation and known disclosure 
preferences of the board, managers are more likely to engage in additional cognitive effort 
to simultaneously get-along with the board of directors and highlight potential litigation 
risk from investors for failing to provide timely disclosures. As such, I predict that known 
disclosure preferences of the firm will attenuate the impact of comply-or-explain regulation 
on managers’ disclosure recommendations. In contrast, reason writing theory suggests that 
the impact of comply-or-explain is likely greater when there is a comply-or-explain 
regulation and unknown disclosure preferences of the board. Figure 3.1 graphically plots 
an ordinal interaction, such that the effect of comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ 
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disclosure recommendations is greater when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown 
than known to be biased toward non-disclosure. Stated formally, hypothesis 2 is as follows:   
H2:  The effect of a comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure 
recommendations is greater when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown 
than when it is known.    
 
 
3.4 Research Method 
3.4.1 Experimental Design and Participants 
I employ a 2 × 2 between-participants experimental design to test my predictions. The first 
independent variable is disclosure regulation type. I vary whether the disclosure regime is 
voluntary versus comply-or-explain. The disclosure regime manipulation occurs 
immediately after participants read a disclosure matter that has come to the attention of top 
management. The second independent variable is knowledge of the firm’s prior disclosure 
policy. I manipulate whether the firm’s prior disclosure policy is known to be biased toward 
no disclosure versus unknown. In the known condition, participants are informed about the 
firm’s prior disclosure preferences shortly before reading the specific disclosure matter and 
the applicable disclosure regulation. 
I recruited 121 experienced corporate managers via Qualtrics Panel Management52 
(hereafter Qualtrics). Qualtrics provided assurance that the participants reside in the United 
States, and have extensive corporate working experience. In addition, I included three 
screening questions (Holt and Loraas 2019). First, I asked participants their highest 
academic qualification, and retained those with a graduate degree (i.e., Master’s degree or 
higher). Second, I asked participants to select one of three choices: (1) I have an MBA, (2) 
                                                          
52 Recent experimental accounting research has relied on several web-based research organizations to 
recruit difficult-to-get participants including audit committees, CFOs, and auditors (Holt and Loraas 
2019; Kang 2019; Pyzoha 2015). Qualtrics is one of the most widely used web-based research 
organizations. Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017) report that participants in online experiments exert a 
comparable effort and honesty as participants in traditional laboratory experiments. 
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I do not have an MBA or (3) other. I retained participants with an MBA. Finally, I asked 
participants where they have obtained their MBA, and retained participants who responded 
‘I obtained my MBA from the US’. Participants who met these requirements (n = 121) 
were allowed to proceed to the experiment.  
Qualtrics offers various incentive packages such as gift cards and monetary 
incentives to encourage participation. Qualtrics does not disclose details of their participant 
compensation packages. I paid AU$25 (about US$17 at the time) per participant for their 
participation. The experiment was administered via Qualtrics software, which randomly 
allocated participants that met the criteria to one of the four experimental conditions53. 
On average, participants are 55.44 years-old, 62% are male and have an average of 
30.23 (18.57) years of working (managerial) experience. Participants took an average of 
4.9 (4.6) college-level accounting (finance) courses, with 74.4 (80.2) percent having 
financial (nonfinancial) reporting experience. Participants took an average of 13.36 
minutes to complete the task. I conduct my main analyses with all 121 participants54,55. 






                                                          
53 Approval to use human subjects was granted by The University of Adelaide’s Office of Research 
Ethics, Compliance and Integrity. 
 
54 The demographic profile of the participants nor time taken to complete the task do not significantly 
differ across the experimental conditions. 
 
55 Qualtrics provided me a filtered dataset after deleting data that they deemed of poor quality. Broadly 
defined, these include participants who have (1) not met the screening criteria (2) provided incomplete 
responses and (3) failed manipulation checks. In addition, Qualtrics applies speeding checks and 
automatically excludes participants that speed through the experiment. 
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Table 3. 1: Descriptive statistics for participants 
Number of participants 121 
Age and Sex  
Age (Mean in years) 55.44 
Male (%) 62 
Reporting experience  
Number of participants with financial reporting experience  90 
Number of participants with nonfinancial reporting experience  97 
Working Experience   
Number of years of full time work experience (Mean) 30.23 
Number of years of managerial experience (Mean) 18.57 
Participants’ self-reported accounting and reporting knowledge  
Financial accounting (Mean) 7.58 
Fin. Statement analysis (Mean) 7.79 
Nonfinancial reporting (Mean) 7.37 
Overall reporting (Mean) 6.52 
Distribution of participants according to firm size  
Number of participants working for small firm 55 
Number of participants working for medium-sized firm 23 
Number of participants working for large corporation 43 
Participants with experience in the following industries:  
Financial services / Insurance 25 
Manufacturing 19 
Computer / Software 16 
Retail / Consumer Products 10 
Energy / Utilities 4 
Construction 4 
Chemical / Pharmaceutical industry 4 
Telecommunications 3 
Agriculture / Food 1 
Mass Media 1 
Other 34 
 
Note: Table 1 presents the descriptive profile for the managers who participated in 
the experiment. Participants’ self-reported accounting and reporting knowledge is 
measured on an 11-point scale anchored from 0 = “extremely low” to 10 = 
“extremely high”, with the midpoint labeled “fair”. For the firm size classification, 
participants were asked to select the size of their current firm. For the industry 
classification, I asked participants to select all industries in which they have 




3.4.2 Case and Procedures 
After answering the screening questions described above, all participants begin the 
experiment by reading through background information and financial performance of MIA 
Corp., a hypothetical publicly-traded firm in the retail industry. Participants were told to 
assume the role of Director of Financial Reporting whose responsibility was to make 
disclosure recommendations to the Board of Directors. All participants were informed that 
they will assess a “specific disclosure matter” that has come to the attention of 
management, and then will provide a recommendation to the Board of Directors based on 
whether they believed disclosure of the matter is required at this time.  
 The disclosure matter involved management receiving preliminary evidence of a 
climate change-related risk affecting the underlying economics of the firm56. Specifically, 
participants read that severe floods, hurricanes and other extreme weather events pose 
probable risks to three business segments in coastal areas of MIA Corp57. Participants are 
informed that the three business segments account for a significant portion of the 
Company’s overall sales revenue, and has contributed to 28% of the total sales revenue in 
2018. In addition, participants are told that management is uncertain of the magnitude of 
the financial risks to investors or the firm’s share prices. To reduce noise, financial 
performance of the firm was favorable across all conditions. In order to provide incentives 
for managers to consider their judgment in light of investors’ earnings expectations, 
                                                          
56 I purposely focused on climate change-related risk disclosure given that comply-or-explain disclosure 
regulations are generally used for broad disclosure topics such as climate risk disclosures. In addition, 
recent studies show that climate change-related disclosures have significant firm value effects 
(Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Munoz 2018; Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Muñoz 2014). Further, 
survey evidence also indicates that investors are increasingly demanding climate change risk disclosures 
(Krueger, Sautner, and Starks 2020). 
 
57 The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) identifies three forms of climate change-related risks: (1) 
physical risks, (2) regulatory risks, and (3) other risks. In my setting, I focus on physical risk exposure 
because information on the other two risks “is not particularly proprietary and may also be gathered 
from other information sources” (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019, p. 810). 
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participants are further told that official public announcement of the Company’s annual 
financial performance has not been made at this point pending decision of the specific 
disclosure matter.  
Finally, all participants completed debriefing questions relating to explanatory 
measures for their judgements, their environmental attitude, and demographic profile.   
 
3.4.3 Independent Variables  
I manipulate two independent variables in a between-participants experiment. First, I 
manipulate disclosure regulation at two levels (voluntary versus comply-or-explain). In the 
voluntary conditions, participants are informed that “management disclosure of identified 
material environmental physical risks is voluntary”. Participants are further told that 
“some management voluntarily discloses to investors whether or not there are material 
environmental risks; others choose to be silent on such matters”. I adapted the wording 
“some management voluntarily discloses to investors” from the experimental instrument 
in Kelly and Tan (2017), and is intended to reduce participants’ own interpretations of the 
applicable disclosure rules related to climate change-related risk disclosures, or more 
generally environmental disclosures58. In the comply-or-explain conditions, participants 
are informed that “management disclosure of identified material environmental physical 
risks is required on a “Comply-or-Explain” basis”, and that the disclosure regulation 
“contains provisions that allow publicly listed firms to deviate from recommended 
disclosure rules if such disclosure rules are not applicable to their operations, but mandates 
an explanation for non-disclosure”.  
                                                          
58 Existing disclosure rules in the US on climate change-related risk disclosures are ambiguous 
(Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Munoz 2018), despite the SEC releasing an interpretative guidance to 
clarify existing climate change-related disclosure requirements (SEC 2010, 2016). 
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Second, I manipulate knowledge of the firm’s prior disclosure policy at two levels 
(known versus unknown). In the known conditions, I adapted the approach used in 
Mayorga and Trotman (2016) to operationalize knowledge of the firm’s prior disclosure 
policy by stating that the disclosure preferences of the board. Specifically, participants read 
that: 
“At the last Board of Directors’ meeting, the board of MIA Corp expressed its 
concern that management has been too keen to disclose information in situations 
where it was difficult to quantify the magnitude of the event. All the directors 
indicated that releasing speculative information may potentially harm the firm’s 
share price for no underlying economic reasons.” 
 
Rather than focusing on the preferred views of the CEO or CFO, I chose disclosure 
preferences instituted by the board to reduce managers’ automatically conforming to CEO 
preferences. Given the close hierarchical distance between mid-level managers responsible 
for disclosure recommendations and top management, mid-level managers are less likely 
to disagree with the known disclosure positions of CEOs/CFOs compared to board of 
directors. To heighten disclosure preference of the board, I asked participants to 
“summarize briefly your thoughts about the concerns of the Board on management’s past 
disclosure behavior in situations where it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the event” 
immediately after viewing the prior disclosure policy manipulation59. Asking participants 
to provide their thoughts on the known views of an audience as a heightening strategy has 
been used in prior experimental studies (Mayorga and Trotman 2016; Peecher 1996; Wilks 
2002). I provide full details of the experimental instrument in Appendix B of this paper.   
 
                                                          
59 All participants that were exposed to the firm’s prior disclosure policy provided narrative explanations 
indicating that the board of directors are biased toward no disclosure. 
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3.4.4 Dependent and Process Variables  
The primary dependent variably is managers’ disclosure recommendations. After reading 
the case materials containing the relevant manipulations, participants made a disclosure 
judgement. Specifically, participants were asked to provide a disclosure recommendation 
to the Board of Directors based on whether they believed disclosure of the matter is 
required at this time. Participants responded on an 11-point scale anchored from -5 = 
“extremely supportive of NOT disclosing” to 5 = “extremely supportive of disclosing”, 
with the center point labeled “neutral”. Across all conditions, I required participants to 
provide a brief narrative statement to explain their disclosure recommendation immediately 
after making their disclosure judgement60.   
I then asked participants to respond to two process variables. First, I collected a 
measure of participants’ feelings of accountability by asking “given the disclosure 
requirement presented in the case, to what extent do you feel accountable to disclose the 
specific risk matter in the case”. Participants responded on an 11-point scale anchored from 
0 = “not at all accountable” to 10 = “extremely accountable”. Second, I asked participants 
to indicate how the disclosure requirement affected their judgement by asking them “given 
the disclosure requirement presented in the case, to what extent did the disclosure requirement 
described in the case influence your disclosure recommendation? Participants responded on an 
11-point scale anchored from 0 = “not at all” to 10 = “extremely”.    
 
 
                                                          
60 In the voluntary conditions, I asked participants: “In the space provided below, please briefly explain 
your judgement to help us understand why your response might be different from those of other 
participants in this study”. In the comply-or-explain conditions, participants responded to: “In the space 
provided below, please briefly write a narrative statement to help the Board explain to investors why 
disclosure or non-disclosure is appropriate at this time as you would in the real world”. I deliberately 
used different wording across disclosure regime conditions. This allows me to collect narrative 
explanations across all conditions while also separately heightening the comply-or-explain regulation.   
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Manipulation Checks 
Holt and Loraas (2019) recommend researchers using Qualtrics Panels to include (1) 
screening questions at the beginning of the survey, (2) manipulation and attention check 
questions throughout the experiment and (3) open-ended questions to detect invalid 
responses. Based on this, participants responded to two questions to ensure that my 
manipulations were successful. First, I asked participants to recall the disclosure regulation 
in which they were assigned to in order to confirm my disclosure regulation manipulation 
was successful. I provided participants three options to choose from: voluntary, comply-
or-explain or mandatory. Second, to check the firm’ prior disclosure policy manipulation, 
I asked participants to recall the concerns of the board about management disclosure and 
select between whether there was a concern or no concern (Mayorga and Trotman 2016). 
Participants who have failed my manipulation checks were automatically screened out 
(Holt and Loraas 2019). Therefore, all the 121 participants that are included in the final 
sample successfully recalled the correct disclosure regulation and the views of the board in 
their respective condition61.  
Additionally, I included an attention check question and asked participants to recall 
whether the financial performance of the case firm was (1) favorable, (2) unfavorable or 
(3) financial performance was not mentioned in the case. Over 90% of the participants 
correctly selected that the performance of the case firm was favorable62. Finally and as 
described before, I included two open-ended questions to heighten the manipulations.   
                                                          
61 Qualtrics does not disclose details of the number of participants nor data on the participants who have 
failed the manipulation checks.  
 
62 Excluding participants who have failed the attention check (n = 12) does not change the statistical 
inferences of this study. Specifically, the main effect of regulation (p = 0.007) and firm’s prior disclosure 
policy (p = 0.079) and their interaction (p = 0.426) are consistent with the full sample results reported 
in Panel B of Table 3.2.  
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3.5.2 Test of Hypotheses 
Based on my theory, I predict that managers are more likely to recommend disclosure of a 
negative event in a comply-or-explain regulatory system compared to a voluntary regime. 
I also expect that the effect of the comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure 
recommendations is greater when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown than when 
it is known to be biased toward no disclosure. To test these predictions, I conduct full 
factorial ANOVA using managers’ disclosure recommendations as the dependent variable 
(hereafter Disclosure) and regulation type (hereafter Regulation), firm’s prior disclosure 
policy (hereafter Prior Policy) and their interaction as independent variables. Panel A of 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for managers’ disclosure recommendations, Panel 
B reports the results of ANOVA, Panel C reports planned interaction contrasts for H2, and 
Panel D summarizes the follow-up simple effect test results.  
Descriptive results in Panel A of Table 3.2 show that the means for managers’ 
disclosure recommendations are higher in the comply-or-explain conditions relative to the 
voluntary conditions (mean 2.20 > 0.68). Similarly, the disclosure means in the unknown 
conditions are higher than the means in the known conditions (1.90 > 0.98). The ANOVA 
results in Panel B of Table 3.2 show a significant main effect of regulation, such that 
managers are more likely to recommend disclosure of a negative event in comply-or-
explain disclosure regulation versus voluntary disclosure regime (mean 2.2 > 0.68, F1, 117 
= 10.181, p = 0.002, two-tailed). Therefore, results support H1. I also find a marginally 
significant main effect of the firm’s prior disclosure policy. Consistent with accountability 
theory that people conform to the known preferences of their audience, results show that 
managers are less likely to recommend disclosure of a negative event when the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy is known to be biased toward no disclosure than when it is unknown 
(mean 1.90 > 0.98, F1, 117 = 3.679, p = 0.058, two-tailed).     
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Table 3. 2: Hypotheses testing: Descriptive statistics and ANOVA for Disclosure 
 
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] for Disclosure 
Regulation type Prior disclosure policy 
 Known Unknown Total 
Voluntary 0.33 [3.04] 
n = 30 
1.03 [2.83] 
n = 30 
0.68 [2.94] 
n = 60 
    
Comply-or-Explain 1.63 [2.39] 
n = 30 
2.74 [2.00] 
n = 31 
2.20 [2.25] 
n = 61 
Total 0.98 [2.79] 
n = 60 
1.90 [2.57] 
n = 61 
1.45 [2.71] 
n = 121 
Panel B: ANOVA 
Source SS df Mean Square F p-value 
Regulation 68.440 1 68.440 10.181 0.002 
Prior Policy 24.732 1 24.732 3.679 0.058 
Regulation × Prior Policy 1.262 1 1.262 0.188 0.666 
Error 786.54 117 6.723   
Panel C: Planned interaction contrasts for H2  
Source SS df Mean Square F p-value 
Regulation × Prior Policy 31.788 1 31.788 12.795 0.001 
Contrasts [–2, –2, +1 and +3] 
Panel D: Simple main effects tests 
Simple effects df t p-value 
Effect of comply-or-explain when  prior disclosure policy is 
known 
117 1.644 0.105 
Effect of comply-or-explain when  prior disclosure policy is 
unknown 
117 3.939 0.000 
Effect of prior disclosure policy given voluntary regime 117 2.433 0.019 
Effect of prior disclosure policy given comply-or-explain 117 0.473 0.638 
Simple effect contrasts: DISCLOSURE 
 Contrast One: −1,  −1,  +2 and 0; Contrast Two:  −1,  −1,  0 and +2 
 Contrast Three: −2, +1, 0 and +1; Contrast Four: 0, +1, −2 and +1 
 All p-values are two-tailed.  
Note: Panel A and B of Table 2 summarize the descriptive statistics and two-way ANOVA results for 
managers’ disclosure recommendations. Panel C presents the follow-up simple effect test results. I 
manipulate (1) whether disclosure regulation is voluntary versus comply-or-explain and (2) whether the 
firm’s prior disclosure policy is known to be biased toward no disclosure versus unknown. The dependent 
variable, DISCLOSURE, is measured on an 11-point scale anchored from -5 = “extremely supportive of 
NOT disclosing” to 5 = “extremely supportive of disclosing”, with the midpoint labeled “neutral”. 
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H2 predicts an ordinal form of interaction between regulation type and firm’s prior 
disclosure policy63. Specifically, I expect that the impact of comply-or-explain regulation 
on managers’ disclosure recommendations is greater when the firm’s prior disclosure 
policy is unknown than known to be biased toward no disclosure. However, the 
conventional ANOVA output by default provides a disordinal form of interaction. To 
overcome this limitation inherent in the default code, I use a planned contrast weights 
consistent with my predictions to calculate an ordinal interaction (Buckless and 
Ravenscroft 1990; Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia 2018). These contrasts are –2, –2, +1 
and +3, with the two voluntary regime conditions coded –2 and –2, and the comply-or-
explain known and unknown conditions coded +1 and +3, respectively. These contrast 
codes allow me to simultaneously test a main effect of regulation type and prior disclosure 
policy but also my predicted ordinal interaction. 
As shown in Panel C of Table 3.2, I find a significant interaction effect (F1, 117 = 
12.795, p = 0.001), indicating that the effect of a comply-or-explain regulation on 
managers’ disclosure recommendations is greater when the firm’s prior disclosure policy 
is unknown than when it is known. Thus, H2 is supported. Taken together, the results 
support my expectation that the impact of comply-or-explain regulations on managers’ 
disclosure judgements is moderated by the firm’s prior disclosure policy64. Figure 3.2 




                                                          
63 An ordinal interaction produces a cross-over of predicted values at the boundary or outside the range 
of observed values (i.e., lines do not cross), whereas a disordinal interaction shows a cross-over of 
predicted values within the observed range of values (i.e., lines cross-over) (Widaman et al. 2012). 
 
64 I repeat the ANOVA with managers’ (1) financial / nonfinancial reporting experience (2) accounting 
and reporting knowledge (3) managerial experience and (4) familiarity with capital-market 





Note: Figure 3.2 plots observed means for managers’ disclosure judgements. Managers made 
disclosure recommendation based on (1) whether disclosure regulation is voluntary versus 
comply-or-explain and (2) whether the firm’s prior disclosure policy is known to be biased 
toward no disclosure versus unknown. The dependent variable, DISCLOSURE, is measured on 
an 11-point scale anchored from -5 = “extremely supportive of NOT disclosing” to 5 = 




3.5.3 Mediation Analyses 
The theory of reason writing suggests that the pressure to justify one’s decision to others 
increases human cognitive process and makes people become more cautious when making 
decisions. Consistent with this conjecture, I anticipate managers to exhibit higher feelings 
of accountability in a comply-or-explain regulatory system relative to a voluntary regime 
which in turn drives managers’ increased likelihood of disclosure. Recall that comply-or-
explain regulation mandates managers to justify their decisions if they forgo disclosure. I 
elicit measures for managers’ perceived accountability across experimental manipulations. 
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Table 3. 3: Descriptive statistics and ANOVA for Perceived Accountability 
 
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] for Accountability 
Regulation type Prior disclosure policy 
 Known Unknown Total 
Voluntary 5.80 [2.92] 
n = 30 
6.17 [2.55] 
n = 30 
5.98 [2.72] 
n = 60 
Comply-or-Explain 6.40 [2.71] 
n = 30 
7.23 [1.61] 
n = 31 
6.82 [2.24] 
n = 61 
Total 6.10 [2.81] 
n = 60 
6.70 [2.17] 
n = 61 
6.40 [2.52] 
n = 121 
Panel B: ANOVA 
Source SS df Mean Square F p-value 
Regulation 20.813 1 20.813 3.356 0.069 
Prior Policy 10.752 1 10.752 1.734 0.191 
Regulation × Prior Policy 1.594 1 1.594 0.257 0.613 
Error 725.586 117 6.202   
Panel C: Planned interaction contrasts 
Source SS df Mean Square F p-value 
Regulation × Prior Policy 11.190 1 11.190 4.692 0.032 
Contrasts [–2, –2, +1 and +3] 
Panel D: Simple main effects tests 
Simple effects df t p-value 
Effect of comply-or-explain when  prior disclosure policy is 
known 
117 0.748 0.456 
Effect of comply-or-explain when  prior disclosure policy is 
unknown 
117 2.256 0.026 
Effect of prior disclosure policy given voluntary regime 117 1.614 0.109 
Effect of prior disclosure policy given comply-or-explain 117 0.533 0.595 
Simple effect contrasts: ACCOUNTABILITY  
 Contrast One: −1,  −1,  +2 and 0; Contrast Two:  −1,  −1,  0 and +2 
 Contrast Three: −2, +1, 0 and +1; Contrast Four: 0, +1, −2 and +1 
 All p-values are two-tailed. 
Note: Table 3 summarizes results for managers’ perceived accountability. Panel A presents the 
descriptive statistics and Panel B provides two-way ANOVA results. The dependent variable, perceived 
accountability, is measured on an 11-point scale anchored from 0 = “not at all accountable” to 10 = 
“extremely accountable”. 
143 
Descriptive results in Panel A of Table 3.3 above show that the means for managers’ 
perceived accountability are greater in the comply-or-explain conditions relative to the 
voluntary conditions (mean 6.82 > 5.98). The ANOVA results in Panel B of Table 3.3 show 
a marginal significant main effect of regulation, such that managers perceive a higher level 
of accountability when the disclosure regime is a comply-or-explain relative to a voluntary 
regime (mean 6.82 > 5.98, F1, 117 = 3.356, p = 0.069, two-tailed). Therefore, results support 
the intuition that comply-or-explain regulatory system increases decision-makers perceived 
accountability. Using a planned contrast weights consistent with my ordinal interaction 
prediction, results in Panel C of Table 3.3 show a significant interaction effect (F1, 117 = 
4.692, p = 0.032) indicating that managers’ perceived accountability is highest in the 
comply-or-explain unknown condition relative to the other conditions65.  
Based on these results, I perform mediation analyses using Hayes Process macro 
(PROCESS Model 4) to examine whether managers’ perceived accountability is driving 
my results66 (Hayes 2017; Preacher and Hayes 2008). Because I do not find a significant 
main effect of the firm’s prior disclosure policy on managers’ perceived accountability 
(p = 0.191), I only explore whether managers’ perceived accountability (i.e., my mediator 
variable) mediates the impact of comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure 
recommendations. Results depicted in Figure 3.3 show that the overall indirect effect of 
Regulation operating through the mediator Accountability on my dependent variable, 
                                                          
65 I use a contrast analysis of –2, –2, +1 and +3, with the two voluntary regime conditions coded –2 and 
–2, and the comply-or-explain known and unknown conditions coded +1  and +3, respectively. The 
residual analysis of the contrast is not significant (p = 0.150, two-tailed), indicating that the planned 
contrast adequately explains the variation in my accountability measure. 
 
66 I also performed mediation analyses based on the traditional Baron and Kenny (1986) framework and 
find consistent results.  
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Disclosure, is positive and statistically significant67 (a x b = 0.9597; 95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval from 0.0107 to  ’sreganam taht setacidni gnidnif sihT .)4479.1
 nialpxe-ro-ylpmoc si noitaluger erusolcsid eht nehw rehgih si ytilibatnuocca deviecrep
 stluser eht ,llarevO .snoitadnemmocer erusolcsid rieht sevird neht hcihw ,yratnulov susrev
-ylpmoc ni esualc yfitsuj ot erusserp eht taht gnitirw nosaer fo yroeht eht htiw tnetsisnoc era
 .serusolcsid swen dab fo snoisiced laireganam stceffa snoitaluger nialpxe-ro  
 
Figure 3.3 
Mediation Analysis of Regulation Type on Disclosure – No Prior Disclosure Policy Conditions 
 
 
Figure 3.3 provides the output from a mediation analysis based on Hayes Process Macro 
(PROCESS Model 4). Regulation is a manipulated variable coded 1 for voluntary regime, and 
2 for comply-or-explain regime. For Accountability, I asked participants to indicate their 
perceived accountability based on the disclosure requirement presented in the case. Participants 
responded on an 11-point scale anchored from 0 = “not at all accountable” to 10 = “extremely 
accountable”. For Disclosure, I asked participants to provide a disclosure recommendation to 
the Board of Directors based on whether they believed disclosure of the matter is required at 
this time. Participants responded on an 11-point scale anchored from -5 = “extremely supportive 
of NOT disclosing” to 5 = “extremely supportive of disclosing”, with the midpoint labeled 
“neutral”. All p-values are two-tailed. 
                                                          
67 I tested the indirect effect using non-parametric bootstrapping of 5,000 estimates. The general rule of 
thumb is that if the null of 0 falls between the lower and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval, it 
indicates that the population indirect effect contains 0 and therefore is insignificant. However, if the null 
of 0 falls outside the confidence interval, then the indirect effect is non-zero and thus significant. In my 
setting, the indirect effect of 0.9597 is statistically significant at confidence interval of 95% because the 
lower and upper bound of the confidence interval does not contain 0 ( 7010.0 ; 4479.1 ) (Hayes 2017). 
145 
3.5.4 Additional Analyses 
Recent studies show that personal social preferences explain CSR investment and 
disclosure decisions (Church et al. 2019; Martin and Moser 2016; Riedl and Smeets 2017). 
Specifically, Christensen, Mackey, and Whetten (2014, p. 165) note that while CSR 
practices reflect corporate actions, “it is the individuals within firms who actually create, 
implement, sustain, or avoid such policies and act”.  
Because I focus on a disclosure matter involving climate change-related risk, it is 
possible that managers’ personal views on climate change drives my results. I address this 
alternative explanation in two ways. First, I repeat my primary ANOVA results and include 
managers’ personal views on climate change as a covariate68. Results (untabulated) reveal 
that my primary results are unchanged after controlling managers’ personal views on 
climate change. Specifically, I find that the main effect of regulation remains highly 
significant (F1, 116 = 8.377, p = 0.005, two-tailed). I also find that the main effect of the 
firm’s prior disclosure policy holds to be marginally significant (F1, 116 = 3.195, p = 0.076, 
two-tailed). In addition, I find that managers’ views on climate change is highly significant 
(F1, 116 = 15.421, p = 0.000, two-tailed), indicating that managers’ personal views on 
climate change likely plays an important role in their disclosure recommendations. 
Collectively, the results suggest that managers are more likely to recommend disclosure of 
a negative event in comply-or-explain system relative to a voluntary regime after 
accounting for their personal views. 
Second, I consider whether managers’ personal views on climate change issues 
moderates the impact of comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ disclosure 
recommendations. Using multiple regression, I estimate the following equation: 
                                                          
68 I collected a measure of managers’ personal views on climate change issues by asking to respond “I 
am very concerned about climate change related risks”. Participants responded on an 11-point scale 
anchored from 0 = “strongly disagree” to 10 = “strongly agree”. Following Church et al. (2019), I also 
measured participants overall CSR attitude. 
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Disclosure =  β0 + β1Regulation + β2Policy + β3CCViews + β4Regulation × Policy + 
β5Regulation × CCViews + β5Regulation × Policy × CCViews  
 
Where Regulation is a dummy variable coded as 0 (1) for voluntary (comply-or-explain) 
conditions. Policy refers to the firm’s prior disclosure policy manipulation and is a dummy 
variable coded 0 (1) for the known (unknown) conditions. Finally, CCViews is a continuous 
variable capturing participants’ personal views on climate change issues. As in prior 
research, I mean centered the climate change measure to avoid multicollinearity. The 
regression results are summarized in Table 3.4.  
The regression results are presented in Table 3.4. Consistent with my primary 
results, I find marginal significant main effect of regulation (β1 = 0.217, p = 0.063), 
indicating that managers in the comply-or-explain conditions are more likely to 
recommend disclosure of a negative event than managers in the voluntary conditions. 
Results also show managers’ personal views on climate change are marginally significant 
(β3 = 0.227, p = 0.091). Finally, I find a significant interaction effect between Regulation 
and managers’ personal CCViews (β5 = 0.294, p = 0.041), indicating that comply-or-explain 
regulation evokes managers who are personally concerned about climate change issues to 
recommend climate change related risk disclosures. Taken together, these findings indicate 
that the impact of comply-or-explain disclosure regulations are greater in the absence of 









Table 3. 4: Multiple Regression 
    
Variables  β t-statistics p-value  
Regulation 0.217 1.876 0.063 
Policy 0.120 1.032 0.304 
CCViews 0.227 1.706 0.091 
Regulation × Policy 0.043 .300 0.765 
Regulation × CCViews 0.294 2.072 0.041 
Policy × CCViews -0.055 -.392 0.696 
Regulation × Policy × CCViews -0.098 -.661 0.510 
n = 121 
R2 = 25.2 
 
Disclosure =  β0 + β1Regulation + β2Policy + β3CCViews + β4Regulation × Policy + 
β5Regulation × CCViews + β5Regulation × Policy × CCViews  
 
Note: Table 4 summarizes multiple regression results. Regulation is a dummy 
variable coded as 0 (1) for voluntary (comply-or-explain) conditions. Policy 
refers to the firm’s prior disclosure policy manipulation and is a dummy variable 
coded 0 (1) for the known (unknown) conditions. CCViews is a continuous 
variable capturing participants’ personal views on climate change issues. The 
dependent variable, Disclosure, is measured on an 11-point scale anchored from 
-5 = “extremely supportive of NOT disclosing” to 5 = “extremely supportive of 





In this study, I provide theory and experimental evidence on how comply-or-explain 
disclosure regulations interact with the firm’s pre-existing disclosure norms. Experimental 
results show that managers are more likely to recommend disclosure of a negative event in 
a comply-or-explain regulatory system than in a voluntary regime, and that this effect is 
more pronounced when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown than known. 
Mediation analyses further indicate that comply-or-explain disclosure regulation increases 
managers’ perceived accountability, which in turn drives their disclosure recommendation. 
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Collectively, these results are consistent with the theory of reason writing that the pressure 
to justify decisions to others causes people to become more accountable and constrains 
decision bias. 
The results of this study have a number of important policy and practical 
implications. First, I show that pre-existing views – both at the firm and personal levels – 
undermine the effectiveness of comply-or-explain regulations. Therefore, regulators may 
consider standardizing explanations that firms should provide if they forgo disclosure in 
comply-or-explain regulatory systems. Second, prior accounting research has long 
documented that private benefits of managers (e.g., stock compensation) affect managers’ 
disclosure choices (Baginski et al. 2017; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Nagar, 
Nanda, and Wysocki 2003). I extend this literature by showing that managers’ personal 
social preferences also influence certain forms of managers’ disclosure recommendations 
(Church et al. 2019; Martin and Moser 2016). This finding should be especially informative 
to the board of directors and audit committees that rely on the CSR and sustainability 
disclosure recommendations of firm managers. Finally, my study informs investors to 
scrutinize explanations firms provide in comply-or-explain regulatory systems. 
Several caveats are in order, some of which are inherent in the nature of 
experimental approach. First, I focused on a probable disclosure event and therefore my 
results may not generalize to more or less probable disclosure matters. Future research may 
vary disclosure event probability in comply-or-explain regulatory systems. Second, my 
study does not consider managers’ disclosure judgements where actual economic 
incentives exist. Third, this study does not address how the comply-or-explain compares 
with mandatory disclosure regime. Future research may consider whether more explicit 
mandatory disclosure regimes remedy the impact of the firm’s prior disclosure policy. 
Fourth, I focused on a retail industry context. Future research could examine whether the 
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results hold in more environmentally sensitive industries such as extraction. Relatedly, 
future research may also examine whether comply-or-explain regulation affects managers’ 
decisions to disclose negative events across different disclosure events involving matters 
such as board information or management compensation or are unique to a CSR setting. 
Finally, I focused on firm and personal preferences as moderates of the comply-or-explain 
regulations. Future research may want to investigate other factors that moderate or enhance 
the impact of comply-or-explain regulations. One important factor that can easily be 
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APPENDIX B – INSTRUMENT 1 
 
 
SCREENING QUESTIONS  
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this study. Please answer the following 
questions as they apply to you: 
 
1. Please select the highest academic qualification you have 
o I have a Diploma  
o I have a Bachelor Degree 
o I have a Graduate Degree (Master’s or higher) 




2. Please select one of the following: 
o I have an MBA 





3. I have obtained my MBA in: 
o Australia 
o Europe 
o United States 
o China 
o India  




PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Project Title : Managers’ disclosure choices across alternative disclosure requirements 
Institution  : The University of Adelaide 
Approval Number : H-2019-089 
 
Dear Participant, 
You are invited to participate a research study that examines senior corporate managers’ 
decisions of subjective disclosure matters. This study is part of my PhD research at The 
University of Adelaide under the supervision of Professor Paul Coram and Associate Professor 
Indrit Troshani. You are selected based on your experience in corporate disclosure matters and 
experience in discussing disclosure issues with the board of directors. This study has 
important implications for corporate managers as well as regulators about existing 
disclosure requirements.  
 
You will read a case study describing a hypothetical company which includes information on 
a potential risk disclosure matter. You are invited to evaluate the information regarding the 
disclosure matter based on existing disclosure requirements and make a disclosure 
recommendation to the Board. Completion of this task should take no more than 15-20 
minutes of your time.  
 
Participation in this project is completely voluntary. If you agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from the study at any time prior submission. There will be no implications for 
withdrawal.  
Your individual responses to this project will be kept strictly confidential and will only be 
analyzed on aggregate basis. Please note that your completion and submission of this 
survey will be considered as your consent to participate in this project. 
 
The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of 
Adelaide (approval number H-2019-089). If you wish to speak with an independent person 
regarding concerns or a complaint, the University’s policy on research involving human 
participants, or your rights as a participant, please contact the Human Research Ethics 
Committee’s Secretariat on:  
:   
Email: hrec@adelaide.edu.au  
Post: Level 4, Rundle Mall Plaza, 50 Rundle Mall, ADELAIDE SA 5000  
 
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be 
informed of the outcome. 
 
If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your participation in 
the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, please feel free to contact 
me or Professor Paul Coram (Chief Investigator) using the contact details below: 
Abdifatah Ahmed Haji     Professor Paul Coram  
Research Student     Chief Investigator 
     





I have read and understood the above information about the task. Based on the 
information provided, do you consent to participate in this study? 
 
 Yes I consent to participate 


























Thank you for your consent to participate in this study. You are one of a small group of 
professionals involved in this important study on corporate managers’ disclosure 
judgements. Your participation is highly valued and we thank you for your time. 
We will provide you case materials of a publicly listed company and then ask you to make 
a disclosure judgement based on the information provided. The information provided in 
the case materials is not necessarily representative of the information you would receive 
when evaluating an actual disclosure judgement. For the purpose of this study, please make 
your judgements solely based on the information provided in the case materials. There are 
no right or wrong answers. 
 
As the task requires a high level of concentration, it is very important that you 




















Assume that you are the Director of Financial Reporting of MIA Corp, a leading firm in 
the retail industry that sells various consumer products at competitive prices. Small and 
medium-sized businesses buy annual membership cards and purchase discounted products 
for resale. Similarly, individual consumers become members and purchase products for 
their own personal use. MIA Corp has over 280 stores, and is a publicly-traded company 
that operates throughout the United States, with a diverse investor base. MIA Corp employs 
over 25,000 employees, and has been in operation for 11 years. 
 
 
Director of Financial Reporting  
As the Director of Financial Reporting, your main responsibility is to make disclosure 
recommendations to the Board of Directors. This includes recommendations about key 
disclosure matters. The disclosure reports that you advise on communicate the financial 
and nonfinancial performance of the Company to current and prospective investors. 
 
In this task, you will assess a specific disclosure matter that has come to the attention of 
management. You will then provide a recommendation to the Board of Directors based on 
whether you believe the information should be publicly disclosed. 
 
Please note that there are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in 
understanding the disclosure judgements of corporate managers. 
 
In the next few screens, we will provide you selected financial data and key disclosure 
matter extracted from the annual performance of MIA Corp. 
 








For the Year Ended December 31, 2018 
 
 
Financial Performance  
The financial performance of MIA Corp for the Financial Year ending 31 December 2018 
is at the upper end of what the market has predicted. The earnings per share is consistent 
with the forecasts of all current analysts. In addition, all key financial performance 
indicators such as profitability, liquidity and debts are favorable compared to MIA Corp’s 
major competitors. 
 
Below are the highlights of the Company’s current year financial performance: 
 Sales revenue increased by 11% 
 Earning before tax increased by 16% 
 Earnings per share (EPS) is up by 12% and meets with all analysts’ 
forecasts 




At this point in time on 28 January 2019, official public announcement of the Company’s 
financial performance has not been made, and is awaiting the approval of the Board of 
Directors. As the Director of Financial Reporting of MIA Corp, the Board expects your 













Background Information  
 
At the last Board of Directors’ meeting, the board of MIA Corp expressed its concern that 
management has been too keen to disclose information in situations where it was difficult 
to quantify the magnitude of the event. All the directors indicated that releasing speculative 



























Please summarize briefly your thoughts about the concerns of the Board on management’s 





























[Condition 1 – Continued]  
  
 
Details of Specific Disclosure Matter 
As part of Company-wide growth strategy, MIA Corp has actively invested and acquired 
business segments in important coastal areas. Following industry standards, MIA Corp 
conducts environmental physical risk assessments annually. On November 16, 2018, 
Management has received preliminary evidence suggesting that severe floods, hurricanes 
and other extreme weather events pose probable risks to three business segments in coastal 
areas. These three business segments account for a significant portion of the Company’s 
overall sales revenue, and has contributed to 28% of the total sales revenue in 2018. 
However, Management is uncertain of the magnitude of the financial risks to investors or 
the firm’s share prices.  
 At this point in time, the above information is confidential and there is nothing to 
suggest that it will cease to be confidential.  
 
After receiving the preliminary evidence, the Chief Executive Officer of MIA Corp has 
raised the matter to the chairman and it was decided to hold a Board meeting this afternoon 





Applicable Disclosure Regulation 
Management disclosure of identified material environmental physical risks is voluntary. 
Some management voluntarily discloses to investors whether or not there are material 
















Details of Specific Disclosure Matter 
As part of Company-wide growth strategy, MIA Corp has actively invested and acquired 
business segments in important coastal areas. Following industry standards, MIA Corp 
conducts environmental physical risk assessments annually. On November 16, 2018, 
Management has received preliminary evidence suggesting that severe floods, hurricanes 
and other extreme weather events pose probable risks to three business segments in coastal 
areas. These three business segments account for a significant portion of the Company’s 
overall sales revenue, and has contributed to 28% of the total sales revenue in 2018. 
However, Management is uncertain of the magnitude of the financial risks to investors or 
the firm’s share prices. 
 At this point in time, the above information is confidential and there is nothing to 
suggest that it will cease to be confidential. 
 
After receiving the preliminary evidence, the Chief Executive Officer of MIA Corp has 
raised the matter to the chairman and it was decided to hold a Board meeting this afternoon 




Applicable Disclosure Regulation 
Management disclosure of identified material environmental physical risks is voluntary. 
Some management voluntarily discloses to investors whether or not there are material 












Background Information  
 
At the last Board of Directors’ meeting, the board of MIA Corp expressed its concern that 
management has been too keen to disclose information in situations where it was difficult 
to quantify the magnitude of the event. All the directors indicated that releasing speculative 
information may potentially harm the firm’s share price for no underlying economic 
reasons. 
 
























Please summarize briefly your thoughts about the concerns of the Board on management’s 



































Details of Specific Disclosure Matter 
As part of Company-wide growth strategy, MIA Corp has actively invested and acquired 
business segments in important coastal areas. Following industry standards, MIA Corp 
conducts environmental physical risk assessments annually. On November 16, 2018, 
Management has received preliminary evidence suggesting that severe floods, hurricanes 
and other extreme weather events pose probable risks to three business segments in coastal 
areas. These three business segments account for a significant portion of the Company’s 
overall sales revenue, and has contributed to 28% of the total sales revenue in 2018. 
However, Management is uncertain of the magnitude of the financial risks to investors or 
the firm’s share prices.  
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suggest that it will cease to be confidential.  
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[Question: Disclosure Decision]  
1.1 Please now make a judgement about whether MIA Corp should disclose 
information about the environmental risk matter to investors [Free to re-read the 
above information]. 
 
On the scale below, please provide to the Board of Directors a recommendation on whether 
you believe disclosure on the above risk matter is required at this time. 
Extremely 
supportive of 
NOT disclosing  
     
 
Neutral 
    Extremely 
supportive 
of disclosing  





















1.2 In the space provided below, please briefly write a narrative statement to help the 
Board explain to investors why disclosure or non-disclosure is appropriate at this 
























Questions: Process Variables 
1.1 Given the disclosure requirement presented in the case, to what extent do you feel 
accountable to disclose the specific risk matter in the case?  
  
  Not at all accountable                                                   Extremely accountable 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
1.2  Given the disclosure requirement presented in the case, to what extent did the disclosure 
requirement described in the case influence your disclosure recommendation?  
  
  Not at all                                                                                    Extremely  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
1.3  For the disclosure recommendation you provided, please indicate how much confidence 
you have in that recommendation on the scale below:  
  Completely Unconfident                                        Completely Confident 




















Please answer the following questions about the case materials, to the best of your 
recollections. 
 
1. Which of the following describes the current disclosure requirement relating to 
environmental physical risk disclosure as mentioned in the case?  
 
o Disclosure requirement is Voluntary  
o Disclosure requirement is Mandatory  
o Disclosure requirement is a “Comply-or-Explain” 
 
 
2. In the case, the Board expressed concern that management had been: 
  
o Too keen to disclose information that was difficult to quantify  
o No concern was mentioned 
 
3. MIA Corp’s financial performance was: 
o Favorable  
o Unfavorable  

















Demographics and Post-Task Questions  
Please answer the following questions to help us better understand why your responses 
might be different from those of other participants in this study: 
 
 
1. With which gender do you primarily identify?  
o Male 
o Female  
 
2. What is your native language? 
o English 
o Other language 
 
3. How old are you? 
Please type here __________ years 
 
4. How many years of full time working experience do you have?   
Please type here __________ years 
 
5. How many years of full time managerial experience do you have?   
Please type here ___________ years 
 
6. Please indicate your level of knowledge in the following areas: 
  Extremely low                            Fair                       Extremely high 
 My knowledge of how financial reports 
represent business activities is: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 My knowledge of the meaning and 
interpretation of financial statements is: 
           
 My knowledge of non-financial reporting is:            
 My overall knowledge of existing disclosure 
rules is: 
           
 
 
7. How many college-level Accounting courses have you taken?  
___________ 
 
8. How many college-level Finance courses have you taken?  
___________ 
175 
9. How many times have you been directly involved in a company’s financial reporting process? 
o 0 
o 1 – 5 times 
o 6 – 10 times 




10. How many times have you been directly involved in a company’s non-financial reporting 
process? 
o 0 
o 1 – 5 times 
o 6 – 10 times 




11. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: 
  Strongly Disagree                                                Strongly Agree 
 I strongly believe that companies should 
sacrifice profitability for environmental 
causes 





12. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: 
  Strongly Disagree                                                          Strongly 
Agree 
 I am very concerned about climate change 
related risks  




13.  Please indicate if you are strongly socially Liberal (1), Neutral (6), or strongly socially 
Conservative (11).  
  Strongly Liberal   Neutral   Strongly Conservative 





14. Please select the industry or industries in which you have significant working experience? 
o Agriculture / Food 
o Chemical / Pharmaceutical industry 
o Computer / Software  
o Construction  
o Retail / Consumer Products  
o Energy / Utilities  
o Financial services / Insurance  
o Telecommunications  
o Manufacturing  
o Mass Media 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
15. What is the size of your current company? 
o Small firm 
o Medium-sized firm 



























17. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements 
 
 Strongly Disagree                                                       Strongly Agree   
Disclosure of firm-specific risks influence 
analysts’ earnings forecasts 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Disclosure of firm-specific risks hurt the 
company’s stock price 
           
Non-disclosure of probable risks negatively 
affect companies’ transparency reputation 
           
Non-disclosure of probable risks negatively 
affect management credibility  




































We examine whether integrating corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance 
measures in financial reports, relative to reporting in separate standalone CSR reports, 
attenuates or exacerbates effects of this information on investors’ firm value estimates. 
Using an experiment, we first establish that CSR performance measures are incrementally 
informative to investors, such that investors derive significantly higher (lower) firm value 
estimates in response to positive (negative) CSR measures relative to NO CSR control 
condition. Central to our study, we find that CSR measures have greater impact on 
investors’ firm value estimates when reported in a separate report relative to when 
integrated in a financial report. In addition, we find that more investors misclassified CSR 
information as assured when integrated in a financial report relative to when reported in a 
separate report. Misclassifying investors rated credibility of CSR information higher and 
derived higher firm value estimates compared to investors who correctly classified this 
information as non-assured. Overall, our results identify potential costs of integrated 
reporting, and should be informative to global regulators as they consider alternative CSR 
reporting frameworks.  
 
 
Keywords:  Corporate Social Responsibility; Disclosure; Integrated Reporting; 


















4.1 Introduction  
Global firms increasingly provide corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures 
(KPMG 1999, 2017; Stolowy and Paugam 2018). For example, KPMG (2017) survey 
reports that 75% of 4,900 leading firms in 49 countries and 93% of the largest 250 global 
firms provide CSR disclosures. Survey evidence also indicates that both professional and 
retail investors consider CSR performance measures in their investment decisions (Amel-
Zadeh and Serafeim 2018; Cohen et al. 2011). In a recent survey by the Chartered Financial 
Analyst (CFA) Institute, 73% of 1,588 institutional investors stated that they take CSR 
matters into account in their investment decisions, and 59% of those investors integrate 
CSR indicators into the entire investment decision-making process (CFA 2017). Consistent 
with growing interest from investors, 56% of all shareholder proposals also focused on 
CSR issues in 2017, up from 51% in 2016 (ProxyMonitor 2017). Further, regulators in 
several countries have recently mandated CSR reporting and specific reporting frameworks 
for all or a subset of listed firms69. 
Prior accounting research documents that CSR disclosures have important capital-
market and economic consequences (Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Plumlee et al. 2015; Richardson 
and Welker 2001). More recent archival studies find that integrating CSR information in 
financial reports has incremental capital-market and real effects (Barth et al. 2017; Downar 
et al. 2019). This latter literature suggests that integrating CSR information in financial 
reports generates capital-market and real effects via increased dissemination of CSR 
information to wider audience (Christensen et al. 2017). However, recent experimental 
                                                          
69 Regulators in Europe, the UK, China, South Africa and India among other countries have recently 
mandated CSR for all or a subset of listed firms. However, other regulators such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) remain critical of mandating CSR reporting. For example, the SEC (2016, 
p. 213) asked several policy questions on CSR reporting including: “If we were to adopt specific 
disclosure requirements involving sustainability or public policy issues, how could our rules elicit 
meaningful disclosure on such issues”?  
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studies highlight potential costs of integrated reporting on different stakeholders such as 
investors and managers (Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Johnson 2019).  
In this study – to shed more light on the value of integrated reporting70 – we use a 
controlled experiment with investors to examine how integrating CSR information in 
financial reports affects investors’ firm estimates. Specifically, we examine whether the 
impact of positive versus negative CSR measures (hereafter, CSR performance valence) on 
investors’ firm value estimates is contingent on whether this form of information is reported 
in an integrated report versus separate report (hereafter, report format). We also examine 
whether report format affects investors’ perceived credibility of CSR information. 
Investigating the report format effects of CSR information on investors’ judgements 
is important for several reasons. First, there is currently significant interest across the world 
by standard setters and regulators into integrated reporting. For example, regulators in 
South Africa have already mandated integrated reporting for listed firms since 2010, while 
the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) explicitly mandates disclosing CSR 
indicators such as carbon emissions in annual reports (FRC 2018). In addition, regulators 
in the EU and Australia state that firms can satisfy CSR reporting requirements by issuing 
integrated reports or separate CSR reports. In addition, the SEC is currently seeking public 
feedback on the question of “How important to investors is integrated reporting, as opposed 
to separate financial and sustainability reporting?” (SEC 2016, p. 214). Specifically, the 
SEC is concerned whether adopting specific requirements for CSR disclosures would cause 
registrants to disclose information that is not material to investors (SEC 2016). Our primary 
motivation stems from these current policy questions on CSR reporting frameworks. 
                                                          
70 Throughout the paper and for the purposes of our experimental manipulations, we use ‘integrated 
reporting’ to refer to the combination of financial and CSR performance measures in one report. We 
recognize that while our conceptualization of integrated reporting may only capture certain aspects of 
the integrated reporting framework proposed by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC 
2013), it is nonetheless consistent with the spirit of integrated reporting.  
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Second, CSR disclosures are more “imagery-provoking” and vivid than financial 
disclosures, and are thus more likely to trigger unintentional affective reactions from 
investors (Elliott et al. 2014; Guiral et al. 2019). As such, firm managers may strategically 
integrate positive CSR disclosures in financial reports to influence investors’ firm 
valuations71. Finally, assurance on CSR information is voluntary. It is possible that 
combining audited financial and unaudited CSR information in one report may cause 
investors to misclassify unaudited information as audited (Hodge 2001).  
We draw on “category construction” theory in psychology that suggests categories 
can cause people to adopt a unidimensional or multidimensional perspective (Ahn and 
Medin 1992; Spalding and Murphy 1996). Specifically, Spalding and Murphy (1996) 
contend that categories trigger people to treat items of the same category as equivalent, 
even though they are clearly different. Consistent with this conjecture, Bucaro, Jackson, 
and Lill (2019) find that reporting financial and CSR measures in two separate reports led 
investors to adopt a multidimensional perspective that included a financial dimension, and 
also a social responsibility dimension, whereas integrated reporting caused investors to 
adopt a unidimensional perspective of financial information only. Building on this 
background, we posit that combining financial and CSR information in one report 
diminishes the vividness of CSR information, whereas separate reporting makes CSR 
information more salient. As such, we predict that separate reporting causes stronger 
reactions from investors, such that investors’ firm value estimates are higher (lower) when 
positive (negative) CSR information is reported in a separate report compared to an 
integrated report. Importantly, to the extent that integrated reporting evokes investors to 
adopt a unidimensional perspective and treat items of the same category as equivalent 
                                                          
71 Recent survey evidence indicates that firms increasingly integrate a wide variety of CSR performance 
measures in their regulated financial reports (Cohen et al. 2012; KPMG 2017).  
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(Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Spalding and Murphy 1996), we hypothesize that 
integrated reporting (relative to separate reporting) causes investors to treat non-assured 
CSR information as assured. Consequently, we predict that misclassifying investors derive 
higher CSR information credibility and firm value assessments (Hodge 2001).   
To test our predictions, we conduct a 2 (CSR performance valence) x 2 (report 
format) + 1 (control condition) between-participants experiment with 164 participants 
serving as nonprofessional investors. We design an experimental scenario where 
participants assumed the role of a prospective investor and make a firm value estimate 
based on excerpts of the company’s annual performance. We manipulate CSR performance 
valence at two levels: positive versus negative. In the positive condition, all CSR 
performance indicators have improved over time, whereas in the negative condition – the 
firm’s CSR performance have deteriorated. We also manipulate report format at two levels: 
integrated versus separate report. In the integrated report condition, participants viewed 
financial and CSR information in one report. In the separate report condition, participants 
first viewed financial data, answered few questions and then read CSR information in a 
separate report. We include a control condition that received background and financial 
information only.   
Results are generally consistent with our predictions. First, we find that investors’ 
derived significantly higher (lower) firm value estimates in response to positive (negative) 
CSR information relative to a no CSR control condition. Second, we find that separate 
reporting causes stronger reactions from investors, such that their firm value estimates are 
more negative when poor CSR information is reported in a separate report relative to an 
integrated report. However, investors who consider positive CSR information derive 
comparable firm value estimates, regardless of reporting format of this information. 
Mediation analyses further indicate that separate reporting increases investors’ perceived 
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management credibility and triggers investors’ stronger reactions to separate reporting. 
Finally, as predicted - we find that more investors misclassified CSR information as assured 
when integrated in a financial report relative to a separate report. Consequently, 
misclassifying investors rated CSR disclosure credibility higher and derived higher firm 
value estimates compared to investors who correctly classified this information as non-
assured. Collectively, our findings highlight potential costs of integrated reporting and 
suggest that integrating CSR measures in financial reports diminishes CSR performance 
and leads investors to misclassify CSR measures as assured.  
We contribute to the broader CSR literature, integrated reporting research and 
policy questions. First, we contribute to the broader CSR literature that documents CSR 
reporting has important capital-market and economic benefits (Clarkson et al. 2013; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Plumlee et al. 2015). We extend this line of literature by considering 
whether variations in CSR reporting attenuate or exacerbate benefits of CSR disclosures. 
Our experimental evidence indicates that the incremental effects of CSR information is 
contingent on how investors receive this form of information, such that CSR information 
has a greater impact on investors’ judgements when provided in a separate report relative 
to an integrated report.   
Second, we add to a growing stream of experimental and archival studies that 
examine capital-market and behavioral effects of integrated reporting (Barth et al. 2017; 
Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Green and Cheng 2019; Johnson 2019; Reimsbach, Hahn, 
and Gürtürk 2018). Specifically, our study is positioned within a recent stream of 
experimental studies that provide evidence on how integrated reporting affects managers’ 
investment and strategy evaluations (Esch, Schnellbächer, and Wald 2019; Johnson 2019), 
auditors’ materiality assessments (Green and Cheng 2019) and investors’ judgements 
(Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk 2018). Our study most 
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closely relates to a concurrent paper by Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill (2019) who find that 
report format affects investors’ willingness to invest. We complement their work by 
considering how report format affects investors’ firm value estimates72. Importantly and 
unlike all related studies, our experimental design includes a no CSR disclosure condition 
which provides a better control and allows us to determine the incremental effects of CSR 
performance measures on investors beyond CSR reporting format effects. Finally, we 
provide first evidence on whether integrating CSR information in financial reports leads 
investors to misclassify CSR information as assured, and how this subsequently affects 
their perceived information credibility and firm value estimates. 
Finally, our study has important policy implications. As CSR reporting regulations 
increase internationally (Ho 2017), reporting format of these matters will likely carry 
greater importance in the future. As noted above, global regulators are currently 
considering possible implications of integrating CSR performance measures in regulated 
financial reports (SEC 2016; FRC 2018). Beyond CSR reporting regulations, a number of 
nonprofit organizations such as the IIRC continue to promote integrated reporting (IIRC 
2013, 2017). Similarly, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) published 
a set of industry-specific standards in 2018 to help investors and companies identify and 
integrate financially-material CSR matters (SASB 2018). Our study is timely and should 
be informative to the SEC’s inquiry and other global regulators as well as interest groups 
as they consider alternative CSR reporting frameworks. Specifically, as more and more 
firms incorporate non-assured CSR performance measures in their financial reports or 
obtain assurance on ‘selected’ CSR indicators, regulators may want to mandate firms to 
                                                          
72 Firm valuation is a fundamentally different concept from investors’ willingness to invest chiefly 
because investors are likely to consider components of firm value (e.g., liquidity, expected cash flow 
etc.) in response to CSR disclosures. Therefore, investors’ firm value estimates reflect their assessment 
of a firm’s long-term prospects.  
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explicitly label their CSR measures as ‘non-assured’ or ‘assured’ to mitigate investors 
potentially misclassifying these non-assured CSR measures as assured.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The ensuing section discusses background of recent 
CSR trends, and reviews related literature. Section 3 describes our theory and develops 
research hypotheses. In Section 4, we describe our experiment and other research design 
choices. Section 5 presents the results as well as additional analyses. Section 6 concludes 
the study, with a discussion of implications to theory and practice.   
 
4.2 Background and Related Literature   
4.2.1 CSR Reporting Trends 
Over 60 countries have recently mandated CSR reporting for all or a subset of listed firms 
(Ho 2017). The EU, UK, China, India and South Africa among other countries have all 
mandated CSR reporting. However, there is considerable variation in how companies 
report their CSR performance measures. For example, companies either integrate CSR 
information in their financial reports or report in separate standalone reports (KPMG 2017). 
To this end, several countries such as South Africa, the UK and Brazil began to 
standardize CSR reporting by mandating firms to integrate their CSR performance 
measures into financial reports.  Other countries such as China and Singapore mandate the 
publication of standalone CSR reports. Regulators in other jurisdictions such as the EU and 
Australia are flexible about CSR report format. For instance, the revised corporate 
governance principles issued by the  Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), specifically 
Principle 7.4, states that firms may meet CSR reporting requirements by issuing an 
integrated report or a separate CSR report (ASX 2019). Similarly, an EU commission 
recommended the integrated reporting framework proposed by the IIRC among other 
alternative reporting frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and SASB 
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standards (EU-Commission 2017). However, the SEC is currently seeking public opinion 
on several policy questions including “If we propose line-item disclosure requirements on 
sustainability or public policy issues, which, if any, of these frameworks should we 
consider in developing any additional disclosure requirements?”  (SEC 2016, p. 214).  
In this study, we experimentally examine whether and how integrating financial 
and CSR performance measures in one report versus reporting in separate reports affects 
investors’ reactions to CSR information. In the next section, we review relevant archival 
and experimental research. 
 
4.2.2 Related Literature 
Prior research provides evidence that CSR information is informative to capital-markets 
and investors (Clarkson et al. 2013; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-
Muñoz 2014). Specifically, capital-markets reward (penalize) firms associated with 
positive (negative) CSR performance73 (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996; Plumlee et al. 
2015). Experimental studies in controlled settings provide corroborating evidence and 
show that investors incorporate CSR information in their valuation judgements (Chan and 
Milne 1999; Milne and Patten 2002; Wang and Tuttle 2014), and adjust their firm value 
estimates in response to both positive and negative CSR indicators (Coram, Monroe, and 
                                                          
73 However, it is important to note that other studies find that CSR information is not informative to 
capital-markets, and has no impact on firm value (e.g., Cho et al. 2015). Further, the link between CSR 
reporting and components of firm value (e.g., cost of capital/ debt) is less clear-cut. For example, several 
studies such as Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Plumlee et al. (2015) find a negative association between CSR 
reporting and cost of capital while Richardson and Welker (2001) and Magnanelli and Izzo (2017) find 
a contrasting positive association between CSR reporting and cost of capital and cost of debt, 
respectively. Further, Clarkson et al. (2013) find no association between voluntary CSR disclosures and 
cost of capital, but show a positive association between CSR disclosure and firm value. 
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Woodliff 2009; Elliott et al. 2014,  ). However, prior research has not considered reporting 
format effects of CSR information74. 
Recent studies find that integrated reporting has important capital-market benefits 
such as reduced information asymmetry and increased market liquidity (Barth et al. 2017; 
Lee and Yeo 2016). A separate line of studies documents real effects of integrated 
reporting, such that firms required to disclose their CSR records in financial reports 
improve their CSR performance (Christensen et al. 2017; Downar et al. 2019).  A likely 
explanation of the capital-market and real effects of integrated reporting is that integrating 
CSR information in financial reports increases dissemination of this information to wider 
audience, compared to when this form of information is reported in a separate report 
(Christensen et al. 2017).   
However, experimental studies highlight potential costs of integrated reporting on 
managers’ operational decisions (Esch, Schnellbächer, and Wald 2019; Johnson 2019), 
auditors’ materiality assessments (Green and Cheng 2019) and investors’ investment 
judgements (Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk 2018). For 
example, Johnson (2019) conducted an experiment with managers and finds that CSR 
report format and audience affect managers’ resources allocations. Specifically, he finds 
that when the disclosure audience is investors-only and CSR information is integrated in a 
financial report, managers allocated more capital to maximize financial benefits rather than 
social benefits. However, managers allocated more capital that maximize social benefits 
when CSR information is disclosed in a separate report and the disclosure audience is 
disparate stakeholders.  
                                                          
74 Several studies explore CSR performance and disclosure scores across alternative reporting outlets 
(e.g., de Villiers and Van Staden 2011; Mahoney et al. 2013). For example, Mahoney et al. (2013) find 
that U.S. firms issuing voluntary standalone CSR reports have higher CSR performance scores relative 
to control firms that do not issue standalone reports, indicating firms with superior CSR records issue 
standalone CSR reports to signal their superior CSR performance. 
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Of particular relevance to our investigation, Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk (2018) 
used an experiment with professional investors and find an interaction between report 
format and assurance of CSR information. Specifically, they report that - in the case of 
non-assured CSR information - integrated reporting positively affected professional 
investors’ evaluation of CSR performance, resulted in a higher weighting of this 
information, and led to higher firm value estimates. In another experiment with 
professional investors, Arnold, Bassen, and Frank (2018) find that investors’ firm value 
estimates are higher when positive CSR information is integrated with financial 
information, but investors who considered negative CSR information in a separate report 
arrived at the same valuation as those receiving CSR in an integrated report. 
Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill (2019) focused on a different group of nonprofessional 
investors and examine effects of CSR information in an integrated or separate report on 
investors’ willingness to invest. In contrast to Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk (2018), they 
find that CSR information has greater influence on investors’ willingness to invest when 
this information is reported in a separate report relative to an integrated report. Their results 
persist both for positive and negative CSR information, and is driven by investors’ 
increased feelings of CSR disclosure relevance being greater when this information is 
reported in a separate report. 
Overall, the experimental studies provide important insights on how integrated 
reporting affects various stakeholder groups. Our study adds to this line of literature and 
examines how CSR performance valence and report format affect nonprofessional 
investors’ firm value estimates. Unlike Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk (2018) who used a 
group of professional investors, we focus on nonprofessional investors’ reactions to 
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integrated reporting75. Our study is also different from Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill (2019) 
who examined CSR reporting format effects on investors’ willingness to invest. Instead, 
our focus is on CSR reporting format effects on investors’ firm value estimates. Further, 
different to both of these studies, we also compare the incremental effects of CSR 
disclosures to a control group who were provided with only financial information. Finally, 
we provide new evidence on whether integrating CSR information in financial reports leads 
investors to misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured, and the subsequent 
effects on investors’ perceived disclosure credibility and firm value estimates. In doing so, 
we respond to recent calls by De Villiers, Venter, and Hsiao (2017) who call for 
experimental studies that examine how integrated reporting affects investors’ judgements. 
 
4.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.3.1  Category Construction Theory 
Category construction theory suggests that categories trigger people to adopt a 
unidimensional or multidimensional perspectives (Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson 
1987; Spalding and Murphy 1996). Experiments involving sorting tasks show that people 
fail to organize items into their natural categories (i.e., family resemblance categories) 
(Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson 1987). That is, categories trigger people to adopt a 
unidimensional perspective, and treat items of the same category as identical although they 
are clearly different (Spalding and Murphy 1996). However, people easily identified family 
resemblance and adopted a multidimensional perspective when additional conceptual 
                                                          
75 Prior accounting research demonstrates that professional and nonprofessional investors use different 
valuation and information processing techniques (see, e.g., Elliott 2006; Frederickson and Miller 2004). 
Specifically, nonprofessional investors are more vulnerable to variations in disclosure reports, and are 
likely subject to unintentional cognitive effects of disclosure reports than sophisticated investors (Elliott 
2006; Maines and McDaniel 2000). Further, nonprofessional investors form a significant portion of the 
investing community (Cohen et al. 2011), and is a group of investors that regulators in many countries 
are increasingly concerned about given increasing complexity in corporate reports (SEC 1998, 2016). 
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knowledge making the family resemblance salient is provided (Ahn and Medin 1992; 
Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson 1987).  
In our setting where investors make a firm valuation, we posit that integrated 
reporting triggers investors to adopt a unidimensional perspective, such that investors treat 
financial and CSR performance measures as equivalent (Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019). 
As such, the vividness of CSR information decreases in an integrated reporting format, and 
a financial perspective prevails given the valuation task. However, reporting financial and 
CSR performance measures in two separate reports evokes investors to adopt a 
multidimensional perspective involving both a financial perspective and a CSR 
perspective. Given that CSR information is imagery-provoking and emotionally sensitive 
(Elliott et al. 2014), we posit that depicting CSR information in a separate standalone report 
as opposed to an integrated report makes CSR information salient. 
Based on the above discussion, we predict that reporting CSR measures in a 
separate report relative to an integrated report has a greater impact on investors’ firm value 
estimates. Therefore, we pose the following hypotheses: 
H1a:  Investors who view positive CSR information in a separate report will derive higher 
firm value estimates relative to investors who receive the same information in an 
integrated report. 
 
H1b:  Investors who view negative CSR information in a separate report will derive lower 
firm value estimates relative to investors who receive the same information in an 
integrated report. 
 
4.3.2  CSR Information Classification 
Prior experimental accounting research has focused on whether the presence or absence of 
CSR assurance affects investors’ perceived credibility and investment judgements (Cheng, 
Green, and Ko 2015; Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff 2009; Kuruppu and Milne 2010; 
Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk 2018). In this study, we examine whether report format of 
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CSR information affects investors’ perceived credibility of CSR information. Specifically, 
we assess whether integrating CSR information in financial reports increases investors’ 
perceived credibility of this information. We study one possible channel in which this 
occurs, that is whether investors misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured when 
integrated in a financial report relative to when reported in a separate CSR report. In a 
financial accounting experiment, Hodge (2001) finds that investors who viewed 
hyperlinked audited and unaudited financial information misclassified more unaudited 
information as audited and rated the credibility of the unaudited information higher than 
did investors who viewed hardcopy materials. In his study, the investors who assessed the 
unaudited financial information as more credible also judged the firm's earnings potential 
to be higher. 
In an integrated reporting setting, Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk (2018) argue that 
investors’ higher firm value estimates in response to non-assured CSR information in an 
integrated report may be due to a halo effect stemming from combining CSR information 
with audited financial information. However, their study does not collect measures on 
whether investors misclassified non-assured CSR information as assured. Other recent 
experimental studies did not also consider whether integrated reporting leads investors to 
misclassify CSR information as assured (e.g., Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019). In this 
study, we provide direct evidence on whether integrated reporting relative to separate 
reporting leads more investors to misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured76.  
To the extent that integrated reporting causes investors to adopt a unidimensional 
perspective and treat items of the same category as identical (Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 
                                                          
76 Assurance on CSR information is voluntary in most jurisdictions, and there is no specific mandate 
that requires companies to disclose whether all or specific CSR indicators are assured or non-assured. 
For example, KPMG (2017) survey shows that 67% of top 250 global companies, and 45% of 4,900 
leading worldwide firms obtained independent assurance for their CSR data in 2017, up from 63% and 
42% in 2015 respectively. 
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2019; Spalding and Murphy 1996), we contend that integrated reporting (relative to 
separate reporting) causes more investors to misclassify CSR information as assured. 
Consequently, we predict that misclassifying investors will rate CSR disclosure credibility 
higher, and derive significantly higher firm value estimates relative to investors who 
correctly classify this information as non-assured (Hodge 2001). Our hypotheses are 
summarized as follows:  
 
H2a: More investors will misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured when this 
information is integrated in a financial report relative to when reported in a separate 
report. 
 
H2b: Misclassifying investors will rate CSR disclosure credibility higher and derive 
higher firm value estimates relative to investors who correctly classify this 
information as non-assured. 
 
 
4.4 Experimental Method 
4.4.1  Experimental Design and Participants 
We employ a 2 × 2 + 1 between-participants experiment to test our predictions. We first 
manipulate CSR performance valence type at two levels (i.e., positive versus negative). 
Second, we manipulate report format at two levels, and vary whether CSR measures are 
integrated in a financial report or reported in a separate CSR report. We include a no CSR 
disclosure control condition that receives company background and financial information 
only. Importantly, we hold the underlying economics of the firm and other key features of 
the firm constant across conditions to isolate reporting format effects on investors’ 
judgements to both positive and negative CSR performance measures.  
We utilized Amazon Mechanical Turk (hereafter MTurk) to recruit participants 
serving as nonprofessional investors in exchange for US$2 fixed payment. Recently, 
MTurk has become a reliable recruitment source of reasonably informed investor groups 
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for behavioral accounting studies (Buchheit et al. 2017). Importantly, Farrell, Grenier, and 
Leiby (2017) show that online workers including those in MTurk exert a comparable effort 
as participants in traditional labor markets, even under a substantially lower pay levels.  A 
unique feature of the MTurk platform is that participants can be previewed using their pre-
registered profiles77. To rule out effects of institutional setting and further enhance data 
quality, we rely on stringent pre-registered profiles of our participants. For example, we 
required participants to have a U.S. Graduate Degree; live in the U.S.; and have an MTurk 
performance Approval Rate of 98% or above. 
Following Koonce, Miller, and Winchel (2015), we used screening questions to 
ensure that the participants of our study have reasonable accounting knowledge and 
investing experience necessary for the experimental task (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 
2002). In addition to the MTurk filters described above, we required participants to have 
(1) taken at least two college-level accounting and/or finance courses and (2) purchased or 
sold individual stocks at least two times in the past. A total of 337 individuals have 
attempted our survey link and we retained 178 participants (or approximately 53%) who 
met our screening requirements. The experiment was administered via Qualtrics software, 
which randomly allocated participants that met the criteria to one of the five experimental 
conditions78. 
All participants are aged 25 or above, 98% self-reported that their native language 
is English, and 65% are male. Further, 88% stated that they have more than 5 years of 
                                                          
77 MTurk recruits diverse “Workers” interested in participating online studies. To be selected, potential 
Workers must fill in an initial registration questionnaire which collects their profile attributes such as 
sex, age, country of residence, educational background among others. MTurk in turn combines Worker 
attributes and allows Requesters to select potential participants based on their profile (known as 
Qualifications). Further, MTurk records performance levels of Workers (e.g., Masters) so Requesters 
can select Workers that meet or exceed certain levels of performance for their research.  
 
78 Approval to use human subjects was granted by The University of Adelaide’s Office of Research 
Ethics, Compliance and Integrity. 
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professional working experience; 98% (65%) stated that they have read financial (CSR) 
reports at least once in the past. On average, participants took approximately 12 minutes to 
complete the task, thereby their participation fee translates to US$10 per hour (about 
AU$15 at the time) which is comparable to recent studies using MTurk participants (e.g., 
Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019). Table 4.1 below summarizes demographical information 
of the participants. 
 
 
Table 4. 1: Descriptive statistics for participants 
 Frequency Percent 
Final number of participants 164 100 
Investing experience    
Number of participants with investing experience 157 95.7 
Age distribution of participants    
o 18-24 0 0 
o 25-34 51 31.1 
o 35-44 59 36.0 
o 45-54 33 20.1 
o 55 or Older  20 12.2 
Number of times participants assessed financial reports   
o This is my first time 4 2.4 
o 1 – 5 times 45 27.4 
o 6 – 10 times 42 25.6 
o More than 10 times 72 43.9 
Number of times participants assessed CSR reports   
o This is my first time 62 37.8 
o 1 – 5 times 71 43.3 
o 6 – 10 times 18 11.0 
o More than 10 times 12 7.3 
Participants’ full time working experience (in years)   
o 0 0 0 
o 1-5  15 9.1 
o 6-10 32 19.5 
o 11-15 28 17.1 
o More than 15 Years 88 53.7 
 
Note: Table 4.1 presents the demographic profile of the investors who participated in the 
experiment. One participant did not provide their demographic data and therefore the above 




4.4.2  Case Material and Procedures 
Participants first answered screening questions to verify their accounting knowledge and 
investing experience, as described above. All participants began the experiment by reading 
through background information and financial performance of Apax Limited., a 
hypothetical firm in the Industrial and Engineering sector. Participants assumed the role of 
a prospective investor and evaluated the common stock of Apax Limited. To isolate the 
incremental effects of CSR indicators and reduce investors’ anchoring on financial 
performance, participants were explicitly told that the financial performance of Apax 
Limited has been mixed over the last three years. After reading financial performance 
highlights, participants were randomly assigned to one of the five experimental conditions. 
Participants in the control condition viewed background and financial information only.  
Across all conditions, assurance of CSR information was absent. The case materials 
explicitly stated that “only the Financial Information has been independently audited by a 
well-known audit firm”. We summarize sequence of the experimental events in Figure 4.1. 
We also provide the full experimental instrument in Appendix C. 
 




Note: Figure 4.1 describes sequence of experimental events across the four CSR disclosure 
experimental manipulations. For the control condition, participants also first responded to the 
screening questions, read firm and industry background information, and finally read financial 
report containing financial information alone. Participants then proceeded to make valuation 
judgement, responded to manipulation check and post-task questions. 
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In designing the research instrument, we have taken a number of steps to ensure that our 
case materials reflect current disclosure practices. First, we reviewed the integrated reports 
of the top 50 South African companies by market capitalization for the year 2014, given 
that integrated reporting has been mandatory in South Africa since 2010. We also reviewed 
a sample of 2017 annual reports (i.e., Form 10-Ks) of U.S. mining firms subject to Section 
1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires SEC-registered mining firms to disclose social 
information in their financial reports79. The objective of these reviews was to observe how 
firms integrate their CSR information in financial reports, and accordingly align to our 
experimental manipulation. Second, we sought feedback from four leading experimental 
accounting researchers who have undertaken similar types of research projects to comment 
on our case materials. Finally, we conducted a pilot experiment using a smaller sample of 
MTurk participants to test whether our manipulations are working (Buchheit et al. 2017). 
We made adjustments to the experimental materials based on feedback we received, current 
disclosure practices and pilot experiment80. Overall, we believe that the experimental 
materials reflect current features of CSR disclosure practices. 
 
4.4.3  Independent Variables 
We manipulate two independent variables. First, we vary CSR performance valence at two 
levels (positive versus negative). In the positive (negative) condition, all CSR performance 
                                                          
79 Our sample of US mining firms includes 10 leading firms by market capitalization. 
 
80 We run a 2 x 2 + 1 pilot experiment except in the pilot experiment, assurance of CSR information was 
present across all CSR conditions. In the main study, however, assurance of CSR information is absent 
across all CSR conditions. The control condition materials in the pilot and the main experiment were 
unchanged, and therefore we incorporate participants exposed to the control condition in our full 
analyses (Buchheit et al. 2017). We also ensured that participants who were in the pilot experiment are 
excluded in the main experiment using relevant MTurk features designed for this purpose.  
 
198 
measures of the firm have improved (deteriorated) over time81. Importantly, our 
experimental scenario focuses on a setting where the financial implications of CSR 
activities are quantified given that investors tend to ignore narrative CSR disclosures 
(Milne and Chan 1999). A review of the integrated reports of top 50 South African firms 
by market capitalization also indicates that companies disclose both the positive and 
negative financial implications of their CSR activities. For example, companies report 
significant financial savings stemming from reductions in water / energy usage as part of 
their CSR initiatives (for more examples, see Appendix D). 
Second, we manipulate report format of CSR information at two levels (integrated 
versus separate report). In the integrated report condition, participants view financial and 
CSR information in one report. Consistent with Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill (2019), the 
financial and CSR information were reported in separate sections of the same report. To 
strengthen our manipulation of integrated reporting, participants were explicitly informed 
that they will read annual performance report that contain both financial and CSR measures 
of Apax Limited. In contrast, participants in the separate report condition first viewed 
standard financial statements, answered a debriefing question about the firm’s financial 
performance and then viewed a separate report entitled Sustainability Report (for a similar 
approach see e.g., Arnold, Bassen, and Frank 2018). Further, participants were told that 
they will read financial statements and a separate Sustainability Report.  
Our manipulations exhibit both naturally occurring features of CSR reporting and 
address existing policy questions (KPMG 2017; SEC 2016). For example, a recent KPMG 
(2017) survey reports that 60% of 4,900 worldwide companies, and 78% of the largest 250 
global companies integrate CSR information in their 2017 financial reports (also see e.g., 
                                                          
81 On the surface, it may sound unusual for firms to report all negative CSR performance data. However, 
for experimental purposes, we make this design choice to reduce noise in our data and isolate investors’ 
reactions to positive versus negative CSR information.   
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Cohen et al. 2012). Our second manipulation captures reporting format effects of different 
CSR performance measures by considering both positive and negative CSR disclosures. 
Historically in an unregulated environment, CSR disclosures have tended to be largely 
positive (Boiral 2013). However, as CSR reporting continues to become more mainstream 
and CSR reporting regulation matures, more variety of this type of disclosure will occur as 
managers would want to preempt litigation risks of withholding negative CSR news. 
Further, our experimental design includes a NO CSR control condition and therefore also 
speaks to settings where CSR disclosure is absent. 
  
4.4.4  Dependent and Process Measures  
The main dependent variable in our study is firm valuation. To measure participants’ firm 
value estimates, we provided them the closing stock price of our case company (Apax 
Limited) at $4.60, and asked them to predict whether the stock price of Apax Limited will 
increase, decrease or stay the same based on the information provided. Based on their 
prediction, we asked participants to indicate the increase or decrease in percentage terms. 
This approach provides better control and rules out unrelated factors that participants may 
bring with them in their firm value estimates; and is consistent with prior studies (Coram, 
Monroe, and Woodliff 2009; Hopkins 1996). We compute our ‘firm value’ measure as the 
sum of change provided by the participants plus closing stock price.  
We also collected data on a number of process measures. First, we asked 
participants to indicate whether the CSR information was ‘assured, non-assured or unsure’. 
Second and relatedly, we collected a measure of investors’ feelings of disclosure reliability. 
Participants responded on an 11-point scale anchored from 0 =”not at all reliable” to 10 = 
“extremely reliable”. Finally, we collected measures for several other process variables. 
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For example, we elicit measures of investors’ perceived relevance and materiality of CSR 
information; processing ease; management credibility; and investors’ CSR attitude. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Manipulation Checks  
Immediately after reading the case materials, participants were asked to respond to two 
manipulation check questions. First, we asked participants to recall whether the “CSR 
performance of Apax Limited was positive, negative or unsure”. For the positive (negative) 
CSR conditions, 93% (92.5%) of the participants correctly stated that the CSR performance 
they viewed was positive (negative), indicating our CSR performance valence 
manipulation was successful. Second, we asked participants to indicate whether they 
received the CSR measures in an integrated report or in a separate CSR report. 
Approximately 91% (49%) of the participants correctly recalled that they read CSR 
information in a separate (integrated) report82. Finally, we asked participants in the no CSR 
control condition to recall whether the financial performance of Apax Limited was 
“positive, mixed or negative”. Because participants in the control condition only 
considered financial information, it is important for our analyses that they correctly recalled 
that the financial performance of Apax Limited was mixed. For this reason, we retained 
                                                          
82 We argue that the high failure rate in the integrated relative to the separate reporting condition is likely 
due to the fact that integrated reporting is relatively new and is a reporting format where investors, 
particularly nonprofessional investors do not have prior experience. Results are inferentially identical if 
we remove participants that failed our reporting format and/or CSR performance valence manipulation 
check questions. For this reason, we present results based on the full sample to increase statistical power 
of the results. 
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participants that successfully recalled that the financial performance of Apax Limited was 
mixed. Our final sample size is 164 participants83.  
 
4.5.2  Baseline Analysis 
As a baseline analysis, we first establish whether CSR performance indicators are 
incrementally informative to investors’ firm value estimates. Based on prior research, we 
expect investors’ firm value estimates to be higher (lower) in response to positive 
(negative) CSR performance measures compared to the no CSR control condition.  
Panel A of Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for investors’ firm value 
estimates. Results show that the mean stock price estimates of investors who considered 
positive CSR indicators is $4.73, whereas the mean stock price of investors who considered 
financial information alone is $4.57. In the negative CSR conditions, the average stock 
price estimate is $4.35 relative to the average stock price estimate of $4.57 in the no CSR 
control condition84.  
Panel B of Table 4.2 below presents results of analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
planned comparisons for our baseline analysis. Results show that investors’ firm value 
estimates are significantly higher in response to positive CSR performance indicators 
relative to NO CSR control condition (t = -2.244, p = 0.026), and significantly lower in 
                                                          
83 The majority of the excluded participants (n = 19) were in the control NO CSR condition, who took 
very little amount of time (i.e., less than 5 minutes) and/or failed condition-specific attention check 
question. For this reason, we have added additional 14 participants from the soft run who were in the 
control No CSR condition to increase power of the results. These participants successfully recalled the 
condition-specific manipulation check question that the financial performance of Apax Limited was 
mixed, and also spent a reasonable amount of time (i.e., 5 or more minutes). The case materials in the 
main experiment and soft run for the NO CSR control condition were identical. 
 
84  The closing stock price of Apax Limited was $4.60. The average stock price estimate of investors 
who viewed positive CSR information is $4.73, an increase of 3.5% or $0.13. On the other hand, the 
average stock price estimate of investors who viewed negative CSR information is $4.35, a decrease of 
5.43% or $0.25. Investors in the NO CSR disclosure control condition did not significantly change their 
stock price estimate at $4.57 relative to $4.60. 
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response to negative CSR measures relative to no CSR condition (t = 3.160, p = 0.002). In 
sum, the results indicate that CSR performance measures are incrementally informative to 
investors’ firm value estimates85.  
 
 
Table 4. 2: Descriptive and ANOVA results - Firm value estimates 
 
Table 4.2 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean, (Standard Deviation) and 
Observations 
CSR Disclosure Integrated Report Separate Report Condition Means 
 
Positive CSR 4.74 
(0. 38) 
n = 31 
4.71 
(0. 31) 
n = 32 
4.73 
(0.35) 














n = 68 
 








n = 33 
 










Positive CSR Disclosure versus No CSR Disclosure   -2.244 159 0.026 
Negative CSR Disclosure versus No CSR Disclosure   3.160 159 0.002 
 
Note: Panel A of Table 4.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for investors’ firm value 
estimates. Panel B presents the follow-up simple effect test results. We manipulate (1) whether 
CSR performance measures are positive versus negative and (2) whether CSR measures are 
integrated in a financial report versus reported in a separate report. For the dependent variable, 
Firm Value estimates, we provided participants the closing stock price of Apax Limited at $4.60, 
and asked them to predict whether the stock price of Apax Limited will increase, decrease or 
stay the same based on the information they have read. Based on their prediction, we asked 
participants to indicate the increase or decrease in percentage terms. We compute our ‘Firm 
Value’ measure as the sum of change provided by the participants plus the closing stock price. 
 
                                                          
85 We tested whether these results are driven by investors’ CSR attitude and/or their general political 
views, and find that the results are not driven by these factors. 
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Our results are consistent with prior archival and experimental research that documents the 
incremental effects of CSR reporting (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Elliott et al. 2014; Milne and 
Patten 2002; Plumlee et al. 2015). Next, we examine whether integrating CSR performance 
measures in financial reports versus reporting in separate report exacerbates or attenuates 
effects of this information on investors’ firm value estimates.   
 
4.5.3  Tests of Hypotheses  
We formally test four hypotheses to examine effects of CSR information and reporting 
format of this information on investors’ firm value estimates. Our theory predicts that 
categories (here reporting format) triggers investors to adopt a single or multiple 
perspectives, such that integrated reporting causes investors to adopt a single perspective 
of financial information only. However, separate reporting evokes investors to adopt 
multidimensional perspectives of both financial and CSR information. As such, we predict 
that CSR information has a greater impact on investors’ firm value estimates when reported 
in a separate report relative to an integrated report. Results are presented in Panel A of 
Table 4.3. Consistent with our prediction, we find a significant difference in the negative 
CSR disclosure conditions. Specifically, reporting negative CSR performance indicators in 
a separate report leads to stronger reactions from investors, such that their firm value 
estimates are more negative when this information is reported in a separate report relative 
to when integrated in a financial report (t = 2.258,  p = 0.025). However, we do not find a 
significant difference between integrated or separate reporting for positive CSR 
performance indicators (t = 0.379, p = 0.705). Therefore, the results support H2b, but H2a 
is not supported.  
We provide further analyses in Panel B of Table 4.3 to test our theory that CSR 
information has greater impact when reported in separate reports. Specifically, we compare 
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investors’ reactions to CSR disclosure across alternative CSR reporting formats relative to 
the no CSR control condition. Consistent with our prediction, the results show that 
investors’ firm value estimates are significantly higher (lower) in response to both positive 
(negative) CSR disclosure than the control condition when reported in separate reports: 
Positive CSR in separate report versus control condition (t = -1.751, p = 0.082) and negative 
CSR in separate report versus control condition (t = 3.837, p = 0.000). However, the results 
reveal that investors significantly adjust their firm value estimates only when positive CSR 
information is reported in an integrated report relative to the control condition (t = -2.119, 
p = 0.036), but not when negative CSR information is reported in an integrated  report (t = 
1.635, p = 0.104). 
Collectively, the results indicate that separate reporting causes stronger reactions 
from investors, such that their firm value estimates are higher (lower) when positive 
(negative) CSR performance measures are reported in a separate report relative to a 














Table 4. 3: Reporting format effects of CSR information 
Table 4.3 Panel A: ANOVA with Planned Comparisons for H2a and H2b 
Hypotheses t-statistic d.f. p-value 
Integrated versus separate reporting: Positive CSR 
condition 
0.379 159 0.705 
Integrated versus separate reporting: Negative CSR 
condition  
2.258 159 0.025 
 
o Contrasts for positive integrated versus positive separate conditions +1 and -1  
o Contrasts for negative integrated versus positive separate conditions +2 and -2 
 
Table 4.3 Panel B: ANOVA with Planned Comparisons – further analyses for H2a 
and H2b 
Positive CSR integrated versus control condition  -2.119 159 0.036 
Positive CSR separated versus control condition -1.751 159 0.082 
Negative CSR integrated versus control condition 1.635 159 0.104 
Negative CSR separated versus control condition 3.837 159 0.000 
 
o Contrasts for positive versus control condition +2, -1 and -1  
o Contrasts for negative versus control condition +4, -2 and – 2 
o For the individual reporting format contrasts, we used standard +1 and -1 
 
Note: Panel A of Table 4.3 presents ANOVA results for H1a and H1b. Panel B presents the 
follow-up ANOVA results taking into account the control condition. We manipulate (1) whether 
CSR performance measures are positive versus negative and (2) whether CSR measures are 
integrated in a financial report versus reported in a separate report. For the dependent variable, 
Firm Value estimates, we provided participants the closing stock price of Apax Limited at $4.60, 
and asked them to predict whether the stock price of Apax Limited will increase, decrease or 
stay the same based on the information they have read. Based on their prediction, we asked 
participants to indicate the increase or decrease in percentage terms. We compute our ‘Firm 




4.5.4  Mediation Analyses 
We examine possible channels in which separate reporting exacerbates the effects of CSR 
information on investors’ firm value estimates. One possible channel is investors’ 
perceived management credibility. For example, Wang and Tuttle (2014) show that 
investors use CSR performance as a cue to evaluate management credibility. Following 
206 
Baron and Kenny (1986), we conducted mediation analyses and find that investors’ 
perceived management credibility mediates the relationship between reporting format of 
negative CSR information and investors’ firm value estimates86. Specifically, we find that 
investors’ perceived management credibility is significantly lower when negative CSR 
information is reported in a separate report than in an integrated report. Figure 4.2 further 
shows that (1) there is a significant relationship between reporting format of CSR 
information and investors’ perceived management credibility (β -0.229, p = 0.061), (2) 
management credibility is significantly associated with firm value (β +0.281, p = 0.002), 
and (3) reporting format is significantly associated with firm value (β -0.264, p = 0.003) 
(4) but the significant relationship between reporting format and firm value is reduced when 
management credibility is incorporated87 (β -0.211, p = 0.083).  
In sum, the mediation analyses indicate that separate reporting acts as a 
subconscious heuristic cue and affects investors’ perceived management credibility, which 
in turn influences their firm value estimates. We do not repeat the mediation analyses for 
the positive CSR condition because there are no reporting format effects for the positive 





                                                          
86 We also collected data on several other process variables including investors’ perceived relevance 
and materiality of CSR disclosure as well as access of CSR information across alternative reporting 
formats. We find that materiality partially mediates the relationship between reporting format of CSR 
information and firm value estimates. For brevity purposes, we present results of investors’ perceived 
management credibility across alternative reporting formats.   
 
87 Following Preacher and Hayes (2008), we also performed mediation analyses based on Hayes Process 
macro (PROCESS Model 4) using non-parametric bootstrapping of 5,000 estimates at 95 percent 
confidence interval and find similar results. Specifically, results indicate that the effect of CSR report 
format on investors’ firm value estimates operates through investors’ perceived management credibility. 
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Note: Figure 4.2 shows mediation analysis for negative CSR disclosure condition. For 
Reporting Format, participants were either assigned to CSR information integrated in a financial 
report or reported in a separate CSR report. For Management Credibility, we asked participants 
“how trustworthy do you believe the management of Apax Limited to be” and provided them an 
11-point scale ranging from 0 = “not at all trustworthy” to 11 = “very trustworthy”. For the Firm 
Value variable, we provided participants the closing stock price of Apax Limited at $4.60, and 
asked them to predict whether the stock price of Apax Limited will increase, decrease or stay 
the same based on the information they have read. Based on their prediction, we asked 
participants to indicate the increase or decrease in percentage terms. We compute our ‘Firm 
Value’ measure as the sum of change provided by the participants plus the closing stock price. 
 
 
4.5.5  CSR Assurance Classification  
Next, we examine whether integrating CSR measures in a financial report triggers investors 
to misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured. Recall that assurance of CSR 
information was absent across all conditions. Panel A of Table 4.4 provides descriptive 
results and show that more investors in the integrated report conditions (n = 24, 36.36%) 
incorrectly classified CSR indicators as assured than investors in the separate report 
conditions (n = 15, 23.08%). Descriptive results also show that misclassifying investors 
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rated disclosure credibility higher (mean 8.72 > 7.62), and derived higher firm value 
estimates (mean 4.68 > 4.43) relative to investors who correctly classified CSR information 
as non-assured.  
Panel B of Table 4.4 presents results of ANOVA with planned comparisons, and 
shows that misclassifying investors in the integrated report conditions rated credibility of 
CSR disclosure significantly higher (t = 2.727, p = 0.009), and derived significantly higher 
firm value estimates (t = 2.616, p = 0.013) compared to investors in the separate report 
conditions who correctly classified CSR information as non-assured88. Therefore, the 
results provide support to hypotheses (H3a and H3b).  
Next, we provide further analyses and examine whether there are differences 
between the disclosure credibility ratings and firm value estimates of investors who 
correctly classified CSR information as non-assured. As expected, we find no significant 
differences, both for the disclosure credibility ratings (t = 0.841, p = 0.406) and firm value 
estimates (t = 0.491, p = 0.626). This latter finding provides additional evidence that 
misclassification leads investors to assess CSR disclosure credibility higher and derive 
higher firm value estimates. 
Overall, our analyses suggest that integrated reporting relative to separate reporting 
leads more investors to misclassify non-assured CSR information as assured. Importantly, 
we find that misclassifying investors in the integrated report conditions assessed CSR 
disclosure credibility higher and derived significantly higher firm value estimates than 
investors who correctly classified CSR information as non-assured.  
 
                                                          
88 As shown in Panel B of Table 4.4, we also compared misclassifying investors in the same integrated 
report conditions to investors who correctly classified CSR information as non-assured, and find that 
misclassifying investors derived significantly higher firm value estimates (t = 2.281, p = 0.028) relative 
to investors in the same integrated report condition who correctly classified CSR information as non-
assured. As expected, we do not find significant differences in the firm value estimates of misclassifying 
and correct investors in the separate report conditions (t = 1.539, p = 0.133). 
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Table 4. 4: CSR assurance classification 
 
















Correct classification rate 19 (28.79) 7.89 (2.13) 4.46 (0.26) 
Incorrect classification rate 24 (36.36) 8.79 (1.77) 4.72 (0.48) 
Separate Report 
Correct classification rate 23 (35.38) 7.39 (1.75) 4.41 (0.31) 
Incorrect classification rate 15 (23.08) 8.6 (1.55) 4.62 (0.52) 
Total correct classification 42 (32.06) 7.62 (1.92) 4.43 (0.29) 
Total incorrect classification 39 (29.77) 8.72 (1.67) 4.68 (0.49) 
 
Table 4.4 Panel B: ANOVA with Planned Comparisons  
Disclosure Credibility    t-statistic d.f. P -value 
Correct versus Incorrect – Integrated versus Separate Report 2.727 44.95 0.009 
Correct versus incorrect – Integrated Report 1.508 41 0.139 
Correct versus incorrect – Separate Report 2.173 36 0.036 
Correct versus correct – Integrated versus to Separate Report 0.841 40 0.406 
Firm Value Estimates   t-statistic d.f. P -value 
Correct versus Incorrect –  Integrated versus Separate Report 2.616 39.33 0.013 
Correct versus Incorrect – Integrated Report 2.281 36.94 0.028 
Correct versus Incorrect – Separate Report 1.539 36 0.133 
Correct versus Correct – Integrated versus to Separate Report 0.491 40 0.626 
 
Note: Table 4.4 presents investors’ perceived assurance of CSR performance measures. Panel A 
shows the descriptive statistics while Panel B provides ANOVA results. For the dependent 
variable, Disclosure Credibility, participants responded on an 11-point scale anchored from 0 
=”not at all reliable” to 10 = “extremely reliable”. For the second dependent variable, Firm Value 
estimates, we used the same measure as in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
 Correct classification = participants who correctly stated that CSR measures were not 
assured. 
 Incorrect classification = participants who incorrectly stated that CSR measures were 
assured. 
 We do not include participants who were “unsure” of whether CSR measures were assured 
or non-assured in the analyses. These participants were 33.33% (40%) in the integrated 
(separate) report conditions. There are also two (2) missing values, one in each reporting 
condition.  
210 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
In this study, we extend prior literature by considering how the reporting format of CSR 
information affects investors’ reactions to CSR performance measures. Recent archival 
studies find that integrated reporting is incrementally informative to capital-markets (Barth 
et al. 2017; Lee and Yeo 2016), and has real effects on firm behavior (Christensen et al. 
2017; Downar et al. 2019). The archival literature suggests that the capital-market and real 
effects of integrated reporting stem from increased dissemination of CSR information to 
wider audience. However, experimental research highlights unintended consequences of 
integrating CSR measures in financial reports (Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Johnson 
2019; Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk 2018).     
 Building on this literature and the theory of category construction, we conducted an 
experiment with nonprofessional investors and find that CSR information has a greater 
impact on investors’ firm value estimates when reported in a separate report relative to an 
integrated report. We also find that more investors misclassified non-assured CSR 
information as assured when integrated in a financial report compared to when reported in 
a separate CSR report. Consequently, misclassifying investors rated CSR disclosure 
credibility higher, and derived significantly higher firm value estimates relative to investors 
who correctly classified this information as non-assured. Taken together, our results are 
consistent with the theory of category construction that categories can trigger perspectives 
(i.e., unidimensional versus multidimensional perspective). This indicates that integrated 
reporting leads investors to adopt a unidimensional perspective and treat financial and CSR 
measures as equivalent, whereas separate reporting evokes investors to adopt a 
multidimensional perspective that includes both financial and CSR performance measures. 
As a result, integrated reporting diminishes CSR performance measures and causes 
investors to misclassify non-assured CSR measures as assured.  
211 
These results have several policy implications. First, recent surveys show 
considerable heterogeneity in CSR reporting approaches, with 60%  of 4,900 worldwide 
companies integrating their CSR information in financial reports in 2017 (KPMG 2017). 
Of this, 45% obtained independent assurance of their CSR disclosures. Given the 
considerable heterogeneity in CSR reporting approaches by global firms and the worldwide 
move to more integrated reporting as well as the increase in CSR reporting regulations 
globally, understanding how alternative CSR reporting formats affect investors is an 
important topic for regulators, standard-setters, interest groups, and the business 
community. Specifically, our study should be informative to global regulators, and 
particularly responds to the SEC’s recent inquiry of “How important to investors is 
integrated reporting, as opposed to separate financial and sustainability reporting?” (SEC 
2016, p. 214).  
Second, our study is informative to CSR reporting and disclosure assurance 
standard-setting. Currently, assurance of CSR information is largely voluntary 
internationally. Our results indicate that the integration of CSR performance measures in 
financial reports may lead investors to misinterpret this form of information as assured 
when that is not the case. These findings extend the findings of Hodge (2001) and highlight 
the importance of requiring firms to explicitly disclose whether and which CSR 
performance measures are assured or non-assured, especially when this form of 
information is integrated in audited financial reports.  
Finally, our study extends limited research on how integrated reporting affects 
investors. Existing research has so far focused on capital-market reactions to the adoption 
of integrated reporting (Barth et al. 2017; Lee and Yeo 2016). Recent experimental studies 
also provide evidence on how integrated reporting affects managers (Esch, Schnellbächer, 
and Wald 2019; Johnson 2019), auditors (Green and Cheng 2019) and investors (Arnold, 
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Bassen, and Frank 2018; Bucaro, Jackson, and Lill 2019; Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk 
2018). We add to this growing literature and provide early evidence on how integrated 
reporting affects nonprofessional investors’ firm value estimates. Specifically, we are the 
first to show that integrating CSR performance measures in financial reports causes 
investors to misclassify non-assured CSR measures as assured.  
The implications of the study notwithstanding, several caveats are in order which 
provide opportunities for future research. First, similar to most experimental research that 
provides participants with additional information, our study is not immune to demand 
effects. However, we have taken several steps to mitigate demand effects such as including 
a control condition and using a between-participants experimental design. Second, our 
results do not speak to firms that simultaneously disclose CSR information both in their 
financial reports and other alternative outlets such as standalone CSR reports and/or 
company websites (Cohen et al. 2012). Using multiple channels to communicate CSR 
information plausibly increases dissemination of this information (Christensen et al. 2017). 
However, capital-market and/or real effects of repeated disclosures within one or across 
multiple reporting channels remain an important area for further research (Cazier and 
Pfeiffer 2017). Third, our experimental case focuses on a setting where the financial 
implications of CSR measures are explicitly highlighted. Given our theory of category 
construction, quantifying CSR measures may have increased the resemblance of financial 
and CSR measures. Future research may examine whether our experimental findings 
extend to a setting where CSR measures are not quantified, and presented in a narrative 
form. Finally, our study does not effectively address the question of whether integrating 
CSR information in financial reports per se increases dissemination and awareness of this 
information. Future research using eye-tracking technology can determine whether 
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APPENDIX C – INSTRUMENT 2 
 
 
Questions: [Screening Questions]  
In order to help us better understand why your responses might be different from those of 
other participants in this study, please answer the following questions. 
 














































Apax Limited is a publicly traded company that operates within the Industrial and 
Engineering sector. This sector is highly competitive as it attracts a growing number of 
small business start-ups, with leading multinational giants already controlling a large share 
of the market. Broader macroeconomic factors such as recurring financial crises and 
uncertainty surrounding oil and gas prices further pose unpredictable challenges to the 
industry. These challenges are likely to remain in the foreseeable future. Overall, the Board 
and Management of Apax Limited ensure current shareholders and potential investors that 






Apax Limited is an industrial and assembling company that operates throughout the U.S. 
The company’s primary business segment develops and commercializes modern 
technologies for homes and businesses. Our products include appliances such as washing 
machines, vacuum cleaners, and microwave ovens. We also sell heaters and air 
conditioners. Our secondary business segment provides assembling services for automobile 
and computer hardware. Given the industry’s intense competition, our competitive strategy 
is to sell products and services at discounted prices to attract and retain customers. As such, 
cost management remains a top priority, both in terms of controlling operational and non-
operational costs.  
  
At Apax Limited, our goal is to continuously deliver great value to our clients and 





On the next page, you will view a Press Release from the management of Apax Limited 
showing summary of key financial performance indicators of the Company relative to 













For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Management Discussion of Financial Results 
 
Apax Limited announces Annual Financial Results for the year ended December 31, 2017. 
The Company recorded net income of $6.35 million for the current fiscal year compared to 
$5.68 million in the previous year 2016, resulting in an 11.8% year-on-year increase.  
 
Despite this year-on-year increase, Apax’s financial results over the past three years 
have been mixed relative to industry peers. This mixed performance is caused by poor 
traffic of sales due to increased industry competition. 
 
The following table compares our performance indicators to the industry average: 
 
Key Performance Indicators  Apax Limited Industry Average 
Revenue Growth (From Prior Year) 5.83% 11.66% 
Earnings Growth (Last 5 Years) 6.72% 10.53% 
Return on Assets 8.42% 8.44% 
Total Debt/ Equity  67.16% 73.82% 







On the next page, you will view the Financial Statements of Apax Limited for the year 




 The Financial Statements have been independently audited by a well-known 








For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Income Statement     
(Amount in  Thousands)     
 




$     79,964  
 
$     75,560  
 
$     86,220  
Costs and Expenses  
   
          Cost of Goods Sold  49,644 47,425 49,212 
          Other General Expenses  22,250 20,800 23,738 
Total Costs and Expenses  71,894 68,225 72,950 
 
 
   
Profit before Income Tax  8,070 7,335 13,270 
Provision for Income Tax  1,720 1,655 1,895 
Net Income  $6,350 $5,680 $11,375 
     
Balance Sheet     
(Amount in  Thousands)     
  2017 2016 2015 
ASSETS 
 
   
        Current Assets 23,814 20,112 29,240 
        Non-current Assets  26,920 25,260 34,002 
Total Assets  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
LIABILITIES  
 
   
         Current Liabilities 9,140 9,880 8,550 
         Long-term Liabilities  11,243 11,450 11,003 
Total Liabilities  $20,383 $21,330 $19,553 
  
   
Total Stockholders' Equity  30,351 24,042 43,689 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 

















For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Management Discussion of Financial Results 
 
Apax Limited announces Annual Financial Results for the year ended December 31, 2017. 
The Company recorded net income of $6.35 million for the current fiscal year compared to 
$5.68 million in the previous year 2016, resulting in an 11.8% year-on-year increase.  
 
Despite this year-on-year increase, Apax’s financial results over the past three years 
have been mixed relative to industry peers. This mixed performance is caused by poor 
traffic of sales due to increased industry competition. 
 
The following table compares our performance indicators to the industry average: 
 
Key Performance Indicators  Apax Limited Industry Average 
Revenue Growth (From Prior Year) 5.83% 11.66% 
Earnings Growth (Last 5 Years) 6.72% 10.53% 
Return on Assets 8.42% 8.44% 
Total Debt/ Equity  67.16% 73.82% 




On the next page, you will view the Financial Statements of Apax Limited for the year 
ended December 31, 2017.  
 
 Only the Financial Information has been independently audited by a well-






Apax Limited discloses sustainability performance information in the Financial 
Statements. We do this integration to highlight the impact of our sustainability 







For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Income Statement     




$     79,964  
 
$     75,560  
 
$     86,220  
Costs and Expenses  
   
          Cost of Goods Sold  49,644 47,425 49,212 
          Other General Expenses  22,250 20,800 23,738 
Total Costs and Expenses  71,894 68,225 72,950 
 
 
   
Profit before Income Tax  8,070 7,335 13,270 
Provision for Income Tax  1,720 1,655 1,895 
Net Income  $6,350 $5,680 $11,375 
     
Balance Sheet     




   
        Current Assets 23,814 20,112 29,240 
        Non-current Assets  26,920 25,260 34,002 
Total Assets  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
LIABILITIES  
 
   
         Current Liabilities 9,140 9,880 8,550 
         Long-term Liabilities  11,243 11,450 11,003 
Total Liabilities  $20,383 $21,330 $19,553 
     
Total Stockholders' Equity  30,351 24,042 43,689 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
Sustainability Performance       
     2017 2016 2015 
Energy Usage (GJ)  344,502 390,200 422,400 
Cost savings due to reductions in energy usage ($)   462,345 202,196 186,765 
Carbon Emissions CO2 (tons)        
648,900 725,000 801,000 
Paper Usage per Employee  6,872 8,468 9,860 
Cost savings due to reductions in paper usage ($)  32,203 11,300 10,020 
Fresh Water Usage (gallons)  4,210,000 4,650,000 5,120,000 
Cost savings due to reductions in water usage ($)  148,605 109,420 98,280 
Number of Work Related Injuries  5 6 12 




Note:   
 Our sustainability indicators have all improved. This enhances our sustainability profile. 
 In addition to social and environmental benefits, total cost savings realized from sustainability 
activities in 2017 amount to $643,153, significantly contributing to our financial performance.  
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Sustainability Statement  
Apax Limited recognizes a growing responsibility to find solutions to environmental and climate 
change issues. We also recognize that good sustainability practices can have financial benefits for 
our company. As noted above, we have realized total cost savings of $643,153 from sustainability 





Sustainability ratings measure environmental and social responsibility of a frim. The Table below shows 
our Sustainability Rating score relative to the industry average. Our rating is “Excellent” or in Category 
A*. 
 
SUSTAINABILITY RATING SCORES 
 Apax Limited Industry Average 
Environmental Score 88.60 64.33 
Social Responsibility Score 92.55 70.20 
Governance Score 91.23 65.43 
Overall Sustainability Rating Score 90.79 66.84 
 
 





Key Sustainability Performance Indicators   
 
Energy Usage  
Total energy usage of 344,502 Gigajoules (GJ) in this year is 11.71% lower than last year’s energy 
consumption of 390,200 Gigajoules (GJ). Due to this reduction in energy usage, we realized an 
annual cost savings of $462,345, significantly improving our financial performance. Further, 






Total carbon emissions decreased 10.5% from 725,000 metric tons of CO2 in 2016 to 648,900 
metric tons of CO2 in 2017. The reductions in carbon emissions not only resulted in meaningful 
cost savings, but also enhanced our sustainability ratings.  
 
 
Paper Usage  
This year’s office paper usage per employee of 6,872 is 18.85% lower than last year’s office paper 
usage per employee of 8,468. This has resulted in a meaningful cost saving of $32,203, and 





We have identified water consumption as a significant driver of our sustainability performance and 
total overhead costs. Our water usage of 4.21 million gallons in this year is 9.46% lower than last 
year’s water usage of 4.65 million gallons. Cost savings realized from reductions in water usage is 
$148,605.
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Employee Health and Safety 
We take seriously our employees’ health and safety. Although we have reduced work related 
injuries significantly from 10 to 5 during the year, it is disappointing that we are still not reaching 
our goal of zero injuries. All five injuries were not life-threatening and we are pleased to report that 





Environmental Lawsuits  
Our business activities are subject to various federal and state laws and regulations relating to the 
protection of the environment. These laws and regulations require us to respond to certain 
environmental legal claims. At December 31, 2017 we have 11 ongoing environmental lawsuits, 
















































For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Management Discussion of Financial Results 
 
Apax Limited announces Annual Financial Results for the year ended December 31, 2017. 
The Company recorded net income of $6.35 million for the current fiscal year compared to 
$5.68 million in the previous year 2016, resulting in an 11.8% year-on-year increase.  
 
Despite this year-on-year increase, Apax’s financial results over the past three years 
have been mixed relative to industry peers. This mixed performance is caused by poor 
traffic of sales due to increased industry competition. 
 
The following table compares our performance indicators to the industry average: 
 
Key Performance Indicators  Apax Limited Industry Average 
Revenue Growth (From Prior Year) 5.83% 11.66% 
Earnings Growth (Last 5 Years) 6.72% 10.53% 
Return on Assets 8.42% 8.44% 
Total Debt/ Equity  67.16% 73.82% 




On the next page, you will view the Financial Statements of Apax Limited for the year 
ended December 31, 2017.  
 
 Only the Financial Information has been independently audited by a well-






Apax Limited discloses sustainability performance information in the Financial 
Statements. We do this integration to highlight the impact of our sustainability 










    




$     79,964  
 
$     75,560  
 
$     86,220  
Costs and Expenses  
   
          Cost of Goods Sold  49,644 47,425 49,212 
          Other General Expenses  22,250 20,800 23,738 
Total Costs and Expenses  71,894 68,225 72,950 
 
 
   
Profit before Income Tax  8,070 7,335 13,270 
Provision for Income Tax  1,720 1,655 1,895 
Net Income  $6,350 $5,680 $11,375 
     
Balance Sheet 
    




   
         Current Assets 23,814 20,112 29,240 
        Non-current Assets  26,920 25,260 34,002 
Total Assets  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
LIABILITIES  
 
   
         Current Liabilities 9,140 9,880 8,550 
         Long-term Liabilities  11,243 11,450 11,003 
Total Liabilities  $20,383 $21,330 $19,553 
  
   
Total Stockholders' Equity  30,351 24,042 43,689 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
Sustainability Performance     
  2017 2016 2015 
Energy Usage (GJ)  390,200 344,502 318,240 
Costs due to increase in energy usage ($)   262,345 202,196 156,179 
Carbon Emissions CO2 (tons)        725,000 648,900 587,331 
Paper Usage per Employee  8,468 6,872 5,902 
Costs due to increases in paper usage ($)  12,203 11,300 9,544 
Fresh Water Usage (gallons)  4,650,000 4,210,000 3,823,535 
Costs due to increase in water usage ($)  128,605 109,420 88,923 
Number of Work Related Injuries  10 5 14 
Number of Ongoing Environmental Lawsuits  13 11 6 
 
Note:   
 Our sustainability indicators show negative trend. This damages our sustainability profile. 
 In addition to negative environmental and social effects, total cost of sustainability activities 
in 2017 amount to $643,153, having significant negative impact on our financial performance.  
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Sustainability Statement  
Apax Limited recognizes a growing responsibility to find solutions to environmental and climate 
change issues. We also recognize that our sustainability practices have direct impact on our 
financial performance. As noted above, additional costs due to increase in sustainability indicators 





Sustainability ratings measure environmental and social responsibility of a frim. The Table below 




 Apax Limited Industry Average 
Environmental Score 24.11 64.33 
Social Responsibility Score 30.20 70.20 
Governance Score 35.42 65.43 
Overall Sustainability Rating Score 29.91 66.84 
 
 








Energy Usage  
Total energy usage of 390,200 Gigajoules (GJ) in this year is 11.71% higher than last year’s 
344,502 Gigajoules (GJ). This has increased our operating expenses by $462,345, consequently 
undermining the overall reported financial performance in 2017. We also recognize that this 




Total carbon emissions increased 10.5% to 725,000 metric tons of CO2 in 2017 from 648,900 metric 
tons of CO2 in 2016. The increase in carbon emissions not only contributed to increases in energy 
costs, but also negatively affected our sustainability ratings as well as carbon emission targets. 
 
 
Paper Usage  
This year’s office paper usage per employee of 8,468 is 18.85% higher than last year’s paper usage 
per employee of 6,872. The increase in paper usage has increased our operating expenses by 
$32,203. The increase in paper usage has negatively affected our financial performance and 




We have identified water consumption as a significant driver of our sustainability performance and 
total overhead costs. Our water usage of 4.65 million gallons is 9.46% higher than last year’s water 
usage of 4.21 million gallons. The increase in water usage has increased our operational cost by 
$148,605. 
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Employee Health and Safety 
We take seriously our employees’ health and safety. Although we have reduced work related 
injuries significantly in the past, it is disappointing to report that we had 10 injuries during the year, 
compared to 5 injuries last year. Our goal of zero injuries remains management’s priority. All the 
injuries were not life-threatening and we are pleased to report that the employees will soon return 
to work.  
 
 
Environmental Lawsuits  
Our business activities are subject to various federal and state laws and regulations relating to the 
protection of the environment. These laws and regulations require us to respond to certain 
environmental legal claims. At December 31, 2017 we have 13 ongoing environmental lawsuits, 











































For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Management Discussion of Financial Results 
 
Apax Limited announces Annual Financial Results for the year ended December 31, 2017. 
The Company recorded net income of $6.35 million for the current fiscal year compared to 
$5.68 million in the previous year 2016, resulting in an 11.8% year-on-year increase.  
 
Despite this year-on-year increase, Apax’s financial results over the past three years 
have been mixed relative to industry peers. This mixed performance is caused by poor 
traffic of sales due to increased industry competition. 
 
The following table compares our performance indicators to the industry average: 
 
Key Performance Indicators  Apax Limited Industry Average 
Revenue Growth (From Prior Year) 5.83% 11.66% 
Earnings Growth (Last 5 Years) 6.72% 10.53% 
Return on Assets 8.42% 8.44% 
Total Debt/ Equity  67.16% 73.82% 







On the next page, you will view the Financial Statements of Apax Limited for the year 




 Only the Financial Information has been independently audited by a well-









For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Income Statement     
(Amount in  Thousands)     
 




$     79,964  
 
$     75,560  
 
$     86,220  
Costs and Expenses  
   
          Cost of Goods Sold  49,644 47,425 49,212 
          Other General Expenses  22,250 20,800 23,738 
Total Costs and Expenses  71,894 68,225 72,950 
 
 
   
Profit before Income Tax  8,070 7,335 13,270 
Provision for Income Tax  1,720 1,655 1,895 
Net Income  $6,350 $5,680 $11,375 
     
Balance Sheet     
(Amount in  Thousands)     
  2017 2016 2015 
ASSETS 
 
   
        Current Assets 23,814 20,112 29,240 
        Non-current Assets  26,920 25,260 34,002 
Total Assets  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
LIABILITIES  
 
   
         Current Liabilities 9,140 9,880 8,550 
         Long-term Liabilities  11,243 11,450 11,003 
Total Liabilities  $20,383 $21,330 $19,553 
  
   
Total Stockholders' Equity  30,351 24,042 43,689 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 













[To strengthen the separate report manipulation, after viewing the above financial 






Please give your opinion on the financial performance of Apax Limited: 
o Good performance  
o Average performance  







On the next page you will view the Sustainability Report of Apax Limited for the year 


























Our Sustainability Report includes a summary of key sustainability performance indicators 
and management’s discussion of key indicators as of December 31, 2017.  
 
Sustainability Statement  
Apax Limited recognizes a growing responsibility to find solutions to environmental and climate 
change issues. We also recognize that our sustainability practices have direct impact on our 
financial performance.  
 
Sustainability Rating 
Sustainability ratings measure environmental and social responsibility of a frim. The Table below shows 




SUSTAINABILITY RATING SCORES 
 Apax Limited Industry Average 
Environmental Score 88.60 64.33 
Social Responsibility Score 92.55 70.20 
Governance Score 91.23 65.43 
Overall Sustainability Rating Score 90.79 66.84 
 
 




Key Sustainability Performance Indicators   
(Figures are stated in full)  2017 2016 2015 
 
Energy Usage (GJ)  
344,502 390,200 422,400 
Savings due to reductions in energy usage ($)   462,345 202,196 186,765 
Carbon Emissions CO2 (tons)        648,900 725,000 801,000 
Paper Usage per Employee  6,872 8,468 9,860 
Savings due to reductions in paper usage ($)  32,203 11,300 10,020 
Fresh Water Usage (gallons)  4,210,000 4,650,000 5,120,000 
Savings due to reductions in water usage ($)  148,605 109,420 98,280 
Number of Work Related Injuries  5 10 14 
Number of Ongoing Environmental Lawsuits  11 13 24 
 
 
   
 
Energy Usage  
Total energy usage of 344,502 Gigajoules (GJ) in this year is 11.71% lower than last year’s energy 
consumption of 390,200 Gigajoules (GJ). Due to this reduction in energy usage, we realized an 
annual cost savings of $462,345, significantly improving our financial performance. Further, 





Total carbon emissions decreased 10.5% from 725,000 metric tons of CO2 in 2016 to 648,900 
metric tons of CO2 in 2017. The reductions in carbon emissions not only resulted in meaningful 
cost savings, but also enhanced our sustainability ratings.  
 
 
Paper Usage  
This year’s office paper usage per employee of 6,872 is 18.85% lower than last year’s office paper 
usage per employee of 8,468. This has resulted in a meaningful cost saving of $32,203, and 





We have identified water consumption as a significant driver of our sustainability performance and 
total overhead costs. Our water usage of 4.21 million gallons in this year is 9.46% lower than last 
year’s water usage of 4.65 million gallons. The resultant avoided operational cost is $148,605, 




Employee Health and Safety 
We take seriously our employees’ health and safety. Although we have reduced work related 
injuries significantly from 10 to 5 during the year, it is disappointing that we are still not reaching 
our goal of zero injuries. All five injuries were not life-threatening and we are pleased to report that 





Environmental Lawsuits  
Our business activities are subject to various federal and state laws and regulations relating to the 
protection of the environment. These laws and regulations require us to respond to certain 
environmental legal claims. At December 31, 2017 we have 11 ongoing environmental lawsuits, 

























For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Management Discussion of Financial Results 
 
Apax Limited announces Annual Financial Results for the year ended December 31, 2017. 
The Company recorded net income of $6.35 million for the current fiscal year compared to 
$5.68 million in the previous year 2016, resulting in an 11.8% year-on-year increase.  
 
Despite this year-on-year increase, Apax’s financial results over the past three years 
have been mixed relative to industry peers. This mixed performance is caused by poor 
traffic of sales due to increased industry competition. 
 
The following table compares our performance indicators to the industry average: 
 
Key Performance Indicators  Apax Limited Industry Average 
Revenue Growth (From Prior Year) 5.83% 11.66% 
Earnings Growth (Last 5 Years) 6.72% 10.53% 
Return on Assets 8.42% 8.44% 
Total Debt/ Equity  67.16% 73.82% 







On the next page, you will view the Financial Statements of Apax Limited for the year 




 Only the Financial Information has been independently audited by a well-









For the Year Ended December 31, 2017 
 
 
Income Statement     
(Amount in  Thousands)     
 




$     79,964  
 
$     75,560  
 
$     86,220  
Costs and Expenses  
   
          Cost of Goods Sold  49,644 47,425 49,212 
          Other General Expenses  22,250 20,800 23,738 
Total Costs and Expenses  71,894 68,225 72,950 
 
 
   
Profit before Income Tax  8,070 7,335 13,270 
Provision for Income Tax  1,720 1,655 1,895 
Net Income  $6,350 $5,680 $11,375 
     
Balance Sheet     
(Amount in  Thousands)     
  2017 2016 2015 
ASSETS 
 
   
        Current Assets 23,814 20,112 29,240 
        Non-current Assets  26,920 25,260 34,002 
Total Assets  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 
     
LIABILITIES  
 
   
         Current Liabilities 9,140 9,880 8,550 
         Long-term Liabilities  11,243 11,450 11,003 
Total Liabilities  $20,383 $21,330 $19,553 
  
   
Total Stockholders' Equity  30,351 24,042 43,689 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity  $50,734 $45,372 $63,242 















[To strengthen the separate report manipulation, after viewing the above financial 






Please give your opinion on the financial performance of Apax Limited: 
o Good performance  
o Average performance  







On the next page you will view the Sustainability Report of Apax Limited for the year 
























Our Sustainability Report includes a summary of key sustainability performance indicators 
and management’s discussion of key indicators as of December 31, 2017.  
 
 
Sustainability Statement  
Apax Limited recognizes a growing responsibility to find solutions to environmental and climate 
change issues. We also recognize that our sustainability practices have direct impact on our 
financial performance.  
 
Sustainability Rating 
Sustainability ratings measure environmental and social responsibility of a frim. The Table below 





 Apax Limited Industry Average 
Environmental Score 24.11 64.33 
Social Responsibility Score 30.20 70.20 
Governance Score 35.42 65.43 
Overall Sustainability Rating Score 29.91 66.84 
 
 





Key Sustainability Performance Indicators     
(Figures are stated in full)  2017 2016 2015 
 
Energy Usage (GJ) 
 390,200 344,502 318,240 
Costs due to increase in energy usage ($)   462,345 202,196 156,179 
Carbon Emissions CO2 (tons)        725,000 648,900 587,331 
Paper Usage per Employee  8,468 6,872 5,902 
Costs due to increases in paper usage ($)  32,203 11,300 9,544 
Fresh Water Usage (gallons)  4,650,000 4,210,000 3,823,535 
Costs due to increase in water usage ($)  148,605 109,420 88,923 
Number of Work Related Injuries  10 5 14 
Number of Ongoing Environmental Lawsuits  13 11 6 
     
Energy Usage  
Total energy usage of 390,200 Gigajoules (GJ) in this year is 11.71% higher than last year’s 
344,502 Gigajoules (GJ). This has increased our operating expenses by $462,345, consequently 
undermining the overall reported financial performance in 2017. We also recognize that this 




Total carbon emissions increased 10.5% to 725,000 metric tons of CO2 in 2017 from 648,900 metric 
tons of CO2 in 2016. The increase in carbon emissions not only contributed to increases in energy 




Paper Usage  
This year’s office paper usage per employee of 8,468 is 18.85% higher than last year’s paper usage 
per employee of 6,872. The increase in paper usage has increased our operating expenses by 
$32,203. The increase in paper usage has negatively affected our financial performance and 





We have identified water consumption as a significant driver of our sustainability performance and 
total overhead costs. Our water usage of 4.65 million gallons is 9.46% higher than last year’s water 
usage of 4.21 million gallons. The increase in water consumption has increased our operational cost 
by $148,605. It has also decreased our sustainability ratings, and hinders our conservation efforts 




Employee Health and Safety 
We take seriously our employees’ health and safety. Although we have reduced work related 
injuries significantly in the past, it is disappointing to report that we had 10 injuries during the year, 
compared to 5 injuries last year. Our goal of zero injuries remains management’s priority. All the 
injuries were not life-threatening and we are pleased to report that the employees will soon return 




Environmental Lawsuits  
Our business activities are subject to various federal and state laws and regulations relating to the 
protection of the environment. These laws and regulations require us to respond to certain 
environmental legal claims. At December 31, 2017 we have 13 ongoing environmental lawsuits, 






















Question: Firm Value Estimates  
Directions: To answer the following questions, please consider the information about Apax 
Limited you have read: 
 
1. Before the information was released, the share price of Apax Limited was $4.60. Based 
on the performance of the Company, what are your predictions of the share price upon 
release of the reports? 
 
o Increase ( ) 
o Decrease ( ) 
o No Change  ( ) 
 
 
2. If you believe that the share price of Apax Limited will increase or decrease, please 
indicate by how much in percentage terms?  
 








Question: Willingness to Invest 
 
3. How attractive is Apax Limited as a potential investment? 
 
  Not at all Attractive                                                  Very Attractive 
 Attractiveness of Apax Limited as a 
potential investment is: 




4. Assume you have $10,000 to invest in the Industrial and Engineering Sector. What 
percentage of this $10,000 will you invest in Apax Limited’s stock? 
 
  Nothing at All                                                                                       Entire Amount 
 My investment in Apax 
Limited would be: 






Question: Disclosure Reliance  
 
5. Please give your opinion on the reliability of Apax Limited's reported information: 
 
  Not at all reliable                                              Extremely reliable 
 The reliability of Financial information is:  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 The reliability of Sustainability information 
is: 




Question: Disclosure Relevance   
 
 
6. Please indicate the relevance of Apax Limited's information to your investment judgements: 
 
  Not at all relevant                                              Extremely relevant 
 The relevance of Financial information to my 
investment judgement is: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 The relevance of Sustainability information to 
my investment judgement is: 




Question: Influence of Sustainability Matters   
 
7. To what extent did the sustainability performance of Apax Limited influence your judgements? 
 
  Nothing at all                                                                Completely 
 Influence of the sustainability performance 
on my investment judgement is: 





Question: Processing Ease  
 
8. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:  
  
  Strongly Disagree                                                  Strongly Agree 
 Sustainability information of Apax Limited 
is easy to process 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Sustainability information of Apax Limited 
is difficult to understand  








Question: Apax Limited’s Social Reputation   
 
9. Based on the sustainability information provided, please give your opinion on the social and 
environmental reputation of Apax Limited. 
 
  Very Low                                                                           Very High 
 Apax Limited’s social and environmental 
reputation is:  




Questions: Management Competence and Credibility                   
    
10. How competent do you believe the management of Apax Limited to be? 
 
  Not at all Competent                                                 Very Competent 
 The management of Apax Limited is 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
11. How trustworthy do you believe the management of Apax Limited to be? 
 
  Not at all Trustworthy                                               Very Trustworthy 









12. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following four 
statements  
  
  Strongly Disagree                                               Strongly Agree 
 I was happy with Apax Limited’s 
sustainability performance 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 I was upset with Apax Limited’s 
sustainability performance 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 I was disappointed with Apax Limited’s 
sustainability performance 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 I was pleased with Apax Limited’s 
sustainability performance 













Questions: Manipulation Checks 
 
Please answer the following questions about the case materials, to the best of your 
recollections. 
 
1. Apax Limited’s net income from 2016 to 2017 
 
o Increased  
o Decreased  
o Remained Constant  
 
 















4. Sustainability information of Apax Limited was reported in:  
 
o Financial Statements 
o Separate Sustainability Report 
o Not Sure  
 
 
5. Sustainability information of Apax Limited was: 
 
o Assured 
o Not Assured 
















Questions: Post-task Questions  
 
Please answer the following demographical questions. 
 
1. What is your sex?  
o Male 
o Female  
 
 





o 55 or Older  
 
 
3. What is your native language? 
o English  
o Other language 
 
 
5. How many Accounting courses have you taken?  
o 0 
o 1-5  
o 6-10 
o I majored in Accounting  
 
 
6. How many Finance courses have you taken?  
o 0 
o 1-5  
o 6-10 
o I majored in Finance  
 
 
7. Please rate your own knowledge of the meaning and interpretation of financial 
statements. 
 
  Incompetent                                                           Very Competent 
 My knowledge of the meaning and 
interpretation of financial statements is: 





8.  Please indicate if you are Strongly Liberal (1), Neutral (6), or Strongly Conservative 
(11).  
 
  Strongly Liberal   Neutral   Strongly Conservative 




9. How many full time years of working experience do you have? 
o 0 
o 1-5  
o 6-10 
o 11-15 
o More than 15 Years 
 
 
10. How many times have you assessed a company’s financial performance by analyzing 
its financial statements? 
o This is my first time 
o 1 – 5 times 
o 6 – 10 times 
o More than 10 times 
 
 
11. How many times have you assessed a company’s sustainability performance by 
analyzing its sustainability disclosures? 
o This is my first time 
o 1 – 5 times 
o 6 – 10 times 
o More than 10 times 
 
 
12. Have you ever bought or sold an individual company’s common stock or debt 





13. Do you plan to invest in an individual company’s common stock or debt securities in 








14. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: 
 
  Strongly Disagree                                             Strongly Agree 
 I carefully look at sustainability disclosures 
of companies before I invest in companies 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 I perceive sustainability risk as 
“significant” risk for my investment 
decisions 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Sustainability performance of companies is 
NOT really an important factor for my 
investment decisions 




15. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: 
 
  Strongly Disagree                                             Strongly Agree 
 I strongly believe that companies should 
sacrifice profitability to preserve the 
environment 











Thank you very much for your participation. 
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The overarching objective of this dissertation is to examine the economic and behavioral 
implications of CSR reporting regulations and standards. The focus of prior research has 
been predominantly the causes and consequences of CSR reporting in voluntary settings. 
This dissertation expands research on CSR reporting by considering the implications of 
CSR reporting regulations. This Chapter summarizes the main research findings of the 
studies in this dissertation. The Chapter also discusses the implications of these findings to 
theory, policy issues, and practice. Finally, the Chapter highlights several limitations which 
raise important opportunities for future research. 
 
5.2 Summary of Research Findings  
This dissertation contains three distinct studies with a focus on CSR reporting regulations. 
The first study in Chapter Two reviews over 100 empirical studies in accounting, finance, 
economics, law and management to evaluate consequences of CSR reporting regulations. 
Specifically, Study One assesses the impact of the regulations on (1) reporting quality, (2) 
capital-markets and (3) firm behavior.  Study One also describes key developments and 
regulatory objectives of the CSR reporting regulations across countries and finds that the 
regulations (i) reflect the socio-economic development of the countries and (ii) vary 
systematically across countries. The review highlights that most countries implement CSR 
reporting regulations that contain ‘comply-or-explain’ clauses. 
 Despite the comply-or-explain nature of the regulations, studies find strong adverse 
capital-market reactions around legislative events leading up to the CSR reporting 
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regulations. A separate line of archival research documents evidence supporting real 
effects, consistent with the CSR reporting regulations changing firm behavior. However, 
reporting quality appears to have remained low after the regulations. One important insight 
from the first study in this dissertation is that the shift from voluntary to mandatory CSR 
reporting has affected real operational activities of affected firms, which in turn give rise 
to social externalities. 
Study Two in Chapter 3 builds on the insights from Study One and examines 
whether comply-or-explain regulation affects managers’ evaluations of new disclosure 
matters affecting the firm’s underlying economics, and how comply-or-explain regulation 
interacts with the firm’s prior disclosure norms (known to be biased toward no disclosure 
versus unknown). Using an experiment with experienced managers, Study Two shows that 
managers are more likely to make disclosure of a negative event in a comply-or-explain 
regime than in a voluntary regime, and that this effect is greater when the firm’s prior 
disclosure policy is unknown than when it is known to be biased toward less disclosure. 
Further analyses suggest that the effect of comply-or-explain regulation on managers’ 
disclosure judgements operates through managers’ perceived accountability.  
The final and third study in Chapter 4 examines how integrating CSR performance 
measures in financial reports relative to reporting in separate standalone reports affects 
investors’ firm value estimates. Category construction theory in cognitive psychology 
predicts that integrated (separate) reporting causes investors to adopt a unidimensional 
(multidimensional) perspective, which consequently decreases (increases) the vividness of 
CSR information. Results of Study Three are consistent with this theoretical prediction. 
Also consistent with this theory that categories trigger people to treat items of the same 
category as equivalent, Study Three shows that more investors misclassified CSR 
information as assured when integrated in a financial report relative to when reported in a 
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separate report. Consequently, misclassifying investors rated CSR disclosure credibility 
higher and derived significantly higher firm value estimates compared to investors who 
correctly classified this information as non-assured. Collectively, the findings of Study 
Three highlight potential costs of integrated reporting and suggest that integrating CSR 
information in financial reports diminishes CSR performance and affects investors’ 
perceived assurance of CSR information. Figure 5.1 below provides a summary figure 
integrating the studies of this dissertation.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: A summary figure integrating the studies of the dissertation 
 
Note: Figure 5.1 summarizes and integrates the three studies of this dissertation. Insights 
from Study One that CSR reporting regulations are heterogeneous across countries and give 
rise to alternative CSR reporting frameworks inform Study Two and Study Three. Also, 
results from Study Two that experienced corporate managers recommend disclosure of a 
negative CSR event affecting the firm’s underlying economics in a regulatory context inform 
the experimental design of Study Three. Collectively, the results of this dissertation inform 




5.3 Research Implications  
5.3.1 Theoretical Contributions  
The studies in this dissertation offer a number of theoretical contributions. First, research 
in psychology and accounting has long demonstrated that people – including accounting 
professionals – engage in motivated reasoning to arrive at conclusions consistent with pre-
existing preferences (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Kadous, Magro, and Spilker 2008; Kunda 
1990; Wilks 2002). Study Two in Chapter 3 provides evidence suggesting that comply-or-
explain disclosure regulation may constrain motivated reasoning of managers. Specifically, 
comply-or-explain regulations may constrain managers’ motivated reasoning through the 
explain clause by increasing managers’ perceived accountability. Prior psychology and 
legal research demonstrate that reason writing - or the pressure to justify one’s decision to 
others - increases human cognitive process and makes people become more accountable 
when making decisions (Liu 2018; Sieck and Yates 1997; Tetlock 1983). Thus, reason 
writing reduces decision bias (Cohen 2015; Oldfather 2007; Paxton, Ungar, and Greene 
2012; Posner 1995). Therefore, Study Two in this dissertation provides theory-consistent 
debasing mechanism (i.e., reason writing) that potentially constrains motivated reasoning 
in corporate disclosure settings.   
 Second, accountability theory posits that subordinates confirm to the known 
preferences of their supervisors (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Study Two considers a setting 
where there is a conflict between the preferences of subordinates and supervisors, and 
shows that subordinates may not confirm to the known preferences of their supervisors 
when they have their own preferences.   
Finally, Study Three in Chapter 4 contributes to the theory of category construction 
in psychology. Category construction theory suggests that categories trigger perspectives, 
such that people adopt a “unidimensional” perspective or “multidimensional” perspective 
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(Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson 1987; Spalding and Murphy 1996). Study Three 
reports the results of an experiment in a firm valuation setting examining the impact of 
integrating CSR performance measures in financial reports relative to reporting in separate 
reports. Consistent with category construction theory, the results indicate that alternative 
reporting formats can cause investors to adopt a unidimensional or multidimensional 
perspective. An important theoretical contribution is that effects of categorical cues extend 
to firm valuation settings, which has not been examined in prior research. 
 
5.3.2 Policy Contributions 
As noted in Study One in Chapter 2, an increasing number of countries have mandated 
CSR reporting for all or a subset of listed firms (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2019; Ho 
2017). Specifically, regulators in several jurisdictions such as the EU, India, Singapore and 
South Africa have introduced CSR reporting regulations that contain comply-or-explain 
clauses. Other countries such as China and the UK adopted mandatory CSR reporting 
requirements. However, other regulators such the SEC remain critical of adopting CSR 
reporting requirements (SEC 2010, 2016). In a public release, the SEC sough public 
feedback for several policy questions including “If we were to adopt specific disclosure 
requirements involving sustainability or public policy issues, how could our rules elicit 
meaningful disclosure on such issues?” (SEC 2016, p. 213). In addition, the commission 
expresses a concern that adopting line-item CSR disclosure requirements could cause 
registrants to disclose information that is not material to investors. Based on this concern, 
the SEC seeks feedback for the question of “How could we create a disclosure framework 
that would be flexible enough to address such issues as they evolve over time?” (SEC 2016, 
p. 213). 
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Study Two address these questions in an experiment with experienced corporate 
managers. Specifically, Study Two examines the impact of comply-or-explain disclosure 
regulation on managers’ evaluations of negative disclosure events affecting the firm’s 
underlying economics, and whether the firm’s prior disclosure norms moderates effects of 
comply-or-explain regulations. The results indicate that managers are more likely to make 
disclosure of a negative event in a comply-or-explain regulation relative to a voluntary 
regime. The positive effect of comply-or-explain disclosure regulation on mangers’ 
disclosure recommendations is greater when the firm’s prior disclosure policy is unknown 
than when it is known to be biased toward no disclosure. The results also indicate that 
managers’ personal views on CSR issues interact with comply-or-explain regulations, such 
that managers are more likely to make disclosure of a negative event when they are 
personally supportive of CSR issues than when they are not. These findings inform the 
SEC and other global regulators that the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain as a 
disclosure regulation is contingent on pre-existing firm and personal preferences toward 
CSR disclosure issues.  
Study Three addresses existing policy questions on how integrating CSR 
performance measures in financial reports affects investors’ judgements. Regulators in 
South Africa and the UK have mandated integrated reporting while regulators in other 
countries such as China and Singapore require public listed firms to publish a separate CSR 
report. Regulators in Australia and the EU are flexible about CSR reporting format so long 
firms disclose mandated CSR information. In addition, the SEC is presently seeking public 
feedback on the question of “How important to investors is integrated reporting, as opposed 
to separate financial and sustainability reporting?” (SEC 2016, 214). Motivated by the 
ongoing interest across the world by standard setters and regulators into integrated 
reporting, Study Three examines how integrating CSR performance measures in financial 
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reports relative to reporting in separate CSR reports affects investors’ firm value estimates. 
The results reveal that CSR performance measures have greater impact on investors’ firm 
value estimates when reported in a separate report than when integrated in a financial 
report. Further analyses indicate that more investors misclassified CSR performance 
measures as assured, consequently arriving at higher CSR disclosure credibility and firm 
value assessments. These results should be informative to the SEC and other global 
regulators as they consider alternative CSR reporting frameworks. Specifically, as more 
and more firms incorporate non-assured CSR performance measures in their financial 
reports or obtain assurance on ‘selected’ CSR indicators, regulators may want to consider 
mandating firms to explicitly label their CSR measures as ‘non-assured’ or ‘assured’ to 
mitigate investors potentially misclassifying these non-assured CSR measures as assured.    
 
5.3.3 Practical Contributions 
The studies in this dissertation also offer several practical contributions. One of the findings 
in Study Two is that managers’ personal views on CSR issues influence their disclosure 
judgements. This finding has important implications for board of directors and audit 
committees relying on managers’ CSR disclosure recommendations. Specifically, while 
CSR activities and disclosures reflect corporate actions, “it is the individuals within firms 
who actually create, implement, sustain, or avoid such policies and act” (Christensen, 
Mackey, and Whetten 2014, p. 165). Board of directors and audit committees may therefore 
want to understand managerial CSR preferences to ensure that CSR disclosure decisions 
are optimal and informative to relevant stakeholders. 
Study Three reveals that investors misclassify CSR performance measures as 
assured when integrated in financial reports relative to when reported in separate reports, 
consequently increasing investors’ perceived disclosure credibility and firm value 
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estimates. This finding has practical implications for users of financial reports and CSR 
assurance providers. The findings highlight to the users of financial reports to be cautious 
of performance metrics in financial reports since all performance indicators are not 
necessarily audited. For CSR assurance providers, the findings imply that firm managers 
may strategically obtain assurance for selected CSR performance indicators to influence 
investors’ perceptions of other non-assured CSR performance measures. As such, CSR 
assurance providers may want to specify which CSR performance measures they have 
audited in their assurance statement to avoid potential lawsuit of investors.   
Finally, the results of Study Three has important implications for the integrated 
reporting campaign and CSR reporting standard-setting. Specifically, nongovernmental 
bodies such as the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB) continue to promote integrating financially-material 
CSR performance measures in regulated financial reports. However, Study Three shows 
that CSR performance measures have greater impact on investors when reported in separate 
reports compared to when integrated in financial reports.  
 
5.4 Research Limitations  
The results and implications of the studies in this dissertation should be interpreted in light 
of several limitations. Study Two and Three of this dissertation use experimental method. 
A comparative advantage of the experimental approach over other methods such as archival 
method is the ability to provide empirical evidence on an ex ante basis to standard-setting 
bodies and regulators on proposed changes to existing reporting standards and regulations 
(Elliott 2015; Kachelmeier and King 2002; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). This is 
important because ex ante empirical evidence informs the design of new regulation by 
highlighting the intended and unintended consequences of new regulation, thus potentially 
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mitigating the costs of unintended consequences (Kachelmeier and King 2002; Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016).  Nonetheless, experimental researchers face a trade-off between internal 
and external validity, and often maximize internal validity at the expense of external 
validity (Bloomfield, Nelson, and Soltes 2016; Elliott 2015). As such, the studies of this 
dissertation relied on simplified but tightly controlled experimental setting to maximize 
internal validity. Elliott (2015, p. 529) notes that “[While the simplified experimental 
setting may not precisely mimic the real environment in which individuals make these 
judgments and decisions, the simplification is an advantage rather than a disadvantage89”.     
As CSR reporting regulations mature, future research using alternative research 
methods may expand on the findings of this dissertation in several ways. First, despite the 
growing popularity of comply-or-explain disclosure regulations worldwide, empirical 
evidence on this type of disclosure regulation is still scarce (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
2019). This includes the effect of comply-or-explain regulations on reporting quality, 
capital-markets and/or firm behavior. Second, as more and more firms integrate their CSR 
performance measures in regulated financial reports (Cohen et al. 2012; KPMG 2017), 
future research could examine whether more integrated reporting affects reporting 
complexity. Finally, the integrated reporting literature has largely focused on capital-
market reactions to integrated reporting (Barth et al. 2017; Lee and Yeo 2016). Little is still 
known about the real effects of integrated reporting, specifically whether CSR performance 
of affected firms changes as a result of mandated integrated reporting (Christensen et al. 
2017; Downar et al. 2019). 
 
 
                                                          
89 This is because the experimental method exhibits randomization, tightly controlled setting and 
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